Rivera v. Kijakazi

JOSE ANTONIO TORRES RIVERA, Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, ^[1] Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:20-CV-02324

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

May 5, 2022

MEMORANDUM

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK, Chief United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Jose Antonio Torres Rivera (“Rivera”) brings this action under section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying his application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. (Doc. 1). For the following reasons expressed herein, and upon detailed consideration of the arguments raised by the parties in their respective briefs, the Commissioner's decision shall be AFFIRMED.

I. Background and Procedural History

On November 8, 2019, Rivera filed an application under Title II for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits alleging disability beginning October 1, 2010. (Doc. 14-2, at 29). The Social Security Administration initially denied the application on March 7, 2019, prompting Rivera's request for a hearing, which Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Gwendolyn M. Hoover held on December 20, 2019. (Doc. 14-2, at 115). In a written decision dated February 4, 2020, the ALJ determined that Rivera is not disabled and therefore not entitled to benefits or income under Title II. (Doc. 14-2, at 26). The Appeals Council subsequently denied Rivera's request for review on October 16, 2020. (Doc. 14-2, at 2).

On December 11, 2020, Rivera commenced the instant action. (Doc. 1). On December 22, 2020, the parties consented to proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 6). The Commissioner responded on August 16, 2021, providing the requisite transcripts from Rivera's disability proceedings. (Doc. 13; Doc. 14). The parties then filed their respective briefs, with Rivera raising three bases for reversal or remand. (Doc. 17; Doc. 20). This matter is ripe for disposition.

II. Standards of Review

To receive benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant must demonstrate an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509. To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe physical or mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous work or any other substantial gainful activity in significant numbers in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a).^[2] Additionally, to be eligible to receive Title II benefits, a claimant must be insured for disability insurance benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(a); 20 C.F.R. § 404.131.

A. Administrative Review

In evaluating whether a claimant is disabled, the “Social Security Administration, working through ALJs, decides whether a claimant is disabled by following a now-familiar five-step analysis.” Hess v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 200-01 (3d Cir. 2019). The “burden of proof is on the claimant at all steps except step five, where the burden is on the Commissioner of Social Security.” Hess, 931 F.3d at 201; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a)(1). Thus, if the claimant establishes an inability to do past relevant work at step four, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could perform consistent with his or her residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a)(1).

B. Judicial Review

The Court's review of a determination denying an application for Title ii benefits is limited “to considering whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.” Katz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 19-1268, 2019 WL 6998150, at *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 20, 2019). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). The quantum of proof is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A single piece of evidence is not substantial if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by such evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). in an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ's decision] from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).

The question before the Court, therefore, is not whether Rivera is disabled, but whether the Commissioner's determination that Rivera is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that an ALJ's errors of law denote a lack of substantial evidence.”); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F.Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The [Commissioner]'s determination as to the status of a claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal matters is plenary). “In determining if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.” Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F.Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). If “the ALJ's findings of fact . . . are supported by substantial evidence in the record, ” the Court is bound by those findings. Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000).

III. The ALJ's Decision

In her written decision, the ALJ determined that Rivera “was not been under a disability, as defined within the Social Security Act, at any time from October 1, 2010, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2019, the date last insured.” (Doc. 14-2, at 42). The ALJ reached this conclusion after proceeding through the five-step sequential analysis provided in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ found that Rivera last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on December 31, 2019. (Doc. 14-2, at 31).

A. Step One

At step one of the five-step analysis, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If a claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity, the claimant is not disabled, regardless of age, education, or work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Substantial gainful activity is defined as work activity requiring significant physical or mental activity and resulting in pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572. The ALJ must consider only the earnings of the claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574(a)(2). Here, the ALJ determined that Rivera “engaged in substantial gainful activity from January 1, 2010 through February 2014.” (Doc. 14-2, at 31).

B. Step Two

At step two, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically determinable impairment-or a combination of impairments-that is severe and meets the 12-month duration requirement. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the ALJ determines that a claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits the claimant's “physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, ” the ALJ will find that the claimant does not have a severe impairment and is therefore not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If, however, a claimant establishes a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the ALJ proceeds to step three. Here, the ALJ found that Rivera has the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, diabetes with peripheral neuropathy, obesity, osteoarthritis of the knees, depression, anxiety, mood disorder, and chronic pain syndrome. (Doc. 14-2, at 32). The ALJ also determined that Rivera has the following non-severe impairment: hypertension, a history of pancreatitis, a pilonidal cyst, GERD, headaches, and hyperlipidemia. (Doc. 14-2, at 32).

C. Step Three

At step three, the ALJ must determine whether the severe impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals the medical equivalent of an impairment listed in the version of 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 that was in effect on the date of the ALJ's decision. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 404.1525, 404.1526. The sections in this appendix are commonly referred to as “listings.” If the ALJ determines the claimant's impairment or impairments meet a listing, then the claimant is considered disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). Otherwise, the ALJ must proceed to the fourth step of the analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). The ALJ considered the listings 1.02 (major dysfunction of a joint), 1.04 (disorders of the spine), 11.14 (peripheral neuropathy), 12.04 (depressive, bipolar and related disorders), and 12.06 (anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders). (Doc. 14-2, at 35). Here, the ALJ determined that none of Rivera's impairments, considered individually or in combination, meet or medically equal the severity of a listed impairment. (Doc. 14-2, at 19-32).

D. Residual Functional Capacity

Between steps three and...