Rittenhouse Entm't, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, Civil No. 3:11-CV-00617

RITTENHOUSE ENTERTAINMENT, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF WILKES-BARRE, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 3:11-CV-00617

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

May 7, 2021

Judge Jennifer P. Wilson

MEMORANDUM

This is a civil rights case that is currently before the court on remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit with instructions to consider whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and whether Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' tortious interference with a contract claim. For the reasons that follow, summary judgment as to the remaining Defendants is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Thomas J. Greco ("Greco") is the owner or principal of several companies, including Rittenhouse Entertainment, Inc. ("Rittenhouse"), The Mines, Inc. ("The Mines"), G Net Comm. Co. Inc. ("G Net"), and Phoenix Estates ("Phoenix"), all of which are named as plaintiffs in this action. (See Doc. 36 ¶¶ 1-5.) The facts of this case primarily concern The Mines, which is the owner and operator of a nightclub of the same name located in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.¹ (Id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs allege generally that Defendants have acted in a concerted effort to violate The Mines' constitutional rights by selectively enforcing state and local laws against The Mines and that this selective enforcement was motivated by racial animus due to the fact that The Mines served significantly more Black and Hispanic customers than other similarly situated nightclubs in the same geographic area.

Plaintiffs first filed suit on April 4, 2011, bringing eight claims for relief against seventeen defendants. (Doc. 1.) The named defendants were the City of Wilkes-Barre ("Wilkes-Barre" or "the City"); Thomas Leighton ("Leighton"), who was the mayor of the City at all times relevant to this case; Gerry Dessoye ("Dessoye"), who was the City's chief of police at all relevant times; J.J. Murphy ("Murphy"), who was the city administrator at all relevant times; Butch Frati ("Frati"), who was the City's director of operations at all relevant times; Tony Thomas, Jr., Kathy Kane, William Barrett, Rick Cronauer, and Michael Merritt (collectively referred to as "the City Council Defendants"), who all served on the Wilkes-Barre City Council during the period of time relevant to this case; King's College, which is a private college located across the street from The Mines inWilkes-Barre; Thomas J. O'Hara ("O'Hara"), who was the president of King's College at all relevant times; Robert McGonigle ("McGonigle"), who was associate vice president for student affairs and the dean of students at King's College at all relevant times; Paul Lindenmuth ("Lindenmuth"), who was the chair of King's College's criminal justice and sociology department at all relevant times; John McAndrew ("McAndrew"), who was the King's College director of public relations² at all relevant times; Luzerne County ("Luzerne County" or "the county"); and Michael Savokinas ("Savokinas"), who was the sheriff of Luzerne County at all relevant times. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 6-18; Doc. 139, ¶ 139.)

Defendants divided into three separate groups, all of which moved to dismiss the complaint. The City Defendants (Wilkes-Barre, Leighton, Dessoye, Murphy, Frati, Thomas, Kane, Barrett, Cronauer, and Merritt) moved to dismiss the complaint on June 6, 2011. (Doc. 12.) The College Defendants (King's College, O'Hara, McGonigle, Lindenmuth, and McAndrew) moved to dismiss on the same day. (Doc. 13.) The County Defendants (Luzerne County and Savokinas) moved to dismiss on June 15, 2011. (Doc. 15.)

United States District Judge A. Richard Caputo granted the motions to dismiss in part and denied them in part on March 19, 2012, and granted Plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint. (Docs. 31, 32.) Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint on April 6, 2012. (Doc. 36.)

In the amended complaint, which remains the operative pleading in this case, Plaintiffs raised six causes of action against the Defendants. In Count I, Plaintiffs raised a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 for violation of the Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. ¶¶ 103-07.) In Count II, Plaintiffs raised a claim for retaliation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1985. (Id. ¶¶ 108-09.) In Count III, Plaintiffs raised a claim for violation of their right to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. ¶¶ 110-11.) In Count IV, Plaintiffs Greco, G Net, and Phoenix Estates raised due process and equal protection claims arising from the City Defendants' alleged interference with the Plaintiffs' efforts to secure benefits and development funding under the Keystone Opportunity Zone ("KOZ") program. (Id. ¶¶ 112-13.) In Count V, Plaintiffs raised several state tort law claims against all individual City and College Defendants, including tortious interference, trade disparagement, and defamation. (Id. ¶¶ 114-15.) In Count VI, Plaintiff Greco raised a claim for retaliation against Defendants Leighton and Dessoye, alleging that they had selectively prosecuted him for a felony inretaliation for his complaints regarding the City's treatment of The Mines. (Id. ¶¶ 116-20.)

All defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint on April 20, 2012. (Docs. 39-41.) Judge Caputo addressed the motions through a memorandum and order on June 4, 2012, granting the motions in part and denying them in part. (Docs. 59-60.) Specifically, Judge Caputo: (1) dismissed Count I of the amended complaint to the extent that it was raised by Plaintiffs Greco and Rittenhouse; (2) dismissed Count I to the extent that it raised a § 1985 claim against the County Defendants; (3) dismissed Count II to the extent that it was raised against the County Defendants; (4) dismissed Count II to the extent that it was raised by Plaintiff Rittenhouse; (5) dismissed Count II to the extent that it raised § 1981 and § 1982 claims against the City Council Defendants, Defendant Murphy, or Defendant Frati; and (6) dismissed Count V to the extent that it raised trade disparagement and defamation claims.³ (Doc. 59.) Defendants then answered the amended complaint on September 6, 2012. (Docs. 62-64.)

Following the close of fact discovery, all three groups of Defendants moved for summary judgment as to all remaining claims. (Docs. 135, 138, 141.) JudgeCaputo addressed the motions for summary judgment in a memorandum and order on August 8, 2018. (Docs. 201-02.) Judge Caputo granted summary judgment as to all remaining federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim in light of his grant of summary judgment on the federal claims. (Doc. 201.) Plaintiffs appealed. (Doc. 203.)

On appeal, the Third Circuit vacated and remanded in part and affirmed in part. Rittenhouse Entm't, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 782 F. App'x 148, 150 (3d Cir. 2019). The Third Circuit found that summary judgment was inappropriate as to the claims raised in Counts I, II, and III against the City and College Defendants and accordingly vacated and remanded for further proceedings on those claims. Id. at 153-54. The Third Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment as to all claims raised against the County Defendants and all claims raised in Counts IV and VI. Id. at 155-56. Because the Third Circuit vacated and remanded as to some of Plaintiffs' federal claims, the court additionally vacated Judge Caputo's decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the tortious interference claim and remanded for further proceedings on that claim. Id. at 156 n.6. The Third Circuit accordingly instructed the district court on remand to consider two issues that had been raised before Judge Caputo but on which Judge Caputo had not ruled: (a) whether the City Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to theremaining federal claims and (b) whether the remaining Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' tortious interference claim. Id. at 156 nn.5-6.⁴

Following remand from the Third Circuit, the case was reassigned to the undersigned on June 1, 2020. The court ordered supplemental briefing on the qualified immunity and tortious interference issues on June 17, 2020. (Doc. 215.) Defendants⁵ filed briefs arguing that they should be granted summary judgment on August 14, 2020 and August 17, 2020. (Docs. 221-22.) Plaintiffs filed opposition briefs on September 11, 2020. (Docs. 225-26.) Defendants filed reply briefs on October 9, 2020 and October 23, 2020. (Docs. 236-37.) Accordingly, thequalified immunity and tortious interference issues are ripe for the court's disposition.

JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which allows a district court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction in civil cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, and 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which gives district courts supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that are so closely related to federal claims as to be part of the same case or controversy.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court may grant a motion for summary judgment when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute of fact is material if resolution of the dispute "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is not precluded by "[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary." Id. "'A dispute is genuine if a reasonable trier-of-fact could find in favor of the nonmovant' and 'material if it could affect the outcome of the case.'" Thomas v. Tice, 943 F.3d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2012)).

In reviewing a motion for summary...