RL Clark, LLC v. Hammond

1

2024-Ohio-5051

RL CLARK, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GLADYS HAMMOND ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 23 BE 0047

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Seventh District, Belmont

October 18, 2024

Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Belmont County, Ohio Case No. 21 CIV 0038

JUDGMENT Affirmed.

Atty Timothy B. Pettorini, Atty. Jeremy D. Martin and Atty. Sara E. Fanning, Roetzel & Andress, LPA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Atty Erik A. Schramm, Jr. and Atty. Kyle W. Bickford, Hanlon McCormick, Schramm, Bickford & Schramm Co., LPA, for Defendants-Appellants

BEFORE: Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Katelyn Dickey, Judges.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

WAITE J.

{¶ 1} Appellants challenge the trial court's summary judgment decision regarding the effect of the Marketable Title Act ("MTA") on a one-half royalty interest contained in a 1902 deed. The trial court determined that a 1956 deed was the root of title in this matter. The court examined whether a reference in that deed to prior royalty interests was general rather than specific, and whether the royalty interest was extinguished under the MTA. Appellants contend that the reference to oil and gas reserved by prior grantors was specific enough to satisfy the three-part test in Blackstone v. Moore, 2018-Ohio-4959. Appellants are incorrect, and the trial court properly concluded that the reference to prior oil and gas royalties in the 1956 deed was merely general. Based on the holding in Blackstone, the general reference to a royalty interest does not preserve the interest unless the deed also contained specific identification of a prior recorded title transaction. There is no such specific identification in the 1956 deed. The 1902 royalty interest was extinguished under the MTA.

{¶ 2} Appellants also argue that there are numerous leases in the record, and that those leases can act as savings events to prevent extinguishment under the MTA. Although it is true that a lease can act as a savings event under the MTA, Appellants did not show that the 1902 royalty interest arose in any of the leases that are part of the record in this case. Appellants' assignment of error is overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 3} The dispute in this case is whether Appellants own a one-half oil and gas royalty underlying eight acres of land in Section 2 of Smith Township, Belmont County, Ohio. Appellee owns a portion of the oil and gas rights, but contends that it owns those rights free and clear of the Appellants' alleged interest due to the effect of the automatic extinguishment provisions of the MTA. Appellants rely on a 1902 deed to establish their interest, whereas Appellee relies on a 1956 deed.

{¶ 4} The eight acres in question were originally part of a larger parcel of property, roughly 21 acres in size (also described as 21 acres and 103 square perches or "the 21 -acre tract"). In 1902, the owners, Issac C. Wise and Hannah Wise, conveyed the property to George Green with the following exception: "excepting the one half (1/2) of the oil and gas royalty." (Belmont County Deed Records Vol. 142, Page 127, "The Wise Deed"). Appellants purport to be the successors in interest to this exception of one half of the oil and gas royalty. This royalty interest will be referred to as the "[t]he Wise 1/2 Royalty."

{¶ 5} In 1908, Aaron C. Ramsey acquired the property. The deed contained an exception of one half the oil and gas royalties. In 1925, Mr. Ramsey deeded the property to D.R. Dunfee and Sara B. Dunfee (Belmont County Deed Records Vol. 258, Page 466, "The Ramsey Deed"). This deed also excepted one half of the oil and gas royalties.

{¶ 6} On November 13, 1956, the Dunfees conveyed the property to Joe Sheba, Jr. and Hazel Sheba with the following provision: "subject also to such interest in the oil and gas royalties as have hereto been reserved by former grantors." (Belmont County Deed Records Vol. 428, Page 488, "The Dunfee Deed").

{¶ 7} On March 3, 1972, Joe Sheba, Jr. and Hazel Sheba conveyed the property to Clyde and Marcelene Porter "excepting also all oil and gas reserved by former grantors." (The "Sheba Deed").

{¶ 8} On January 12, 1974, the Porters conveyed the property to James M. Harkins and Jacqueline Harkins "excepting . . . all oil and gas reserved by the Grantors' predecessors in title." (The "Porter Deed").

{¶ 9} On July 13, 1995, the Harkins deeded the property to Lisa Marie Clark. The deed contained the same language as the 1974 Porter Deed: "excepting . . . all oil and gas reserved by the Grantors' predecessors in title."

{¶ 10} In 1997, Lisa M. Clark conveyed a life estate in the property to Jacqueline J. Harkins, and a remainder interest to Lisa Marie Clark, Karen D. Price, and Patricia A. Wonski. In 1999, the remaindermen conveyed their interest to Roger W. Clark and Lisa Clark.

{¶ 11} In 2015, the Clarks sold an undivided 65.91% interest in the oil and gas to Ridgeway Royalties, LLC. Then, in 2017, the Clarks conveyed their 34.09% oil and gas rights to Appellee RL Clark, LLC ("RL Clark").

{¶ 12} On March 11, 2021, Appellee filed a complaint in the Belmont County Court of Common Pleas against 107 defendants, including the 10 Appellants in this appeal. The defendants are referred to as "[t]he Wise Defendants" as their rights purportedly arise from the 1902 Wise Deed and the Wise 1/2 Royalty. RL Clark raised claims of declaratory judgment and quiet title based on the MTA, R.C. 5301.47 et seq. Appellants filed a counterclaim seeking declaratory judgment and quiet title based on the same principles.

{¶ 13} On July 28, 2023, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, and Appellants filed a response in opposition. On September 8, 2023, the trial court granted Appellee's motion for summary judgment. The trial court then adopted Appellee's proposed judgment entry. The court determined that: one who has an unbroken chain of title of record of an interest in land for forty years or more has marketable record title under the MTA; the root of title deed was the 1956 Dunfee Deed; the Dunfee Deed does not contain a specific reference to the "Wise 1/2 Royalty" claimed by Appellants; there are no title transactions affecting title to the "Wise 1/2 Royalty" filed within 40 years of the root of title deed; the "Wise 1/2 Royalty" was not the subject of any of the oil leases Appellants put in evidence; the "Wise 1/2 Royalty" was extinguished by the MTA; and that Appellee RL Clark was the owner of an undivided 34.09% interest in the oil and gas in the property.

{¶ 14} The court's summary judgment entry was filed on October 5, 2023. The notice of appeal was filed on November 2, 2023. Appellants raise a single assignment of error containing three sub-parts.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

{¶ 15} Appellants' single assignment of error asserts the following:

1. The Trial Court erred in determining the oil and gas royalty interest created by the Wise Deed was extinguished by operation of the Ohio Marketable Title Act by ignoring numerous title transactions of the oil and gas estate which encompassed the royalty interest.

2. The Trial Court erred in finding the root of title deed, being the Dunfee Deed, and subsequent conveyances, contain only a general reference.

3. The Trial Court erred by holding the Dunfee Deed was a proper root of title.

{¶ 16} The questions raised by Appellants will be addressed as follows: 1) whether the prior property interest in the 1956 Dunfee Deed is a general reference without a specific identification of a prior recorded title transaction; 2) whether the trial court should have relied on the 1974 Porter Deed as the root of title; and 3) whether the oil and gas leases on the property were "savings events" under the MTA preventing extinguishment of the 1902 Wise 1/2 Royalty.

Summary Judgment Standard

{¶ 17} The trial court entered summary judgment in this matter. An appellate court conducts a de novo review of a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment, using the same standards as the trial court set forth in Civ.R. 56(C). Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). Before summary judgment can be granted, the trial court must determine that: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing the evidence most favorably in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, the conclusion is adverse to that party. Temple v Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977). Whether a fact is "material" depends on the substantive law of the claim being litigated. Hoyt, Inc. v. Gordon & Assoc, Inc., 104 Ohio App.3d 598, 603 (8th Dist. 1995).

{¶ 18} "[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the nonmoving party's claim." (Emphasis deleted.) Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 296 (1996). If the moving party carries its burden, the nonmoving party has a reciprocal burden of setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 293. In other words, when presented with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must produce some evidence to suggest that a reasonable factfinder could rule in that party's favor. Brewer v. Cleveland Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio App.3d 378, 386 (8th Dist. 1997).

{¶ 19} The evidentiary materials to support a ...