Rivera v. Gonzales

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CHARLOTTE RIVERA and LAWRENCE WATSON, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. JULIAN VIVIAN GONZALES and YOLANDA GONZALES, Defendants-Appellants.

No. A-1-CA-40238

Court of Appeals of New Mexico

January 23, 2024

Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY Maria Sanchez-Gagne, District Court Judge

Atler Law Firm, P.C. Timothy J. Atler Jazmine J. Johnston Albuquerque, NM Graeser & McQueen Christopher L. Graeser Santa Fe, NM for Appellees

Bridget Jacober Santa Fe, NM for Appellants

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge

{¶1} This case concerns a property dispute between parties who are cotenants of a parcel situated between their properties. Below, the district court granted Plaintiffs Charlotte Rivera and Lawrence Watson's motion for summary judgment on their claim of wrongful ejectment by Defendants Julian and Yolanda Gonzales. See NMSA 1978, § 42-4-2 (1907) (stating that an "action for ejectment will lie for the recovery of the possession . . . of any real estate, where the party suing has been wrongfully ousted from the possession thereof, and the possession wrongfully detained"). On appeal, Defendants assert that their affirmative defense of laches precluded summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim for wrongful ejectment. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

{¶2} Francisco and Maria Barela owned a parcel of land in Santa F e with a southern border on Agua Fria Street and a northern border between Lorenzo and Lopez Streets. At the end of 1940 the Barelas divided the parcel into multiple lots. At issue in this litigation is the southern lot of 902 Lorenzo Street the northern lot of 901 Lorenzo Street, and a 20 foot by 60 foot parcel between them.

{¶3} In 1940, Maria Barela deeded 901 Lorenzo Street to her daughter Kella Gonzales and Kella's husband, Jose Gonzales. Kella and Jose are the parents of Defendants. The Gonzaleses used the parcel as their driveway. In 1960, Maria Barela deeded 902 Lorenzo Street to her daughter Kate Trujillo and Kate's husband, Jose Trujillo. Jose Trujillo built an adobe wall along the entire northern boundary of 902 Lorenzo that closed off vehicle access between his property and the parcel. In 1963, Maria Barela died without a will and the parcel passed to her heirs, which included the Gonzaleses and the Trujillos.

{¶4} The wall on the Trujillos' property line remained in place until Plaintiffs bought 902 Lorenzo Street from the Trujillos' estate in 2018. Plaintiffs removed the wall, intending to use the parcel for a driveway. After this, Defendants took steps to prevent Plaintiffs from using the parcel for vehicle access to 902 Lorenzo.

{¶5} Plaintiffs filed suit, initially asserting that 902 Lorenzo Street had an easement for vehicle use over the parcel and that the parcel was a public right of way. But during the litigation, Plaintiffs purchased an interest in the parcel from one of the Trujillos' heirs and obtained a quitclaim deed, rendering them cotenants in the ownership of the parcel. Plaintiffs then amended their complaint to include an alternative claim under Section 42-4-2 for wrongful ejectment of a cotenant.

{¶6} Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on their wrongful ejectment claim. Defendants argued that laches, which they had raised as an affirmative defense, precluded Plaintiffs' ejectment claim. After hearing from both parties, the district court ruled that Defendants had not satisfied one of the elements of laches, granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, and issued a writ of possession. Plaintiffs stipulated to the dismissal of their remaining claims, and Defendants appealed.

DISCUSSION

{¶7} The only issue on appeal is whether Defendants are correct that their affirmative defense of laches should have precluded summary judgment. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. See Zamora v. St. Vincent Hosp. 2014-NMSC-035, ¶ 9, 335 P.3d 1243. In this case, because it is undisputed that Plaintiffs made a prima facie case on their claim for wrongful ejectment, Defendants bore the burden to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding the affirmative defense they relied on to oppose summary judgment. See Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. Trissell, 2022-NMCA-001, ¶ 18, 503 P.3d 381; id. ¶ 12 (noting that our appellate courts have "put the onus on the defendant opposing summary judgment with an affirmative defense to present factual support for the defense after the plaintiff has made a prima facie case on its claim alone"). As in Trissell, we must determine "whether the district court erred by concluding that Defendants failed to carry their burden of showing a genuine issue of material fact." Id. ¶ 19.

{¶8} Laches is an equitable defense that "prevents litigation of a stale claim where the claim should have been brought at an earlier time and the delay has worked to the prejudice of the party resisting the claim." Garcia v. Garcia, 1991-NMSC-023, ¶ 30, 111 N.M. 581, 808 P.2d 31. It requires proof of four elements: (1) "[c]onduct on the part of the defendant, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy"; (2) "delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit"; (3) "lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit"; and (4) "injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant or the suit is not held to be barred." Brown v. Taylor, 1995-NMSC-050, ¶ 11, 120 N.M. 302, 901 P.2d 720. All the elements must be met for the defense to apply. Butcher v. City of Albuquerque, 1980-NMSC-127, ¶ 11, 95 N.M. 242, 620 P.2d 1267.

{¶9} In the proceedings below, the district court concluded that the laches defense failed as a matter of law because the second element, notice, was not proven. Defendants argue that the district court erred in this conclusion because Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest had notice over sixty years ago that the parcel was reserved for Defendants to use as a driveway. Defendants assert that Maria Barela restricted use of the parcel, and this restriction provided notice to Plaintiffs via their predecessors in interest. Defendants filed affidavits from Maria Barela's heirs supporting their understanding that, in the 1960s, Maria told Jose Trujillo that no vehicles were permitted to use the parcel to access Trujillos' lot at 902 Lorenzo.^[1] However, all of this evidence concerns Maria's statements or conduct at a time when Maria was the sole owner of the parcel; Plaintiffs' predecessors only became owners and cotenants of the parcel upon Maria's death in 1963....