Ritz v. Ramsay

305 A.3d 1056

Jeffrey A. RITZ, Executor of the Estate of Joseph H. Cummins, Deceased, and Jolene L. Cummins, in Her Own Right

v.Matthew J. RAMSAY, RHJ Medical Center, Inc., Denise L. Shinsky, Keri A. Csikesz, Dennis Jones, Kathy Jones, Keith Jones

Appeal of: Jeffrey A. Ritz and Jolene L. Cummins

No. 1024 WDA 2022

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued May 9, 2023

Filed November 14, 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered August 9, 2022, In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, Civil Division, at No: No. 18-06107, Harry F. Smail, J.

Michael T. Collis, Pittsburgh, for appellants.

David R. Johnson, Pittsburgh, for RHJ MEDICAL CENTER, INC., DENISE L, SHINSK; KERI A. CSIKESZ, DENNIS JONES, KATHY JONES, AND KEITH JONES, appellees.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.^*

OPINION BY STABILE, J.:

Appellants, Jeffrey A. Ritz, as executor of the estate of Joseph H. Cummins (the "Decedent"), and Jolene L. Cummins, appeal from the August 9, 2022 order sustaining the preliminary objections of Appellees RHJ Medical Center, Inc. ("RHJ"), Denise L. Shinsky, Keri A. Csikesz, Dennis Jones, Kathy Jones, and Keith Jones (we refer to the four individual Appellees collectively with RHJ, as the "RHJ Parties.").¹ We affirm.

The pertinent allegations in Appellants’ August 1, 2019 complaint, which we accept as true, are that on December 24, 2016, the Decedent was hit by a car while he was running and suffered fatal injuries. Matthew J. Ramsay was the driver. Ramsay was a patient at RHJ, a methadone clinic where he received a larger than normal dose of methadone on the day of the accident. Ramsay’s post-accident blood and urine samples revealed the presence of marijuana and alprazolam in addition to methadone. The RHJ Parties were aware, based on prior blood tests, that Ramsay had repeatedly used nonprescription anti-anxiety drugs and marijuana during the course of his methadone treatment, in violation of their directives. Appellants therefore alleged that the RHJ Parties knew or should have known that providing Ramsay a larger than normal dose of methadone posed an unreasonable risk to the public.

On August 1, 2019, Appellants filed a complaint alleging one count of negligence against Ramsay as the operator of the vehicle, one count of negligence² against the RHJ Parties as Ramsay’s methadone clinic, and a third count against all parties under Pennsylvania’s wrongful death statute, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8301. Csikesz, Dennis Jones, Kathy Jones, and Keith Jones filed preliminary objections on November 20, 2019, alleging, among other things, that Appellants failed to state a cause of action against them upon which relief could be granted. Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(4). Shinsky and RHJ filed preliminary objections on February 3, 2020, also relying on Rule 1028(a)(4). The trial court held oral argument on February 25, 2020. On March 24, 2020, the trial court entered an order sustaining the preliminary objections of all RHJ Parties. The trial court found that Appellants failed to state a claim against the RHJ Parties because they owed no cognizable duty to the Decedent under the facts alleged in the complaint. The trial court denied reconsideration by order of June 11, 2020.

[1] Subsequently, on May 13, 2022, the trial court approved Appellants’ petition for partial settlement as to Ramsay. The petition contemplated future payment of settlement proceeds to Appellants. On August 9, 2022, Appellants filed a praecipe to settle and discontinue as to Ramsay. The RHJ Parties³ filed this appeal thirty days later, on September 8, 2022. On September 26, 2022, the RHJ Parties filed a motion to quash, arguing that the appeal period commenced on May 13, 2022, when the trial court approved Appellant’s petition for partial settlement. This Court denied the motion without prejudice on December 2, 2022. The RHJ Parties continue to argue on appeal that quashal is warranted. Because this issue implicates our jurisdiction, we address it first.

In Baumbach v. Lafayette College, 272 A.3d 83 (Pa. Super. 2022), this Court considered a similar case. There, as here, the appellees argued the appellant should have filed their appeal within 30 days of the order approving a settlement agreement among several parties. There, as here, the appellant argued the settlement was not final until they received payment and filed a praecipe to discontinue as to the settling defendants. Id. at 88. In Baumbach, the settlement agreement provided that the payment to the appellant of the settlement proceeds followed by a praecipe to discontinue. Id. Instantly, as in Baumbach, the settlement agreement between Appellants and Ramsay contemplated the future exchange of money. The agreement did not, however, expressly state that a praecipe to discontinue would follow. Appellees argue that the absence from the settlement agreement of an express promise to file a praecipe to discontinue as against Ramsay is a critical distinction between this case and Baumbach. Because there was no guarantee as to when, if ever, a praecipe to discontinue would be filed, Appellants were required to file their appeal within thirty days of the order approving the settlement agreement. We disagree.

In Baumbach, the trial court entered an order that approved a settlement agreement whose execution would take place after the court’s order. The Baumbach Court noted that an order is final under Pa.R.A.P. 341 when it disposes of all claims against all parties or ends the litigation. Id. (citing Pa.R.A.P. 341). The same thing happened here, and the same rationale applies. The trial court’s May 13, 2022 order approving the settlement agreement did not end the litigation or dispose of all parties; the order permitted Appellants and Ramsay to execute their settlement agreement. Then, after Appellants’ receipt of the settlement funds, they filed a praecipe to settle, discontinue, and end as to Ramsay. With that praecipe, filed on August 9, 2022, all claims and all parties had been disposed of, and the litigation ended. Appellants’ notice of appeal, filed thirty days after the August 9, 2022 praecipe, was timely.

Turning to the merits, we paraphrase Appellants’ three arguments as follows: (1) the trial court erred in sustaining the RHJ Parties’ preliminary objections on grounds that they owed no duty to the decedent; (2) the trial court failed to accept the facts in Appellants’ complaint as true; and (3) the trial court erred in not granting Appellants leave to amend their pleading. Appellants’ Brief at 6-7.

[2–8] Our standard of review is well-settled:

An appeal from an order granting preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer is subject to plenary review. In determining whether the trial court properly sustained preliminary objections, the appellate court must examine only the averments in the complaint, together with the documents and exhibits attached thereto, and the impetus of our inquiry is to determine the legal sufficiency of the complaint and whether the pleading would permit recovery if ultimately proven. This Court will reverse the trial court’s decision regardingpreliminary objections only where there has been an error of law or abuse of discretion. Finally, preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer require the court to resolve issues solely on the basis of the pleadings, and no testimony or other evidence outside of the complaint may be considered to dispose of the legal issues presented.

McNaughton Properties, LP v. Barr, 981 A.2d 222, 224 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations omitted). Further we accept the facts pled in the complaint and any reasonable inferences therefrom, as true. Feingold v. Hendrzak, 15 A.3d 937 (Pa. Super. 2011). "Preliminary objections which seek the dismissal of a cause of action should be sustained only in cases in which it is clear and free from doubt that the pleader will be unable to prove facts legally sufficient to establish the right to relief." Id. "If any doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, it should be resolved in favor of overruling the preliminary objections." Id.

[9, 10] "Under common law, as a general rule, there is no duty to control the conduct of a third party to protect another from harm." Emerich v. Philadelphia Ctr. for Hum. Dev., Inc., 554 Pa. 209, 720 A.2d 1032, 1036 (1998). Our courts have recognized such a duty in limited circumstances where a special relationship exists. Id. These special relationships are "a parent’s duty to control a child; a master’s duty to control a servant; a possessor of land’s duty to control a licensee; and the duty of those in charge of individuals with dangerous propensities to control those individuals." Brisbine v. Outside In School of Experiential Educ., Inc., 799 A.2d 89, 93 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 316-19), appeal denied, 816 A.2d 1101 (Pa. 2003).

Appellants argue that the RHJ Parties owed a duty to Decedent in this case, relying on DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester County, Inc., 525 Pa. 558, 583 A.2d 422 (1990). There, our Supreme Court held that the defendant healthcare provider owed a duty to its patient’s sexual partner. The patient had been exposed to and contracted hepatitis B, but the healthcare did not advise the patient of the risk of spreading the disease to her sexual partner. The plaintiffs sexual partner sued after he contracted the disease. Id. at 559-60, 583 A.2d 422. Relying on § 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Supreme Court held that the complaint stated a cause of action:

When a physician treats a patient who has been exposed to or who has contracted a communicable and/or contagious disease, it is imperative that the physician give his or her patient the proper advice about preventing the spread of the disease. Communicable diseases are so named because they are readily spread from person to person. Physicians are the first line of defense against the spread of communicable diseases, because physicians know what measures must be

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