Roberson v. Crawford

638 F.Supp.3d 1354

Christopher ROBERSON, Plaintiff, v. Vikas CRAWFORD, Defendant.

Case No. 3:22-cv-1037-MMH-PDB

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division

Signed November 3, 2022

Christopher Roberson, Crestview, FL, Pro Se Plaintiff.

ORDER

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Christopher Roberson, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action on September 16, 2022, by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint (Complaint; Doc. 1-1) with exhibits (Docs. 1-2 through 1-3).¹ In the Complaint, Roberson names Dr. Vikas Crawford as the Defendant. Roberson asserts that Dr. Crawford acted with deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment when he "maliciously and sadistically" prescribed Meloxicam to Roberson on March 25, 2021, and renewed the prescription on June 23, 2021. Complaint at 3. According to Roberson, he went to a" [m]edical call out" on March 25, 2021, but arrived late. Id. at 4. He alleges that Dr. Crawford chastised him, and stated, "All you inmates cry about minor problems when they aren't as big as you say they are. You're a bunch of cry babies." Id. Dr. Crawford then said, "I got some good medication for you, so you can get out of my office." Id. Dr. Crawford prescribed Meloxicam to Roberson, telling him that the medication would treat his arthritis and "change [his] life." Id. at 5. Roberson avers he experienced pain in his body "weeks later." Id. Dr. Crawford ordered blood tests on July 19, 2021, and the results showed Roberson had high creatinine levels. Dr. Crawford ordered additional blood tests on August 14, 2021. Id. After reviewing the results, Dr. Crawford told Roberson that the Meloxicam had destroyed his kidneys. Id. He allegedly stated, "Since the medication has destroyed your kidneys, I think the meds [are not] working like I expected it to." Id. Roberson contends he now has anemia due to kidney failure. Id. at 6. As relief, he requests a declaratory judgment, $3,000,000 in compensatory damages, $3,000,000 in punitive damages, and fees and costs. Id. at 7.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.² See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. "A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or fact." Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Battle v. Cent. State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir. 1990)). A complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is not automatically frivolous. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals should only be ordered when the legal theories are "indisputably meritless," id. at 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, or when the claims rely on factual allegations which are "clearly baseless." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992). "Frivolous claims include claims 'describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district judges are all too familiar.' " Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328, 109 S.Ct. 1827). Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears that a plaintiff has little or no chance of success. Id. As to whether a complaint "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," the language of the PLRA mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts.³ Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted); Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Moreover, under Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show "an affirmative causal connection between the official's acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation." Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306 n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while "[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]" the complaint should " 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.' " Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). While not required to include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must allege "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id.

A "plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that "conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal") (internal citation and quotations omitted). Indeed, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]" which simply "are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680, 129 S.Ct. 1937. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant.

As it relates to medical care, "the Supreme Court has held that prison officials violate the bar on cruel and unusual punishments when they display 'deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.' " Keohane v. Fla. Dep't of Corr. Sec'y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)). To prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must show: "(1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendants' deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the plaintiff's injury." Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2009). The Eleventh Circuit has explained:

"To show that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and a subjective inquiry." Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). To meet the first prong, the plaintiff must demonstrate an "objectively serious medical need"—i.e., "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention," and, in either instance, "one that, if left unattended, poses a substantial risk of serious harm." Id. (alteration adopted) (quotations omitted).

To satisfy the second, subjective prong, the plaintiff must prove that the prison officials "acted with deliberate indifference to [his serious medical] need." Harper v. Lawrence Cty., 592 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). "To establish deliberate indifference," a plaintiff must demonstrate that the prison officials "(1) had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2)

disregarded that risk; and (3) acted with more than gross negligence." Id. (quotation omitted).⁴ An inmate-plaintiff bears the burden to establish both prongs. Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007).

Hoffer v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020) (footnote omitted; emphasis added). For medical treatment to rise to the level of a constitutional violation, the care must be " 'so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.' " Id. at 1271 (quoting Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991)); see also Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating "[g]rossly incompetent or inadequate care can constitute deliberate indifference . . . , as can a doctor's decision to take an easier and less efficacious course of treatment" or fail to respond to a known medical problem).

However, the law is well settled that the Constitution is not implicated by the negligent acts of corrections officials and medical personnel. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348, 106 S.Ct....