Robb v. Conn. Bd. of Veterinary Med.

204 Conn.App. 595

254 A.3d 915

John M. ROBB

v.CONNECTICUT BOARD OF VETERINARY MEDICINE et al.

AC 41912

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 29, 2020

Officially released May 18, 2021

Joseph P. Secola, Brookfield, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Tanya Feliciano DeMattia, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and Clare Kindall, solicitor general, for the appellee (named defendant).

Lavine, Prescott and Moll, Js.^*

MOLL, J.

The plaintiff, John M. Robb, a veterinarian, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing his administrative appeal from the decision of the defendant Connecticut Board of Veterinary Medicine (board)¹ disciplining him upon a finding of professional negligence pursuant to General Statutes § 20-202 (2).² On appeal, we distill the plaintiff's claims to be that the court incorrectly concluded that (1) the board properly construed General Statutes § 22-359b, as well as § 22-359-1 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, in finding him to have been professionally negligent under § 20-202 (2), (2) there was substantial evidence supporting the board's finding that he had failed to obtain informed consent from one of his clients with respect to his rabies vaccination protocol, and (3) the board did not exceed its authority or abuse its discretion in imposing its disciplinary order. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff is licensed to practice veterinary medicine in Connecticut. On August 1, 2014, the Connecticut Department of Public Health (department) submitted to the board a statement of charges³ against the plaintiff charging him with professional negligence in violation of § 20-202 (2). The statement of charges alleged in relevant part: "From about July, 2010 through about February, 2012, while working at the [Banfield Pet Hospital in Stamford, the plaintiff] failed to meet the standard of care in one or more of the following ways: a. [the plaintiff] instructed employees to administer [one-half] doses of rabies vaccines to animals under the weight of fifty pounds; b. [the plaintiff] instructed employees to refrigerate unused [one-half] doses of rabies vaccines to be used to vaccinate another pet; c. [the plaintiff] failed to adequately document medication administration; and/or d. [the plaintiff] failed to obtain adequate informed consent from pet owners."

On November 3, 2014, the plaintiff answered the statement of charges and asserted three special defenses. The plaintiff twice amended his answer and special defenses. In his operative responsive pleading, the plaintiff alleged that he had "instructed his employees to give an appropriate dose of rabies vaccine" to his clients’ dogs, but he otherwise denied the material allegations set forth in the statement of charges. In addition, the plaintiff asserted six special defenses.⁴

The board held six days of administrative hearings between December 2, 2014, and February 23, 2016. On April 5, 2016, the parties submitted posthearing briefs. The record was closed on April 5, 2016, and the board conducted fact-finding on May 4 and November 2, 2016.

On February 2, 2017, the board issued a corrected memorandum of decision⁵ concluding that the department had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that, between approximately July, 2010, and February, 2012, the plaintiff had committed professional negligence in violation of § 20-202 (2). First, the board found that the plaintiff did not contest the department's allegation that he had instructed his employees to administer one-half doses of rabies vaccines to his clients’ dogs weighing under fifty pounds; instead, the plaintiff contended that he had exercised his discretion to adjust the doses based on the weight of the dogs. The board concluded that, pursuant to General Statutes § 22-359b⁶ and § 22-359 -1 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies,⁷ rabies vaccines had to be administered in accordance with "licensed rabies vaccine label directions," which required the administration of one milliliter of rabies vaccine regardless of the weight of the dog, such that the plaintiff's conduct constituted a deviation from the standard of care.⁸

Next, the board determined that the department had proven its allegation that the plaintiff had instructed his employees to refrigerate unused one-half doses of rabies vaccines for later use. The board concluded that the plaintiff did not breach the standard of care by instructing his employees to refrigerate the unused one-half doses for short periods of time; however, the board reiterated its prior determination that the administration of one-half doses of rabies vaccines to dogs weighing under fifty pounds constituted a breach of the standard of care.

Last, the board determined that the department had proven its allegation that the plaintiff had failed to obtain informed consent from his clients with regard to his rabies vaccination protocol. The board stated that, "when a veterinarian deviates from the administration of a statutorily mandated recommended [vaccine] dose, he or she must document and explain to the client that: there is a mandated dose, why the mandated dose was not used, and the risks of not vaccinating the recommended dose." With regard to Anne Bloomdahl, one of the plaintiff's clients, the board determined that "her testimony supported the finding that she did not receive adequate information from [the plaintiff] as to the legality of [the plaintiff's] rabies vaccine protocol.... Bloomdahl incorrectly believed that having her dogs vaccinated with only [one-half] doses of rabies vaccine [s] was sufficient under Connecticut law.... Thus, [the plaintiff] failed to receive informed consent from Bloomdahl when he administered [one-half] doses of rabies vaccine [s] to her dogs without informing her that he was statutorily required to inject her dog[s] with a full milliliter of the rabies vaccine, the reason the full dose was not used, the fact that [the plaintiff] could have obtained a rabies vaccine exemption [pursuant to General Statutes § 22-339b (b) ], and about the risks associated with the failure to vaccinate ... Bloomdahl's dog[s] fully." (Citations omitted.) Additionally, the board found the plaintiff to be "not credible" and "evasive" when questioned about whether he had received informed consent from his clients.⁹

In light of the foregoing determinations, the board concluded that disciplinary action against the plaintiff was warranted pursuant to General Statutes §§ 19a-17¹⁰ and 20-202. In imposing its disciplinary order, the board stated: "The board finds that [the plaintiff's] misconduct of under vaccinating animals for rabies endangered their lives and those around them. The department's expert stated that under vaccination could potentially provide the vaccinated animals with less protection, which ‘could result in the animal getting a zoonotic disease that's potentially fatal to people.’ ... In the situation when an animal is suspected of having contracted rabies, the board notes that the animal must be quarantined and may be killed in order to examine whether it did in fact contract rabies.... Therefore, due to the serious consequences that could result from under vaccination for rabies, and [the plaintiff's] ardent belief that under his Aesculapian authority¹¹ he does not have to vaccinate animals in accordance with state laws and regulations ... the board orders that [the plaintiff's] license to practice veterinary medicine be place[d] on probation for a period of twenty-five ... years under the terms and conditions listed [later in the corrected memorandum of decision]."¹² (Citations omitted; footnote added.)

On March 28, 2017, pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183 (a),¹³ the plaintiff appealed from the decision of the board to the Superior Court. On June 20, 2018, after the parties had filed their respective briefs, the court, Hon. Lois Tanzer, judge trial referee, issued a memorandum of decision dismissing the administrative appeal. The court summarized that "[t]he crux of the [administrative] appeal concerns [the plaintiff's] ability to use his personal rabies vaccination protocol of administering a [one-half] dose of rabies vaccine for dogs weighing less than fifty pounds instead of complying with state statutes and regulations for administering rabies vaccines. [The plaintiff] raised numerous issues before the board in his denial to the [statement of] charges and in several special defenses. He reiterates them in this [administrative] appeal. He raises essentially two challenges: (1) the board misinterpreted and misapplied the statutes and regulations governing the administration of rabies vaccines, and (2) the board did not have substantial evidence to support its findings and conclusions, and it acted illegally, arbitrarily and in abuse of its discretion. [The plaintiff] also challenges the [disciplinary] order of the board as erroneous in law and fact." The court rejected the plaintiff's contentions, concluding that (1) the board properly construed § 22-359b, as well as § 22-359-1 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, to mandate that rabies vaccines be administered in accordance with their attendant label directions, which required the administration of one milliliter of rabies vaccine to dogs regardless of weight, and properly applied the statute and the regulation to determine that the plaintiff had committed professional negligence in violation of § 20-202 (2) by failing to comply with the statute and the regulation, and (2) there was substantial evidence in the record supporting the board's decision. In addition, the court rejected the plaintiff's first through fifth special defenses¹⁴ and determined that the board did not exceed its authority or abuse its discretion in imposing its disciplinary order. This appeal...