Robertson v. Barber Foods, LLC

BRIAN ROBERTSON, Plaintiff, v. BARBER FOODS, LLC, et al., Defendants.

Docket No. 2:19-cv-00455-NT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MAINE

June 11, 2020

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff Brian Robertson alleges that the Defendants terminated his employment and falsely accused him of dishonest behavior in retaliation for reporting his supervisor, Defendant Scott Schmitz, to human resources for harassing a coworker. Based on this conduct, the Plaintiff has brought an eight-count Complaint against Defendant Barber Foods, LLC, its parent company Defendant Tyson Foods, Inc. (collectively "Tyson"),¹ and Schmitz, asserting federal and state law claims for unlawful retaliation as well as six state law tort claims. Compl. (ECF No. 5-3). This matter comes before me on the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6). Defs.' Mot. (ECF No. 6). For the reasons stated below, I GRANT in part and DENY in part the motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Brian Robertson worked as the Food Safety and Quality Assurance Manager at Tyson's food manufacturing facility in Portland, Maine. Compl. ¶¶ 1-2. Robertson's job responsibilities included supervising several employees who were involved with plant operation and working with outside food safety inspectors. Compl. ¶¶ 7-8. Both the federal government and private, independent certification agencies inspected the Portland facility. Compl. ¶ 7.

Defendant Scott Schmitz is the General Manager of Tyson's Portland facility. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 9. Schmitz is responsible for overseeing plant operation. Compl. ¶ 9.

In August of 2018, Robertson observed Schmitz aggressively berating a female member of Robertson's team because Schmitz was upset that her decision on a quality assurance issue had idled the plant for two hours. Compl. ¶ 10. Schmitz's behavior caused the employee to shake and cry. Compl. ¶¶ 10-11. Robertson concluded that Schmitz was acting this way because the employee was a woman and Schmitz felt that he could intimidate her. Compl. ¶ 11.

The next day, Robertson observed Schmitz approach that female employee and ask her for a hug. Compl. ¶ 12. At the conclusion of the daily staff meeting, Robertson pulled Schmitz and Jessica Howard, a human resources representative, aside and explained to Schmitz that his behavior toward the female employee was inappropriate. Compl. ¶ 13. After Schmitz left, Robertson described Schmitz's behavior in full to Howard. Compl. ¶ 13. Robertson took these steps because he felt the responsibility to speak up in opposition to Schmitz's behavior, which Robertson considered inappropriate and illegal. Compl. ¶ 12.

Schmitz met with Robertson the next day, August 8, 2018. Schmitz told Robertson that he should have explained Schmitz's sense of the humor to the employee rather than complaining to human resources. Compl. ¶ 14. Schmitz also complained about overtime costs for quality assurance issues and threatened to "go over Robertson's head." Compl. ¶ 15. Robertson concluded that Schmitz was threatening to retaliate against him for reporting Schmitz's behavior to human resources. Compl. ¶ 15. Schmitz told other employees that Robertson "stabbed him in the back" and that Robertson should not have gone to Human Resources with his concerns. Compl. ¶ 15. Robertson submitted written complaints to Jessica Howard about Schmitz's threats. Compl. ¶ 16.

A few weeks after Robertson reported Schmitz, a private credentialing organization visited the plant for an inspection. Compl. ¶ 17. The audit found that a piece of plastic that protected employees from a belt washing system had to be removed. Compl. ¶ 17. Schmitz opposed removing the plastic, and he instructed his team not to meet with Robertson to prepare a corrective action in response to the audit. Compl. ¶¶ 17-18. Schmitz knew that Robertson was ultimately responsible for implementing a corrective action to respond to the audit. Compl. ¶ 20. Schmitz violated his general manager's duties by failing to work with Robertson, and he violated Tyson's duties to comply with private audit standards. Compl. ¶ 22.

After an unsuccessful appeal of the audit finding, pursued at the command of Schmitz, Robertson filed a corrective action with the auditor indicating that the plastic would not be used on a daily basis. Compl. ¶¶ 23-24, 27. Consistent with thecorrective action, Robertson had the plastic taken town and instructed a member of his team to obtain a photo with the plastic removed. Compl. ¶ 27. Robertson told employees that if there was a need to use the plastic, they could put it up from time to time but that they could not use it on a daily basis. Compl. ¶ 28. Robertson was out of the office from September 11-13, 2018, during which time the plastic was ordered to be replaced on the production line. Compl. ¶¶ 29-30.

Immediately after the plastic was replaced, Schmitz made a knowingly false report to Tyson that Robertson had falsified the corrective action to the private auditor. Compl. ¶ 31-32. Tyson credited Schmitz's report and conducted an inadequate investigation into the allegation that failed to give Robertson a fair opportunity to respond. Compl. ¶¶ 35-36. The company also did not investigate Robertson's report that Schmitz was retaliating against him and ignored crucial facts that would have led Tyson to the conclusion that Schmitz framed Robertson in retaliation for reporting Schmitz to Human Resources. Compl. ¶¶ 34, 36.

Tyson, through its managers and supervisors including Schmitz, reported to others that Robertson had been dishonest in responding to the private auditor. Compl. ¶ 37. Tyson terminated Robertson on September 24, 2018, and it issued a written statement about his behavior that it knew, or should have known, was false. Compl. ¶¶ 38, 40. Tyson knew that Schmitz was engaged in a scheme to retaliate against Robertson and accepted and adopted the scheme. Compl. ¶ 42. Tyson's ultimate response to the audit findings was to implement the solution that Robertsonhad originally proposed—using the plastic on the production line only as needed, rather than on a daily basis. Compl. ¶ 43.

Robertson asserts that the false statements and retaliation by Schmitz and Tyson cost him his job and have prevented him from finding similar employment in the New England area. Compl. ¶¶ 31-42, 73. In September of 2019, the Plaintiff filed this action in state Superior Court. The Complaint asserts eight counts: (1) unlawful retaliation under the Maine Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), against Tyson; (2) unlawful retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, against Tyson; (3) defamation, against Schmitz and Tyson; (4) interference with advantageous economic relations, against Schmitz; (5) interference with prospective economic advantage, against Schmitz and Tyson; (6) fraud, against Schmitz and Tyson; (7) negligent misrepresentation, against Schmitz; and (8) negligence, against Schmitz. Compl. ¶¶ 44-89; Superior Court Docket Record (ECF No. 5-1). The Defendants removed the action to this Court in October of 2019. Notice of Removal (ECF No. 1).

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the "legal sufficiency" of a complaint. Me. Educ. Ass'n Benefits Trust v. Cioppa, 842 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (D. Me. 2012). The general rules of pleading require a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That "short and plain statement" need only "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations and alterations omitted); see Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S.521, 530 (2011) (complaint need not contain "an exposition of [plaintiff's] legal argument," nor must it "pin plaintiff's claim for relief to a precise legal theory").

To determine whether a complaint states a claim, courts in the First Circuit follow a two-step analysis. First, the court must "isolate and ignore statements in the complaint that simply offer legal labels and conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-action elements." Carrero-Ojeda v. Autoridad de Energía Eléctrica, 755 F.3d 711, 717 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal quotations omitted). Then, taking all well-pleaded facts as true and "drawing all reasonable inferences in [plaintiff's] favor," the court must determine whether the complaint "plausibly narrate[s] a claim for relief." Id. (internal quotations omitted). "Plausible" means "more than merely possible" but does not require all facts necessary to establish a prima facie case. Id. at 717-18 (internal quotations omitted). Although a plaintiff need not establish a prima facie case of his claim at the pleading stage, "the elements of a prima facie case may be used as a prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the claim." Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013). Distinguishing sufficient from insufficient pleadings is a "context-specific task." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

DISCUSSION

The Defendants argue that seven of the Plaintiff's eight counts must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Defs.' Mot. 4-14. I discuss each count in turn.

I. Unlawful Retaliation (Counts I and II)

The Defendants first argue that the Plaintiff's claims for unlawful retaliation under the MHRA and Title VII should be dismissed because the Plaintiff fails toallege that he exhausted his administrative remedies.² Defs.' Mot. 4-6. The Plaintiff counters that he need not allege exhaustion in his Complaint and that, in any event, the Defendants have firsthand knowledge of his exhaustion efforts because they were parties to his complaint before the Maine Human Rights Commission ("MHRC"). Pl.'s Opp'n 8-9 (ECF No. 10).

Neither Title VII nor the MHRA treats exhaustion of administrative remedies as a jurisdictional requirement. Rather, courts have interpreted exhaustion to be a condition...