Rivera v. Garland

FIDEL C. RIVERA III, Plaintiff, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL MERRICK B. GARLAND, et al., Defendants.

Case No.: 21-cv-213-MMA (AGS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

May 11, 2021

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS, OR ALTERNATIVELY, FOR JUDGMENT

[Doc. No. 4]

On February 3, 2021, Plaintiff Fidel C. Rivera III ("Plaintiff") filed a Complaint against Department of Justice Attorney General Monty Wilkinson and Does 1 through 10.¹ See Doc. No. 1 ("Compl."). Plaintiff brings claims for discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Defendant moves to dismiss, or alternatively, for partial summary judgment. See Doc. No. 4. Plaintiff filed an opposition, to which Defendant replied. SeeDoc. Nos. 5, 6. The Court found the matter suitable for disposition on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. See Doc. No. 7. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is employed by the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"). See Compl. at ¶ 5. In October 2016, the BOP assigned Plaintiff to MCC San Diego ("MCC") as a Cook Supervisor. See id.

A. General and Continuing Discrimination Allegations

Plaintiff is Puerto Rican. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 14. According to Plaintiff, his troubles at MCC began on his first day of the assignment. See id. at ¶ 10. Plaintiff claims that several persons at MCC—namely, his supervisor, Food Service Administrator Kevin Costa and a fellow employee, Jesus Rico—harassed and discriminated against him because of his Puerto Rican national origin. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 10-11. Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Costa and Mr. Rico often berated him, making "derogatory and aggressive statements to him regarding the fact he is Puerto Rican not Mexican . . . ." Id. at ¶ 44; See also id. at ¶¶ 17, 25, 35.

Plaintiff further alleges that Mr. Rico's harassment included criticizing Plaintiff's cooking, turning inmates against him, and coercing inmates to avoid eating food Plaintiff prepared. See id. at ¶ 13. In January 2017, Plaintiff asserts he reported Mr. Rico's conduct to Mr. Costa, but that Mr. Costa disregarded his complaints. See id. at ¶ 12. Plaintiff claims that the two embarked on a campaign to get him fired. See id. at ¶ 44.

B. Negative Write-Ups

Among other things, their campaign allegedly led to Plaintiff receiving three negative write-ups. The first was the result of Plaintiff's use of potentially spoiled food, which he claims he did at Mr. Costa's direction. See id. at ¶ 15. Plaintiff received his second write-up after members of the department complained that he had been aggressive towards them, which Plaintiff disputes. See id. at ¶ 18. Mr. Costa wrote up Plaintiff athird time, alleging that Plaintiff had used unauthorized food preparation techniques. See id. at ¶ 19. Plaintiff asserts that all three write-ups were reviewed by the Warden and ultimately terminated as false. See id. at ¶ 20.

C. Letters of Reprimand

In June 2017, Plaintiff and Mr. Rico were involved in a physical incident. See id. at ¶ 22. Plaintiff reported the incident to Mr. Costa and thereafter to Associate Warden of Operation Garcia after "Mr. Costa failed to take corrective action." Id. at ¶ 22. The Workplace Violence Committee reviewed the incident and ultimately determined that Plaintiff was at fault and proposed a three-day suspension. See id. at ¶ 23. During the Committee's June 26, 2017 interview, Plaintiff expressed "that the behavior was beyond disagreements and was in violation of the anti-harassment policy" and requested that Mr. Rico be reassigned. Id. at ¶ 24. The suspension was instead downgraded to a letter of reprimand. See id. at ¶ 23.

Plaintiff's second letter of reprimand relates to Mr. Rico's alleged attempts to turn the inmates against him. According to Plaintiff, Mr. Rico encouraged inmates that are members of a Mexican gang to boycott working with Plaintiff on his "PM Food Service Inmate Detail" shift. Id. at ¶¶ 35, 37. As a result, Plaintiff filed a continuing harassment complaint with MCC. See id. at ¶ 37. Plaintiff asserts that a case was opened but that Mr. Garcia and Joey Hendrickson² determined that "Mr. Rico had not committed any misconduct." Id. at ¶ 38. When Plaintiff questioned this, he was issued a cease-and-desist letter as well as a second letter of reprimand. See id. at ¶ 41.

C. Involuntary Reassignments

On January 21, 2018, Plaintiff sustained a work-related injury, limiting the use of one of his hands and requiring six weeks to heal. See id. at ¶ 30. Plaintiff's claim was accepted by the Department of Labor, see id., and Mr. Hendrickson placed Plaintiff on"Temporary Light Duty Assignment," id. at ¶ 31. After only one week, however, Mr. Hendrickson allegedly reassigned Plaintiff back to his regular duties. See id. Plaintiff believed that his injury restricted him from returning to his regular assignment and brought this to Mr. Hendrickson's attention. See id. According to Plaintiff, Mr. Hendrickson threatened that if he refused the reassignment, he would not be paid. Id. at ¶ 32.

Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Hendrickson ultimately corrected the reassignment, placing Plaintiff back on light duty, after the Department of Labor informed him that it violated Plaintiff's restrictions. Id. at ¶ 33. Despite returning Plaintiff to light duty, however, Mr. Hendrickson allegedly reassigned Plaintiff a second time by changing his shift. See id. at ¶ 34. Plaintiff claims that Mr. Hendrickson demanded he report to work that same day for a 2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. shift. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that Mr. Hendrickson provided no explanation for the last-minute change and instead stated "this is what you have, take it or leave it." Id.

D. EEOC Complaint and Sensitive Documents

On July 8, 2017—shortly after the incident between himself and Mr. Rico—Plaintiff filed a report with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") against MCC for failure to follow the BOP's anti-harassment policy. See id. at ¶ 26. Joe Bautista was the regional EEOC counselor. See id.

The exact timeline of events involving the EEOC is unclear. For example, Plaintiff asserts that in January 2018, Mr. Bautista informed Plaintiff that he and Mr. Rico had been separated. See id. at ¶ 29. This, however, was apparently untrue, as the two were still working together. See id. Nonetheless, Plaintiff asserts that on September 25, 2018, he filed a formal EEOC Complaint. See id. at ¶ 43; see also id. at ¶ 4.

Roughly one month later, Plaintiff discovered sensitive documents on an MCC computer relating to him and his EEOC complaint. See id. Plaintiff claims that the "private documents were easily accessible and [ ] fears that others may be able to access his private information." Id.

According to Plaintiff, the EEOC completed an investigation and detailed its findings in an April 11, 2019 report. See id. at ¶ 4. Plaintiff received a Final Agency Decision on November 5, 2019. See id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the claims made in the complaint. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, plaintiffs must also plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard demands more than "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," or "naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the complaint "must contain allegations of underlying facts sufficient to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively." Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must assume the truth of all factual allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). The court need not take legal conclusions as true merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. See Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). Similarly, "conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss." Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998).

Where dismissal is appropriate, a court should grant leave to amend unless the plaintiff could not possibly cure the defects in the pleading. See Knappenberger v. City of Phoenix, 566 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000)).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to dismiss "(1) Plaintiff's involuntary reassignment claims; and (2) Plaintiff's 'sensitive documents' claim." Doc. No. 4 at 9. As an initial matter, neither Plaintiff's involuntary reassignments nor his sensitive documents assertions are independent claims subject to dismissal. They are factual allegations of adverse actions in support of his three Title VII claims: (1) discrimination-disparate treatment; (2) harassment-hostile work environment; and (3) retaliation. The Court thus addresses Defendant's arguments within this framework.

First, Defendant attacks the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. He seeks dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), or alternatively, judgment under Rule 56, of all three causes of action, asserting that Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies relating to the involuntary reassignment allegation. See Doc. No. 4 at 9. However, Defendant has since abandoned this argument. See Doc. No. 6 at 2. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion to dismiss...