Rivera-Lopez v. Lockheed Martin Corp.

AMANDA BETH RIVERA-LOPEZ, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of Emil Rivera-Lopez, deceased; J.N.; J.J.; W.W.; M.P.; C.H.; and THEIR SPOUSES; Plaintiffs, v. LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION, c Maryland corporation; SIKORSKI AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, now a part of Lockheed Martin, a Delaware corporation; SIKORSKI SUPPORT SERVICES, INC., a Lockheed Martin Company, a Delaware corporation; GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, a New York corporation; HAMILTON SUNDSTRAND CORPORATION, a subsidiary of United Technologies Corporation, a Delaware corporation; and BOEING SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT SUPPORT, LLC, a Delaware ‘ corporation; Defendants.

No. CV419-211

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Savannah Division

April 25, 2022

ORDER

WILLIAM T. MOORE, JR., Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant Hamilton Sundstrand Corporation's ("Hamilton") Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 33), which Plaintiff Amanda Beth Rivera-Lopez, individually and as executor of the estate of Emil Rivera-Lopez, and Plaintiffs J.N., J. J W.W., M.P., C.H., ^[1] and their spouses have opposed (Doc 68).^[2] For the following reasons, Hamilton's motion to dismiss (Doc. 33) is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (Doc. 5) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE with leave to amend.

BACKGROUND^[3]

This case arises from a helicopter crash that occurred during a military training exercise which took place off the coast of Yemen on August 25, 2017. (Doc. 5 at ¶¶ 1, 41-43.) At the time of the crash, Emil Rivera-Lopez, deceased, and Plaintiffs J.N., J.J., W.W., M.P., and C.H. (collectively the "Flight Crew") were all members of the United States Military 160th Special Operations Air Regiment ("SOAR").^[4] (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 4 10-14.) The SOAR Regiment is based at Hunter Army Airfield Base in Savannah, Georgia. (Id. at ¶ 6.)

On August 25, 2017, the Flight Crew was conducting day into night hoist training with their UH-60M Helicopter (the "Helicopter"). (Id. at ¶¶ 3, 41-43.) As part of this training, the Flight Crew maintained the Helicopter at "training hoist profile which is minimal feet above the water level (AWL) and very slow knots indicated airspeed (KIAS)." (Id. at ¶ 42.) During one of their approaches for a training hoist, while maintaining their training hoist profile, the Helicopter "experienced a #2 engine failure and other malfunctions which caused the aircraft to crash into the ocean." (Id. at ¶ 4 3.) Emil Rivera-Lopez did not resurface after the crash, and his body was never recovered. (Id. at ¶ 45.) On August 31, 2017, the United States Army declared Rivera-Lopez dead. (Id.) Plaintiffs J.N., JJ., W.W., M.P., and C.H. were all injured in the crash. (Id.)

According to Plaintiffs, the accident was caused, inter alia, due to improper installation of an "injector nozzle T[-]fitting and other parts in the engine[.]" (Id. at ¶ 46.) Additionally, the Helicopter utilized a full authority digital electronic control (FADEC) unit that regulated the input of fuel into the engine. (Id. at ¶ 47.) Plaintiffs allege that the FADEC unit malfunctioned, causing "the engine to go into self-preservation mode and shut itself down[]" and that the FADEC unit's malfunction was also a contributing cause of the Helicopter's crash. (Id.)

On August 23, 2019, Plaintiffs filed this action alleging Defendants committed various torts based on their involvement in manufacturing the Helicopter. (Doc. 1.) According to the amended complaint, Defendant Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, which is now a part of Defendant Lockheed Martin, manufactured, assembled, and modified the Helicopter. (Doc. 5 at ¶ 3.) Defendant Hamilton manufactured, assembled, and installed the FADEC unit. (Id.) Defendant Boeing Sikorsky Aircraft Support developed and implemented the installation and operation manuals for the Helicopter. (Id.) Defendant Boeing Sikorsky Aircraft Support is a joint venture of the Boeing Company, ^[5] Defendant Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, and Defendant Sikorsky Support Services, which is also a part of Defendant Lockheed Martin. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants operated and/or worked on the Helicopter at Hunter Army Airfield in Savannah, Georgia, and that all Defendants' conduct contributed to the accident. (Id. at ¶¶ 3, 51, 54.) Defendant Hamilton now moves to dismiss the second amended complaint as an impermissible shotgun pleading, and alternatively, for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 33 at 2-3.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]" "[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp, v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. at 1966).

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974). For a claim to have facial plausibility, the plaintiff must plead factual content that "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 132 S.Ct. 1702, 182 L.Ed.2d 720 (2012). Plausibility does not require probability, "but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement to relief." '" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. at 1966). Additionally, a complaint is sufficient only if it gives "fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1268 (quotations omitted).

When the Court considers a motion to dismiss, it accepts the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true. Id. at 1260. However, this Court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation[.]" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Moreover," 'unwarranted deductions of fact' in a complaint are not admitted as true for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of plaintiff's allegations." Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005)). That is, "[t]he rule 'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead 'simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary element." Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. at 1966).

ANALYSIS

As stated previously, Defendant Hamilton moves to dismiss Plaintiffs amended complaint as an improper shotgun pleading. (Doc. 33 at 2, 5.) Specifically, Defendant Hamilton argues that the amended complaint fails to delineate which faults or omissions are being alleged against which defendants. (Id. at 6.) Alternatively, Defendant Hamilton argues that the Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Id. at 9.) For the following reasons, the Court finds that the amended complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading requiring amendment. Therefore, the Court need not, at this point, inquire into the merits of Plaintiffs' claims.

"Shotgun pleadings violate Fed.R.Civ.P. 8's requirement that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the claim and courts in this Circuit 'have little tolerance for shotgun pleadings.'" Sarhan v. Miami Dade Coll., 800 Fed.Appx. 769, 771 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (citing Vibe Micro, Inc, v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018)). "A shotgun pleading makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the Court and defendants to understand what claims are alleged and against which defendant the claims are asserted." See Harper v. Bd. of Pub. Edu, for City of Savannah & Cnty. of Chatham, No. CV420-139, 2021 WL 2556695, at *3 (S.D. Ga. June 22, 2021) (first citing Adams v. Huntsville Hosp., 819 Fed.Appx. 836, 838 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam); and then citing Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366-67 (11th Cir. 1996)). Complaints are typically identified as shotgun pleadings if they contain one of four main categories of deficiencies. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1321-23 (11th Cir. 2015) (summarizing "four rough types or categories of shotgun pleadings"). Specifically,

[s]hotgun pleadings include complaints that: (1) contain multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts; (2) do not re-allege all the proceeding counts but are replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action; (3) do not separate each cause of action or claim for relief into separate counts; or (4) in a multi-defendant action, contain counts that present a claim for relief without specifying which defendants the claim is brought

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