Roberts v. Gibbs

655 F.Supp.3d 683

Jaime M. ROBERTS, Plaintiff, v. Glenda GIBBS, Defendant.

Case No. 3:20-cv-322

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Northern Division, at Knoxville

Filed February 9, 2023

Connie Reguli, Pro Hac Vice, LawCare Family Law Center, P.C., Brentwood, TN, James Bryan Moseley, Moseley & Moseley, Attorneys at Law, Murfreesboro, TN, for Plaintiff.

Arthur F. Knight, III, Taylor & Knight, GP, Knoxville, TN, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

CURTIS L. COLLIER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment by Defendant Glenda Gibbs (Doc. 52). Plaintiff responded in opposition (Doc. 59), and Defendant replied (Doc. 60). Defendant has also filed three motions to exclude evidence from the Court's consideration of her summary-judgment motion (Docs. 61, 62, 68), to which Plaintiff has responded in opposition (Doc. 69) and Defendant has replied (Doc. 70). The matter is now ripe for review.

I. BACKGROUND¹

Plaintiff is the biological mother and legal parent of D.M.R., L.C.R., and P.J.S. (Doc. 59 at 2.) She has a parenting plan for D.M.R. and L.C.R. with their father and for P.J.S. with his father. (Id.) Plaintiff had primary custody of P.J.S. (Id.) Defendant was an investigator for Tennessee's Department of Children's Services ("DCS"). (Id. at 1.)

On July 21, 2019, Plaintiff picked up P.J.S. from his father. (Id. at 2.) P.J.S. complained about his bottom hurting; Plaintiff saw redness around his anus and a rash on his inner leg. (Id. at 2-3.) P.J.S. told her that his father had stuck his hand in his "butthole." (Id. at 3.) That same day, Plaintiff took P.J.S. to the emergency room at East Tennessee Children's Hospital, where Dr. Abrams interviewed P.J.S. and performed a physical exam. (Doc. 59-2 at 1-2.) Dr. Abrams reported the potential sexual abuse to DCS and advised Plaintiff not to have P.J.S. see his father until he had been evaluated by DCS and was permitted to go. (Id. at 5, 8.)

On July 23, 2019, P.J.S. underwent a forensic interview with Dr. Lawhon, a clinical psychologist, at the Safe Harbor Child Advocacy Center of the Smokies.² (Doc. 59 at 3-4.) Plaintiff was not present, but according to Dr. Lawhon's report, P.J.S. reported again that his father inserted his finger into his buttocks. (Id. at 4.) Defendant also performed a home visit at Plaintiff's residence, finding no concerns about cleanliness or safety. (Id.)

On July 24, 2019, Plaintiff received a phone call from Defendant, who told Plaintiff that she had found no reason to restrict P.J.S. from seeing or visiting his father and so P.J.S. would have to go to his father for his scheduled visitation. (Doc. 59 at 4.) According to Defendant's affidavit, Plaintiff became "very upset" and "stated that she feared her child would die in a freak accident if allowed to go visit his father, and that the father would dissolve the child's body in a hole where cows are buried." (Doc. 52-1 at 2.) Defendant avers she did not believe there was a basis for that concern. (Id.) She avers Plaintiff also told her she would obtain a new hospital note preventing P.J.S. from visiting his father and that "she was going to leave and take her children with her, and that no one would know their whereabouts." (Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiff then called law enforcement regarding what Defendant said. (Doc. 59 at 4-5.) During the 911 call, she saw that Deputy Kevin Carr of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office was already outside, so she went to speak with him. (Id. at 5.) Defendant arrived as well; she told Plaintiff and Deputy Carr that there was a court order for the removal of all of Plaintiff's children from her custody. (Doc. 59-3 at 2.) Defendant and her direct supervisor, Amy Ball, discussed issuing an immediate protection agreement ("IPA") in which Plaintiff would be prohibited from contacting her children pending a psychological evaluation and court order and the fathers of her children would hold temporary primary custody. (Doc. 52-1 at 3; Doc. 59 at 1; Doc. 59-4 at 1-2.) The father of D.M.R. and L.C.R. and the father of P.J.S. agreed to the IPA. (Id.) Ball approved the IPA by phone. (Id.) Plaintiff did not sign the IPA, which states, "this document is not a court order. It is a voluntary agreement between the signed parties." (Doc. 59-4 at 1-2.)

Plaintiff complied with the terms of the IPA under the belief that Defendant had a court order authorizing the removal of her children until her court date. (Doc. 59 at 5.) But afterwards, when Plaintiff went to the court clerk's office to request a copy of the court order Defendant had referred to, the clerk informed her there was no such order. (Id. at 6.) She then asked Defendant, who said that a petition and order would be submitted in the future, but no petition or order was ever filed to Plaintiff's knowledge. (Doc. 59-1 at 4.) At an unspecified date, the parties held a DCS Child and Family Team Meeting, during which the IPA was dissolved and Plaintiff's original joint custody arrangements resumed. (Doc. 52 at 5.)

On September 17, 2021, Plaintiff filed her first amended complaint suing Defendant, Ball, and Julia Minton³ in their individual capacities. (Doc. 38 at 1-2.) She alleges they acted in concert to violate her procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment when "Gibbs lied to Plaintiff and told Plaintiff that she had a court order for the removal of her children from her home without notice and the opportunity to be heard before a Court." (Id. at 6.) She also alleges they acted in concert to violate her substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment when "Gibbs lied to Plaintiff and told Plaintiff that she had a court order for the removal of her children from her home interfering with her liberty interest in the right to parent her children without undue government interference." (Id. at 6-7.) She seeks three million dollars of compensatory, nominal, and punitive damages. (Id. at 8.)

On December 6, 2022, the parties filed a stipulation dismissing the claims against Ball and Minton. (Doc. 58.) Only the claims against Defendant, Gibbs, remain.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of showing no genuine issue of material fact remains. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 897 (6th Cir. 2003).

If the moving party meets its initial burden, "the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial." Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). A genuine issue for trial exists if there is "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)) (internal quotations omitted). In addition, should the nonmoving party fail to provide evidence to support an essential element of its case, the movant can meet its burden by pointing out such failure to the court. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989).

At summary judgment, the court's role is limited to determining whether the case contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the nonmovant. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The court should view the evidence, including all reasonable inferences, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Nat'l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis, Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001). If the court concludes, based on the record, that a fair-minded jury could not return a verdict in favor of the nonmovant, the court should grant summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir. 1994).

III. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, Defendant urges the Court to dismiss the action because of Thomas v. Shipka, 818 F.2d 496, 503-04 (6th Cir. 1987), which holds that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for constitutional claims. (Doc. 60 at 1, 2.) Defendant argues that the first amended complaint does not "invoke or otherwise mention" § 1983, so it must be dismissed. (Id. at 2.)

Notice pleading "requires only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Rule 8(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires courts to construe pleadings "so as to do justice." "No technical form is required." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).

Therefore, Defendant is incorrect that Plaintiff's first amended complaint must be dismissed on the sole basis that it did not explicitly mention § 1983. Shipka does not stand for the proposition that all pleadings must invoke § 1983 or face dismissal, and Defendant does not cite any authority stating that such a disposition is proper. Plaintiff's first amended complaint was sufficient to put Defendant on notice that there were constitutional claims brought against her. For instance, in her answer to the first amended complaint, Defendant requests costs and attorney fees in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which governs attorney fees in § 1983 actions. Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendant's argument. The Court construes Plaintiff's first amended complaint as an action brought under § 1983.

Plaintiff claims Defendant violated her procedural due process rights...