Robbins v. Cleburne Cnty. Comm'n

300 So.3d 573

Shannon ROBBINS

v.CLEBURNE COUNTY COMMISSION

1180106

Supreme Court of Alabama.

January 31, 2020

Gregory M. Varner and Spencer P. Waddell of Law Office of Gregory M. Varner, P.C., Ashland, for appellant.

Robert C. Lockwood of Wilmer & Lee, P.A., Huntsville, for appellee.

MITCHELL, Justice.

Alabama counties may only enter into contracts that are authorized by the legislature. Shannon Robbins, the former county engineer of Cleburne County, sued the Cleburne County Commission ("the Commission") alleging breach of contract after the Commission denied the validity of a renewal option in his employment agreement. To decide his appeal, we must determine whether the Commission was authorized by the legislature to enter into that employment agreement. Because Robbins cannot prevail regardless of which potentially applicable statute gives the Commission authority to contract for the employment of a county engineer, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of his case.

Facts and Procedural History

On February 18, 2010, Robbins signed an agreement with the Commission to continue his employment as the Cleburne County Engineer ("the agreement"). The agreement provided:

"TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT: The employer hereby extends employment of the employee, and the employee hereby accepts an extension of employment with the employer for a period of 60 months, beginning on the 1st day of February, 2011, to the 31st day of January, 2016; however, this Agreement may be terminated by the employee or employer at an earlier date, as hereinafter provided. At least 60 days prior to the end of the term of employment pursuant to this agreement, the employee agrees he will notify the employer in writing that he is selecting one of the following options.

"(a) To extend this agreement for an additional twelve (12) month period;

"or

"(b) That he will undertake the negotiation of a new employment contract.

"....

"TERMINATION BY EMPLOYER: This agreement may be terminated by the employer with immediate notice for valid cause in accordance with the Cleburne County Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual, October 2009 Edition."

On October 13, 2015, Robbins attempted to exercise the option to extend the agreement for a sixth year. The Commission refused to recognize the validity of the option and terminated his employment at the end of the original five-year term on January 31, 2016.

Robbins sued the Commission in the Cleburne Circuit Court on January 31, 2018, alleging breach of contract. The Commission filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., arguing that the general law authorizing counties to employ county engineers, see § 11-6-1, Ala. Code 1975 ("the general law"), limited contracts to five years and that the agreement was thus void ab initio. Robbins responded by arguing that the general law did not apply and that a local law requiring Cleburne County to hire a county engineer who "shall serve at the pleasure of the county commission," § 45-15-130.01, Ala. Code 1975 (Local Laws) ("the local law"), authorized the agreement. The trial court agreed that the local law was the relevant source of the Commission's contracting authority but concluded that the agreement violated the local law and granted the Commission's motion to dismiss. This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

"The appropriate standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6) is whether, when the allegations of the complaint are viewed most strongly in the pleader's favor, it appears that the pleader could prove any set of circumstances that would entitle her to relief. In making this determination, this Court does not consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only whether she may possibly prevail. We note that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief."

Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993) (citations omitted).

Analysis

If the Commission was not authorized to enter into the agreement, Robbins cannot prove any set of circumstances that would entitle him to relief. The Alabama Constitution does not extend home rule to the State's counties. As a result, it has long been recognized in Alabama that county governments "are creatures of the Legislature," Arledge v. Chilton Cty., 237 Ala. 96, 99, 185 So. 419, 421 (1938), and that "as a political subdivision of the state, a county can exercise only that authority conferred on it by law." Jefferson Cty. v. Johnson, 333 So. 2d 143, 145 (Ala. 1976) (citing Alexander v. State, 274 Ala. 441, 443, 150 So. 2d 204, 206 (1962) ; Trailway Oil Co. v. City of Mobile, 271 Ala. 218, 222, 122 So. 2d 757, 760 (1960) ). The Commission's contracting authority thus extends only so far as is authorized by the legislature –– which means that the Commission is "liable for those claims only which the law empowers [it] to contract for." Cooper v. Houston Cty., 40 Ala. App. 192, 195, 112 So. 2d 496, 498 (1959) (citing Board of Revenue & Road Comm'rs of Mobile Cty. v. State ex rel. Drago, 172 Ala. 155, 54 So. 995 (1911) ).

In this case, two separate statutes address the Commission's authority to contract for the employment of a county engineer. First, the general law authorizes all counties to hire a county engineer, but it limits that grant of authority by providing that "[t]he county may enter into a contract of employment of appointment to office of said engineer for a period of time not to exceed five years." Second, the local law, which applies only to Cleburne County, requires the Commission to hire a county engineer and provides that "[t]he county engineer shall serve at the pleasure of the county commission." Robbins is entitled to relief only if the Commission was authorized to bind itself to the agreement by one of those two statutes.

Because those statutes are inconsistent, only one can be the operative grant of authority to the Commission. The general law gives Cleburne County the discretion to do without a county engineer and, should the Commission decide to exercise its hiring authority, limits those contracts to five years, while the local law requires the Commission to hire a county engineer and provides that the engineer shall serve at the Commission's pleasure. We do not need to determine which statute governs here because the Commission exceeded its authority under either law.¹

We begin our analysis with the Commission's contracting authority under the general law before considering the authority granted it by the local law.

1. The Agreement is Not Authorized by the General Law

The general law authorizing counties to employ a county engineer limits the maximum duration of employment contracts: "The county may enter into a contract of employment of appointment to office of said engineer for a period of time not to exceed five years." § 11-6-1. The decision to award Robbins a five-year contract with a unilateral option for a sixth year exceeded the Commission's authority, because the general law only authorizes a contract for five years or fewer.

No decision of this Court discusses the application of § 11-6-1, and no opinion of an Alabama court directly considers the use of renewal options to circumvent a statutory limitation on the length of a contract. But we find the reasoning of Attorney General Opinion No. 91-00187 persuasive. See T-Mobile S., LLC v. Bonet, 85 So. 3d 963, 978 (Ala. 2011) ("An attorney general's opinion is not binding upon this Court, although it can be persuasive authority." (citing Anderson v. Fayette Cty. Bd. of Educ., 738 So. 2d 854, 858 (Ala. 1999) )). In that opinion, the Attorney General concluded that the City of Decatur could not enter into a three-year contract with an option to renew for an additional two years when the applicable statute provided that "contracts ... shall be let for periods of not greater than three years." Ala. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 91-00187 (Mar. 20, 1991) (quoting § 41-16-57(e), Ala. Code 1975 ). The agreement between the Commission and Robbins similarly attempts to evade the five-year limitation set by the general law through the use of an option to renew beyond the statutory limit, and the agreement is equally invalid. The agreement exceeds the authority granted to the Commission under the general law, and Robbins is thus unable to prove any set of circumstances that would entitle him to relief if the agreement is governed by the general law.

2. The Agreement is Not Authorized by the Local Law

The local law requires the Commission to employ a county engineer and provides that "[t]he county engineer shall serve at the pleasure of the county commission." § 45-15-130.01. Robbins's primary argument is that the Commission may, "at [its] pleasure," choose to employ a county engineer under a fixed-term contract rather than at will. Based on the understanding reflected in our caselaw that the phrase "at the pleasure of" refers to at-will employment, and in light of the Court of Appeals' decision in Cooper v. Houston County, 40 Ala. App. 192, 112 So. 2d 496 (1959), and the great weight of persuasive authority from other states, we conclude that, in awarding the five-year contract to Robbins, the Commission exceeded its authority under the local law.

The phrase "at the pleasure of" is commonly understood to refer to at-will employment. See, e.g., Mountain v. Collins, 430 So. 2d 430, 432–33 (Ala. 1983) ("Under [ § 11-44-28, Ala. Code 1975,] municipal employees who do not come under civil service regulations are ‘at will’ employees. The board of commissioners is responsible for their hiring, and they are ‘removable at the pleasure of the board of commissioners.’ " (quoting § 11–44–28, Ala. Code 1975)); DeWitt v. Gainous, 601 So. 2d 103, 104 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) ("Under Article 5, § 16–60–111.4(3), [Ala.] Code 1975, the State Board of Education is empowered to ‘appoint the president of each junior college and trade school, each...