Riverside Cnty. Prob. Dep't v. The Superior Court

RIVERSIDE COUNTY PROBATION DEPARTMENT, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, Respondent;

J.A. et al., Real Parties in Interest.

E077962

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Second Division

December 22, 2022

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Order Filed Date: 12/28/22

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County No JUV086925. Samah Shouka, Judge. Petition granted.

Minh C. Tran and Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, Kelly A Moran, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Emily C. Headlee Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner.

John F. Schuck, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Real Party in Interest J.A.

Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, and Sophia Choi, Deputy District Attorney, for Real Party in Interest the People.

Jennifer B. Henning; and James R. Williams, County Counsel (Santa Clara), Kavita Narayan, Assistant County Counsel, Marcelo Quinones, Lead Deputy County Counsel, and Mona M. Williams, Deputy County Counsel, for California State Association of Counties as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION

THE COURT

The opinion filed in this matter on December 22, 2022 is MODIFIED as follows.

1. On page 9, at the end of the last full paragraph, replace (In re J.B. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 410, 413, fn. 1, pet. for rev. filed Mar. 22, 2022.) with (In re J.B. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 410, 413, fn. 1.)

2. On page 13, at the end of the first partial paragraph, replace (People v. Fuentes (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 670, 679, pet. for rev. filed Jun. 14, 2022.) with (People v. Fuentes (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 670, 679.)

2. On page 15, at the end of the last full paragraph, replace People v. Hwang (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 358 (Hwang), review granted Apr. 14, 2021 (S267274) with People v. Hwang (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 358 (Hwang), review granted April 14, 2021, S267274, review dismissed July 22, 2022 Except for these modifications, the opinion remains unchanged. This modification does not effect a change in the judgment.

OPINION

RAMIREZ P. J.

When defendant J.A. was 15, he committed multiple heinous crimes. As the law at the time permitted, he was tried in adult criminal court, found guilty, and sentenced to life in prison.

In 2019, the law was changed so that a person who committed a crime at 15 cannot be transferred to adult court and must be dealt with, if at all, in the juvenile system. At that point, due to a series of resentencings and appeals, the judgment against defendant was not final. Therefore, in 2021 - when defendant was 40 - the juvenile court vacated the sentence, declared him a ward, and committed him to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ); when the DJJ rejected the commitment, it committed him to a secure youth treatment facility (SYTF) operated by the Riverside County Probation Department (Probation). As we will discuss in more detail, the juvenile court ruled that, despite his age, it had jurisdiction over him until the expiration of a two-year period of control.

Probation then filed this writ proceeding. Probation and defendant both contend that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to order any disposition whatsoever; all it could do was dismiss the petition and thus allow defendant's immediate release. The People respond that the juvenile court's ruling was correct, albeit for different reasons than it gave.

We will hold that, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 607,^[1] the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to do anything other than to dismiss the petition. Accordingly, we must grant an extraordinary writ.

I STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 1996, defendant was charged in juvenile court with multiple crimes, all committed when he was 15.

At that time, a 15-year old accused of an offense specified in section 707, subdivision (b) (707(b)), including those with which defendant was charged, could be transferred to adult criminal court, if the juvenile court found him or her unfit for juvenile treatment. (Former § 707, subd. (d), Stats. 1994, ch. 453, § 9.5, pp. 2523-2528.) The juvenile court found defendant unfit and duly transferred him.

After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of two counts of kidnapping during a carjacking (§ 209.5), two counts of kidnapping to commit robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)), two counts of robbery (§ 211), two counts of carjacking (§ 215), one count of forcible sodomy (§ 286, subd. (c)), one count of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)) and four counts of forcible oral copulation in concert (§ 288a, subd. (d)), with various enhancements. In 1999, he was sentenced to eight consecutive life terms, plus seven years four months, in prison.^[2]

In 2014, the People conceded that defendant was entitled to resentencing under People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268 ["sentencing a juvenile offender for a nonhomicide offense to a term of years with a parole eligibility date that falls outside the juvenile offender's natural life expectancy constitutes cruel and unusual punishment"]. Accordingly, the trial court vacated defendant's sentence and resentenced him to a total of 40 years to life in prison.

Defendant appealed. In 2015, we affirmed (People v. Ortega (Nov. 23, 2015, E061027) [nonpub. opn.]); however, he filed a petition for review, which was granted. (People v. Ortega (Mar. 9, 2016, S230917) 2016 Cal. LEXIS 1398.)

In 2018, the Supreme Court transferred the appeal back to us with directions to vacate and reconsider in light of People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349 [sentencing a juvenile offender to 50 years to life is cruel and unusual punishment, even if the juvenile offender's parole eligibility date is within his or her natural life expectancy] (Contreras). (People v. Ortega (June 13, 2018, S230917) 2018 Cal. LEXIS 4334.)

Later in 2018, we held that, under Contreras, the trial court erred by considering defendant's life expectancy. We reversed and remanded for resentencing. In addition, we noted that under Proposition 57, defendant was entitled to a fitness hearing. Because it was not clear from the appellate record whether he had already had a fitness hearing, we directed the trial court to make that determination on remand. (People v. Ortega (Aug. 24, 2018, E061027) [nonpub. opn.].)

On January 1, 2019 - after we issued our remittitur but before defendant was resentenced - Senate Bill No. 1391 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 1391) went into effect. SB 1391 amended section 707 so as to provide that, subject to exceptions not applicable here, a person who committed a crime at the age of 14 or 15 cannot be transferred to adult court.

Accordingly, in June 2021, the trial court ruled (with both counsel concurring) that, in light of SB 1391, transfer was "moot" and adult sentencing should be "vacated."^[3]It declared defendant a ward of the court and committed him to the DJJ.

In July 2021, however, the DJJ rejected the commitment. (See § 736, subd. (a).) Thus, in August 2021, the juvenile court vacated the commitment and set a new dispositional hearing.

Defendant objected that the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction over him. The Riverside County Probation Department (Probation) made a special appearance, also arguing that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction. The People argued that the juvenile court had jurisdiction under section 607, subdivision (h).

The juvenile court agreed that it had jurisdiction under section 607, subdivision (h). It committed defendant to Pathways to Success, an SYTF operated by Probation. It stayed its decision temporarily to enable the parties to file a writ petition.

Defendant filed an appeal. Probation then filed a writ petition.

In the writ proceeding, we issued an order to show cause and stayed the trial court's order. We ordered that the appeal and the writ proceeding be considered together (but not consolidated).^[4]

II DISCUSSION

Defendant and Probation contend that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction over defendant because he was over 25.

A. Legal Background.

"'A "juvenile court" is a superior court exercising limited jurisdiction arising under juvenile law.' [Citation.]" (People v. Ramirez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 55, 66.)

Subject to exceptions not relevant here, "any minor who is between 12 years of age and 17 years of age, inclusive, when he or she violates any law . . . defining crime . . . is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may adjudge the minor to be a ward of the court." (§ 602, subd. (a).) This defines the juvenile court's "initial jurisdiction." (People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 698, 710, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 34-35.) By contrast, "[w]hen a juvenile is declared a ward of the juvenile court, the juvenile becomes 'subject to its continuing jurisdiction.' [Citation.]" (In re Antoine D. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1320.)

"Because the juvenile court's [initial] jurisdiction is based on age at the time of the violation of a criminal law or ordinance, '[i]t is . . . possible that a person might commit a murder at age 17, be apprehended 50 years later, and find himself subject to juvenile court [initial] jurisdiction at age 67.' [Citation.]" (People v. Ramirez, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 66.) In that event, however, unless the juvenile court has a basis for continuing jurisdiction, it must dismiss. (In re Arthur N. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 226, 241.)

Section 607 provides for the termination of continuing jurisdiction. In October 2021, when the juvenile court ruled, it provided as relevant here:^[5]

"(a) The court may retain jurisdiction over a person who is found to be a ward . . . of the juvenile court until the ward attains 21 years of age, except as provided in subdivisio...