Rizk v. Mehirdel

1

JACQUELINE RIZK and SAMIR GONSALVES, Plaintiffs, v. POLICE OFFICER FIRDAUS MEHIRDEL, TAX REG # 950309, POLICE OFFICER DANNY LEE, TAX REG # 950736, Defendants.

No. 14-CV-06434 (HG)

United States District Court, E.D. New York

October 5, 2022

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Hector Gonzalez United States District Judge

Plaintiffs Jacqueline Rizk and Samir Gonsalves brought this action against Defendants Firdaus Mehirdel and Danny Lee for false arrest, excessive force, denial of a right to fair trial and intentional infliction of emotional distress in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York state law. Trial commenced on July 18, 2022. The Court has already granted Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50a with respect to the claims against former Defendant Joel Rosenthal, but reserved decision on the remaining claims and sent them to the jury. On July 21, 2022 the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs with respect to the claims of excessive force, denial of a right to a fair trial and intentional infliction of emotional distress “IIED”. See Jury Verdict Sheet ECF No. 147. Defendants now renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50b with respect to all of Plaintiffs' claims “Motion”. See ECF Nos. 151, 154, 158. For the reasons set forth below Defendants' Motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

The Court assumes familiarity with the background of this case see generally Rizk v. City of New York, 462 F.Supp.3d 203 (E.D.N.Y. 2020), and only briefly discusses the relevant facts. In the early morning of August 3, 2013, Plaintiffs were at a bar/lounge located on Steinway Street in Astoria, Queens. See Trial Transcript, ECF No. 156 at 283:11-19. Defendants Mehirdel and Lee, driving a marked patrol car, were flagged down by a black SUV and passerby, alerting them to an argument between a man and woman, later learned to be Plaintiffs Gonsalves and Rizk. See Trial Transcript, ECF No. 155 at 44:7-46:2. Mehirdel, who was in the front passenger seat of the patrol car, asked Rizk if she was okay, and she replied that everything was fine. Id. at 46:4-12. Nonetheless, Medirdel and Lee exited the car and, in an attempt to separate Gonsalves from Rizk, Mehirdel ordered Gonsalves to come towards him by gesturing with his hands. Id. 47:9-19. Gonsalves did not comply with this order, which resulted in a confrontation between the parties during which Mehirdel stated Gonsalves struck him. Id. at 47:21-51:7; ECF No. 156 at 294:3-300:19. Both Plaintiffs were subsequently arrested: Rizk was arrested at the scene, ECF No. 155 at 50:18-20, and Gonsalves was arrested at the 114th precinct in Astoria, id. at 168:4-9.^[1]

The trial commenced on July 18, 2022. The jury heard testimony from Plaintiffs Gonsalves and Rizk, Defendants Mehirdel and Lee, Captain Joel Rosenthal as well as Dr. Oscar Korte, Plaintiff Rizk's therapist. At the close of evidence on July 19, 2022, pursuant to Rule 50(a), Defendants moved: (i) to dismiss Captain Rosenthal from the action; (ii) to dismiss all of Plaintiffs' remaining claims including false arrest, excessive force, denial of the right to fair trial, failure to intervene, and intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (iii) for qualified immunity with respect to all of Plaintiffs' claims. The Court granted Defendants' motion with respect to Captain Rosenthal, finding that all remaining counts against him should be dismissed. See ECF No. 156 at 365:3-366:5. The Court found that taking all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the jury would not have a legally sufficient basis to find for Plaintiffs as to Captain Rosenthal. Id. The Court reserved decision on qualified immunity and Plaintiffs' remaining claims and sent the case to the jury. Id. at 364:20-25.

After considering the parties' arguments, the testimony before it, and a video of the incident, the jury determined that: (i) Mehirdel used excessive force against Rizk; (ii) Mehirdel denied Plaintiffs' right to a fair trial and Lee failed to intervene to prevent it; and (iii) Mehirdel intentionally inflicted emotional harm on Rizk. See ECF No. 147. The jury found in favor of Mehirdel and Lee as to Plaintiffs' claims for false arrest and Gonsalves' claim of excessive force. Id. The jury awarded Gonsalves and Rizk $13,000 and $2,120, respectively, in compensatory damages. Id. at 6. The jury further awarded Gonsalves and Rizk each $11,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 7. Judgment was entered against Defendants on July 25, 2022. See ECF No. 149.

LEGAL STANDARD

At a jury trial, “[a] court may grant judgment as a matter of law if, after a party has been fully heard on an issue, the court concludes there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the opposing party on an issue essential to a claim.” Woolfolk v. Baldofsky, No. 19-cv-3815, 2022 WL 3358081, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). “That burden is particularly heavy where . . . the jury has deliberated in the case and actually returned its verdict in favor of the nonmovant. In such circumstances, a court may set aside the verdict only if there exists such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or the evidence of the movant is so overwhelming that reasonable and fair-minded persons could not arrive at a verdict against it.” Fox v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 462 F.Supp.3d 241, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”), the court “must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Excessive Force

Defendants argue that the Court should grant a JMOL with respect to Rizk's claim of excessive force because: (i) it fails as a matter of law, and (ii) Mehirdel is entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 151-1 at 12-22. For the reasons set forth below, the Court declines to grant Defendants' Motion.

A. Plaintiff Rizk's Excessive Force Claim Does Not Fail as a Matter of Law “The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from the government's use of excessive force when detaining or arresting individuals. A police officer's use of force is excessive in violation of the Fourth Amendment if it is objectively unreasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting [him], without regard to [his] underlying intent or motivation.” Lawson v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 920 F.Supp.2d. 332, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).

As Defendants point out, Mehirdel was legally entitled to use some degree of force to arrest Rizk, but the reasonableness of the amount of force used is in dispute. ECF No. 151-1 at 20.

“Although [t]he fact that a person whom a police officer attempts to arrest resists, threatens, or assaults the officer no doubt justifies the officer's use of some degree of force, . . . it does not give the officer license to use force without limit. Instead, the force an officer uses must be reasonably related to the nature of the resistance and the force used, threatened, or reasonably perceived to be threatened, against the officer.” Lee v. City of Troy, 339 F.R.D. 346, 361 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Sullivan v. Gagnier, 225 F.3d 161, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2000)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).

“In deciding whether an officer used excessive force, the fact finder must consider the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including: (1) the nature and severity of the crime leading to the arrest, (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and (3) whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Lawson, 920 F.Supp.2d at 340 (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants argue that the video footage and testimony at trial plainly shows that Mehirdel's use of force was reasonable as a matter of law. ECF No. 151-1 at 22. However, “[d]rawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party and giving deference to all credibility determinations of the jury, the Court finds that the [Defendants] ha[ve] not established that the evidence is insufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find in [Plaintiff's] favor.” Lawson, 920 F.Supp.2d at 340 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendants' testimony paints a picture in which Rizk “physically involved herself in defendants' attempt to arrest plaintiff Gonsalves,” resisted Mehirdel's attempts to place her under arrest, and got out of her handcuffs in the police vehicle-as a result, the force used by Mehirdel was reasonable. See ECF No. 151-1 at 20-22. However testimony exists in the record that, if believed by the jury, indicates that: (i) Mehirdel initiated force against Rizk before she resisted arrest, see ECF No. 156 at 300:17-24 (“At one point, he had his hand on my neck and was, like, pushing it down against the car, and he proceeded to handcuff me .... Q: Did you hear anyone say you were under arrest before you grabbed? A: No. I didn't hear anything said before I was grabbed.”); (ii) that she tried to alert Mehirdel to her discomfort and was ignored, see id. at 300:5-9 (“I was screaming: Please. Please .... My dress is going up . . . and he's like: I don't care. Shut up. Shut up. Just throwing me against the car.”); and (iii) and that Mehirdel continued to exert force against Rizk after she was handcuffed, see id. at 302:9-12 (“[H]e reached in to the vehicle towards me .... He reaches in and he does, like, a two movement - -...