Rivera v. Sharp

AMNERYS ANNETTE RIVERA, Plaintiff, v. JOSEPH SHARP, CHOICE COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, andATLANTIC TELE-NETWORK, INC., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2008-0020

DISTRICT COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. CROIX

June 1, 2021

Attorneys:

Lee J. Rohn, Esq.,

Mary Faith Carpenter, Esq.,

St. Croix, U.S.V.I.

For Plaintiff

Charles E. Engeman, Esq.,

Adam G. Christian, Esq.,

St. Thomas, U.S.V.I.

For Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Lewis, District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the "Motion for Summary Judgment to Enforce Settlement Agreement" ("Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement") (Dkt. No. 132) and accompanying Memorandum in Support (Dkt. No. 133) filed by Defendants Joseph Sharp, Choice Communications, LLC, and Atlantic Tele-Network, Inc. (collectively "Defendants"); Plaintiff Amnerys Annette Rivera's ("Plaintiff") "Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment to Enforce Settlement" (Dkt. No. 140); and Defendants' Reply in support of their Motion to Enforce Settlement (Dkt. No. 143).

Also before the Court is Plaintiff's "Motion to Enforce Settlement and for Award of Costs and Fees and Interest" ("Plaintiff's Second Motion to Enforce Settlement") (Dkt. No. 87); Defendants' "Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Settlement and for Award of Costs and Fees and Interest" (Dkt. No. 89); and Plaintiff's Reply in support of her Second Motion to Enforce Settlement (Dkt No. 93).

For the reasons discussed herein, the Court will deny Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement and grant in part Plaintiff's Second Motion to Enforce Settlement.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2008, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this Court asserting employment discrimination claims against Choice Communications, LLC and Atlantic Tele-Network, Inc. under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and Virgin Islands statutes, 10 V.I.C. §§ 1-10 and 62, et seq., along with wrongful discharge, contract, and tort claims against all Defendants. (Dkt. No. 1). The case was referred to mediation on July 8, 2009. (Dkt. No. 67). A Mediation Report dated September 25, 2009 was filed with the Court by Mediator Henry C. Smock, Esq. (Dkt. No. 78). The Mediation Report confirmed that: a mediation conference was held on September 2, 2009; counsel for the parties were present for the mediation conference; and the conflict between the parties was completely resolved as a result of the mediation, with the parties to submit a stipulation or notice of dismissal to the Court. Id.

Upon receipt of the Mediation Report, Magistrate Judge George W. Cannon, Jr., ordered the parties to file a stipulation of dismissal within 30 days. (Dkt. No. 79). When the parties failed to comply with the 30-day deadline for submission of the stipulation of dismissal, the Magistrate Judge entered an Order dismissing the case administratively with prejudice ("Order of Dismissal"). (Dkt. No. 80).

On November 25, 2009, Plaintiff filed an unsealed "Motion to Enforce Settlement" ("First Motion to Enforce Settlement") on the Court's Case Management/Electronic Case Files ("CM/ECF") system. (Dkt. No. 81-1).¹ On December 4, 2009, Plaintiff moved to withdraw the First Motion to Enforce. (Dkt. No. 82). However, because Plaintiff did not seek to have the motion sealed, the First Motion to Enforce Settlement remained publicly accessible on CM/ECF until February 26, 2010, when it was sealed by the Court upon motion by Plaintiff. (Dkt. Nos. 83, 84).

On March 23, 2010, Plaintiff filed a second unsealed motion to enforce settlement on the Court's CM/ECF system. (Dkt. No. 85). Plaintiff moved the same day to seal the motion. (Dkt. No. 86). However, the Second Motion to Enforce Settlement remained publicly available on the CM/ECF system until March 29, 2010.

Magistrate Judge Cannon subsequently denied Plaintiff's Second Motion to Enforce Settlement finding that Plaintiff had "materially breached the settlement agreement without the ability to cure her breach . . . [t]herefore, Defendants are discharged from their duties under the agreement." (Dkt. No. 98 at 11-12). Plaintiff then appealed the Magistrate Judge's Order denying her Second Motion to Enforce Settlement. (Dkt. No. 100).

On July 24, 2018, the Court granted Plaintiff's appeal in part, concluding that the Magistrate Judge had exceeded his authority under the Federal Magistrates Act by: (1) dismissing the case sua sponte following the parties' failure to comply with a Court-ordered deadline for the submission of a stipulation of dismissal after the parties reached a settlement agreement; and (2) ruling on the merits of Plaintiff's Second Motion to Enforce Settlement. (Dkt. No. 129 at 7-12). The Court therefore vacated the Magistrate Judge's Order of Dismissal (Dkt. No. 80), andconsidered de novo the question whether dismissal of the case was appropriate in light of the parties' failure to file a stipulation of dismissal. (Dkt. No. 129 at 8). Because the Court determined that dismissal of the case was inappropriate under the circumstances, the Court concluded that the case would remain on the Court's docket. Id. at 8-9. However, the Court found that it had no subject matter jurisdiction over the enforcement of a settlement agreement. Id. at 11-12.

Defendants then filed their Motion to Enforce Settlement. In their Motion, Defendants moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 for the Court to declare that: "1) the confidentiality clause in the settlement agreement is valid and enforceable; 2) Plaintiff breached the confidentiality clause by filing two unsealed motions to enforce settlement agreement; 3) Defendants are excused from paying any sums to Plaintiff due to her breach of the confidentiality clause; and 4) this case is dismissed with prejudice." (Dkt. No. 132 at 1). Additionally, Defendants argued that the Court retained subject matter jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement. (Dkt. No. 133 at 5-7). Plaintiff filed her Opposition on October 17, 2018 (Dkt. No. 140), and Defendants filed their Reply on October 31, 2018 (Dkt. No. 143).

The Court then issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order finding that its prior determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the enforcement of the parties' settlement agreement in this case was in error. (Dkt. No. 145 at 3-4). The Court vacated in part its July 24, 2018 Order, as it related to the Court's finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the parties' settlement agreement, and as it related to the Court's denial of Plaintiff's Second Motion to Enforce Settlement. Id. at 5.

Presently pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Second Motion to Enforce Settlement as well as the portions of Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement unrelated to the issue of theCourt's subject matter jurisdiction. The Court held a hearing on January 12, 2021 on the two motions. (Dkt. No. 152).

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a movant must show that there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact," and that, on the uncontroverted facts, it is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805-806 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) ("Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. See United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 185 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). Once the moving party has met this burden, the non-moving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" and "may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleadings." D.E. v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 268-269 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the district court is required to view all facts "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Curto v. A Country Place Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 921 F.3d 405, 409 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288 (3d Cir. 2018)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Seamans v. Temple Univ., 744 F.3d 853, 859 (3d Cir. 2014). The role of the court is to "determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Stiegel v. Peters Twp., 600 Fed. App'x 60, 63 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249(1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). A genuine issue of material fact exists when "the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party." Pearson v. Prison Health Service, 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Third Circuit has likened the standard for evaluating a motion to enforce a settlement agreement to the standard for a motion for summary judgment:

[W]hether there was any disputed issue of material fact as to the validity of the settlement agreement[] . . . is similar to that which any court must address when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. . . . The stakes in summary enforcement of a settlement agreement and summary judgment on the merits of a claim are roughly the same -- both deprive a party of his right to be heard in the litigation.

Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1031 (3d Cir. 1991).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement

1. Undisputed Facts²

On March 13, 2008, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this action. (Dkt. Nos. 1; 134 at ¶ 1; 141 at 1, 8; 144 at ¶ 1). On November 3, 2008, the Court referred the case to mediation....