Robert C.B. v. Callahan

170 N.Y.S.3d 619

In the Matter of ROBERT C.B. (Anonymous), appellant.

v.Michael CALLAHAN, respondent.

2020–04671

File No. 97851/09

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—March 29, 2022

July 6, 2022

Disability Rights New York, Albany, NY (William J. Tronsor and Jennifer H. Feeley of counsel), for appellant.

Fitzgerald & Sadove PLLC, White Plains, NY (Erica M. Fitzgerald and Stacy M. Sadove of counsel), for respondent.

MARK C. DILLON, J.P., COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JOSEPH J. MALTESE, LARA J. GENOVESI, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In a guardianship proceeding pursuant to Surrogate's Court Procedure Act article 17–A in which Robert C.B. petitioned to dissolve the guardianship of his person and property, Robert C.B. appeals from an order of the Surrogate's Court, Dutchess County (Michael G. Hayes, S.), dated May 15, 2020. The order, insofar as appealed from, after a hearing, denied that branch of the petition which was to dissolve the guardianship of Robert C. B.’s property.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the petition which was to dissolve the guardianship of Robert C. B.’s property is granted.

Robert C.B. (hereinafter the petitioner) was born in 1996, and his parents died when he was a child. In her will, the petitioner's mother named her brother, Michael Callahan, as the petitioner's guardian, and in 2015, the Surrogate's Court found that the petitioner, who was then 18 years old, was a developmentally disabled person under SCPA article 17–A and appointed Callahan, his uncle, as the guardian of his person and property. In 2019, the petitioner filed a petition to dissolve the guardianship. Callahan agreed not to take a position as to whether the petition should be granted. The petitioner withdrew his allegations contesting the original guardianship determination, as well as any claims that Callahan had not acted in his best interest. Following a hearing, the court granted that branch of the petition which was to dissolve the guardianship of the petitioner's person and denied that branch of the petition as was to dissolve the guardianship of the petitioner's property. The petitioner appeals.

SCPA article 17–A authorizes a court to appoint an individual with a developmental disability "a guardian of the person or of the property or of both if such appointment of a guardian or guardians is in the best interest of the person who is developmentally disabled" ( SCPA 1750–a[1] ). A person is developmentally disabled under SCPA article 17–A if he or she (1) has "an impaired ability to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of decisions which result in such person being incapable of managing himself or herself and/or his or her affairs by reason of developmental disability," (2) "such condition is permanent in nature or likely to continue indefinitely," (3) the disability is attributable to, among other conditions, autism, and (4) the disability "originates before such person attains age twenty-two" ( id. § 1750–a[1] ).

A guardianship under SCPA article 17–A "shall not terminate at the age of majority" of the "person who is developmentally disabled but shall continue during the life of such person, or until terminated by the court" (id. § 1759[1]). "[A]n [SCPA] article 17–A guardianship is the most restrictive type of guardianship available under New York law and should only be granted in the absence of less restrictive alternatives" ( Matter of Eli T., 62 Misc.3d 638, 640, 89 N.Y.S.3d 844 [Sur. Ct., Kings County] ). Further, "proof that a person with an intellectual disability needs a guardian must exclude the possibility of that person's ability to live safely in the community supported by family, friends and mental health professionals" ( Matter of Dameris L., 38 Misc.3d 570, 578, 956 N.Y.S.2d 848 [Sur. Ct., N.Y. County] ).

A person with a developmental disability who is 18 years old or older and for whom a guardian has been appointed under SCPA article 17–A may petition, inter alia, "to have the guardianship order modified, dissolved or otherwise amended" (id. § 1759[2]). "Upon such a petition for review, the court shall conduct a hearing pursuant to [ SCPA 1754 ]" (id. ). If, after the hearing, "the court is satisfied that the best interests of the ... person who is developmentally disabled will be promoted by the appointment of a guardian of the person or property, or both, it shall make a decree naming such person or persons to serve as such guardians" ( id. § 1754[5] ). "The term ‘best interest’ has been aptly described as amorphous and ... [u]nderstanding the functional capacity of an individual with disability, what an individual can or cannot do, is a necessary inquiry in determining best interest and the necessity of guardianship ( Matter of Hytham M.G., 52 Misc.3d 1211[A], 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 51113[U], *3, 2016 WL 3981192 [Sur. Ct., Kings County] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Chaim A.K., 26 Misc.3d 837, 845, 885 N.Y.S.2d 582 [Sur. Ct., N.Y. County] ).

Here, the petitioner correctly contends that the Surrogate's Court erred in denying that branch of the petition which was to dissolve the guardianship of his property. The petitioner established that he did not have a disability as defined in SCPA article 17–A, as his evidence showed that his ability to "understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of decisions" was not impaired (id. § 1750–a[1]). The petitioner presented medical evidence that his autism was mild and that he...