Rivero v. Monroe Cnty. Sheriff's Office

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JORDAN RIVERO, Plaintiff, v. MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, et al., Defendants.

No. 23-CV-81462-ROSENBERG

United States District Court, S.D. Florida

May 14, 2024

ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

ROBIN L. ROSENBERG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. DE 33. The Motion is fully briefed. The Court has reviewed the Motion, the Response, DE 43, the Reply, DE 49, and the record and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion.

I. Case Background

On the early morning of July 3, 2022, Plaintiff Jordan Rivero was a passenger in a single-car crash. DE 31 at ¶¶ 2, 16. Various emergency personnel responded to the scene, including Monroe County deputy sheriffs. Id. at ¶ 18. Plaintiff-extremely disoriented, bleeding from his head, and crying-needed to be extracted from the vehicle. S0278 BWC 2:46-7:41.^[1] The driver needed to be extracted as well. Id. Emergency personnel kept instructing Plaintiff to move back from the damaged rear door (where Plaintiff was sitting), so that they could have room to open the door with tools, but Plaintiff did not listen and instead remained close to the rear door. Id. Because Plaintiff did not comply, a firefighter instead extracted Plaintiff through the rear window in lieu of the rear door. Id.

Once emergency personnel moved Plaintiff away from the vehicle they gently but firmly instructed him to “sit,” told him to “calm down,” and reassured him that he was “in good hands” and “safe.” S0007 BWC 2:45-3:50. Plaintiff would not easily sit down, so the emergency personnel pushed Plaintiff down as he continued to cry and fidget. Id. Plaintiff asked to stand up a few times; the emergency personnel who remained focused on him, the deputy sheriffs, denied his request and kept a hand on him. S0278 BWC 8:04-9:31. Within a minute, Plaintiff stood up and the deputies pulled him back down. Id. at 9:50-10:03.

When Plaintiff got up the second time, Defendant Deputy Dylon Hansen jumped in to help the other deputies wrestle Plaintiff down again. S0007 BWC at 5:34-5:45. Plaintiff appeared to acknowledge the deputies' commands to sit as he yelled “sorry” and sat, but he quickly popped up again. Id. at 5:46. Plaintiff succeeded in getting away this time and fell toward the vehicle where firefighters were still working. Id. at 5:46-5:52. Hansen unholstered his taser. Id. As the deputies tried to restrain Plaintiff, Plaintiff moved closer to the damaged vehicle and then away from the vehicle while still on the side of the road. Id. at 5:52-5:59. Hansen deployed his taser but missed, striking a fellow deputy instead. Id.

Plaintiff, seeing the taser, began back-peddling further away from the deputies and vehicle toward an unbarricaded part of the scene. Id. at 6:00-6:07. Yelling that Plaintiff should “get on the ground,” Hansen fired again, this time connecting with Plaintiff and immediately incapacitating him and dropping him to the ground. Id. at 6:07-6:12. Once the taser shock ended, Plaintiff tried to quickly get up, and Hansen fired again. Id. at 6:12-6:18. The other deputies got on top of Plaintiff. Id. at 6:18-20. Hansen fired the taser two more times as Plaintiff moved. A deputy then told Hansen, “we're good on that,” and Hansen stopped using his taser. Id. at 6:366:42.

Plaintiff kept yelling and occasionally flailed his legs as deputies handcuffed him. Id. at 6:42-8:00. Hansen retrieved a hobble restraint device and applied it to Plaintiff's legs. Id. at 8:559:14. Throughout this entire course of events, Plaintiff was clearly not in his right state of mind, leading the deputies to reasonably question whether Plaintiff had previously taken a narcotic. Id. at 5:34-9:40. Paramedics began to treat Plaintiff, move him to a stretcher, and place him in an ambulance. Id. at 9:35-18:26; S0278 at 22:40-25:03. Because Plaintiff sat up, a paramedic requested that one of the deputies also ride in the ambulance. Id. During this time, Plaintiff was calm and apologetic. Id. at 25:03-29:10. He then slipped in an out of consciousness and seized. Id. at 31:45-36:20. Plaintiff still suffers from medical issues that he attributes to this incident. DE 31 at ¶ 36.

On November 6, 2023, Plaintiff sued the Monroe County Sheriff's Office, Monroe County Sheriff Rick Ramsay in his official and individual capacities, and Monroe County Sheriff's Deputies Dylon Hansen, Ana Coello, and Vaughn O'Keefe in their official and individual capacities. Against all the Defendants, Plaintiff alleges violations of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force and a failure to intervene in that excessive force, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state law claims of battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”).

II. The Parties' Arguments

The Defendants raise two types of arguments in support of dismissal. First, the Defendants argues that Plaintiff has sued the wrong Defendants in the Amended Complaint.^[2] DE at 6-8. Second, the Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims are insufficiently pled. Id. at 8-20. Each argument is addressed in turn.

III. Plaintiff has Sued the Wrong Defendants.

a. The Monroe County Sheriff's Office must be dismissed.

Plaintiff named the Monroe County Sheriff's Office as a Defendant. The Defendants argue that a sheriff's office is not a proper defendant. Plaintiff does not respond to this argument.

The Court looks to state law to determine whether a sheriff's office can be sued. Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214-15 (11th Cir. 1992). Under Florida law, a sheriff's office cannot be sued. Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9); see Hill v. Escambia Cnty. Sheriff's Off., No. 21-10631, 2022 WL 1297809, at *2 (11th Cir. May 2, 2022). Instead, Plaintiff may sue a constitutional officer in his or her official capacity-the Monroe County Sheriff-which Plaintiff has done in this suit. See Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9). Because a sheriff's office cannot be sued, however, the Court DISMISSES Defendant Monroe County Sheriff's Office.

b. Plaintiff's claims against various deputy sheriff Defendants in their official capacities are redundant with his claims against the Sheriff in his official capacity.

The Defendants argue that Plaintiff's decision to sue various deputy sheriff Defendants in their official capacities is redundant, given that Plaintiff also named the Monroe County Sheriff as a Defendant in his official capacity. DE 33 at 7. Plaintiff does not respond to this argument.

Section 1983 suits against officers in their official capacities are “simply ‘another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'” Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)) (internal citation omitted). In naming the deputy sheriffs as Defendants in their official capacities, Plaintiff has pled many redundant claims. Id. That redundancy, according to the Eleventh Circuit, has the potential to confuse a jury. Id. To avoid that potential confusion, the Court DISMISSES the redundant claims against the deputy sheriff Defendants in their official capacities.

c. The Sheriff cannot be sued in his individual capacity.

The Defendants argue that because Plaintiff does not allege that Sheriff Ramsay had personal involvement in this case, he cannot be sued in his individual capacity. DE 33 at 7-8. To this, again, Plaintiff provides no response.

To state a claim against a government official in his or her individual capacity, a plaintiff must allege the official was “personally involved in acts or omissions that resulted in the constitutional deprivation.” Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). Relatedly, suits about policies or practices must also be brought against defendants in their official capacities. Id. All of Plaintiff's allegations against Sheriff Ramsay concern Ramsay's role as a policymaker, and thus, Plaintiff fails to allege that Ramsay had any personal involvement in the incident. Therefore, the Court DISMISSES all claims against Sheriff Ramsay in his individual capacity.

IV. Plaintiff's Claims Cannot Overcome Qualified and Sovereign Immunities.

The Defendants also argue that Plaintiff's claims are insufficiently pled. The Court analyzes this argument count-by-count, guided by the U.S. Supreme Court's direction that a complaint's factual allegations must be accepted as true. See Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable inferences from his Complaint; moreover, video footage at this stage must reviewed in the light most favorable to a plaintiff., Robinson v. City of Huntsville, No. 21-13979 2022 WL 3867584, at *3 (11th Cir. Aug. 30, 2022).^[3] But conclusory recitations of elements of causes of actions cannot stand alone as recitations of elements “must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

a. Count One, a Section 1983 excessive force claim, is not sufficiently pled to overcome the Defendants' qualified immunity.

Count One of the Amended Complaint alleges the Defendants violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. Specifically, this count is based on Deputy Hansen's decision to tase Plaintiff in violation of his office's policy limiting taser use to arrest or custodial situations; to tase Plaintiff in light of the circumstances to deploy the taser in its most dangerous mode, “prong-mode”; and to use the hobble restraint device. DE 31 at ¶¶ 46-61. Count One also is based on Deputies Coello and O'Keefe's use of the taser and the hobble restraint device. Id. Lastly, the excessive...