Robertson v. Houston, Mississippi Public School District

335 So.3d 1082

Lemond ROBERTSON, as Guardian and Next Friend of A.R., a Minor, Appellant

v.HOUSTON, MISSISSIPPI PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee

NO. 2020-CA-00931-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

December 14, 2021

Rehearing Denied March 22, 2022

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MARK TYLER JACKSON

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: WALTER WILLIAM DUKES, Gulfport, MARA MICHÈLE LESIEUR JOFFE

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., GREENLEE AND SMITH, JJ.

SMITH, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Lemond Robertson, as the guardian and next friend of A.R.,¹ a minor, sued the Houston, Mississippi Public School District (the School District) under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). Following a hearing on the School District's motion for summary judgment, the Chickasaw County Circuit Court found that no genuine issues of material fact existed to show the School District had "breached its ministerial dut[ies]" or "failed to use ordinary care and take reasonable steps to minimize foreseeable risks to [A.R.]." The circuit court therefore granted the school district's summary judgment motion. Robertson appeals and argues the circuit court erred because genuine issues of material fact exist. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶2. A.R. attended Houston High School. Around 7 a.m. on May 5, 2017, A.R.'s mother called the high school and spoke to a school secretary. A.R.'s mother stated she had just learned from a fellow parent that another student, T.B., had allegedly expressed an intention to harm A.R. once both girls arrived at school that day. After receiving the phone call from A.R.'s mother, the secretary immediately passed along the information to Assistant Principal Robert Winters, who then notified Principal Jason Cook of the alleged threat.

¶3. When A.R.'s school bus arrived at school around 7:15 a.m., she found Cook, Winters, and Coach Chris Pettit waiting for her as she exited the bus. Pettit escorted A.R. away from the other students gathered in the commons area and into the gym. When T.B.'s bus arrived at the high school later that morning, Cook and Winters met T.B. as she exited the bus. The two administrators escorted T.B. into the high school with the intention of taking her to the front office to determine whether T.B. had threatened A.R. As the three entered the commons area, however, T.B. suddenly broke into a run. Winters attempted to restrain T.B., but she broke away from his grasp and ran into the gym.

¶4. With Winters and Cook in pursuit, T.B. chased A.R. into the gym's bleachers. A.R. stated that as she began to run down the bleacher stairs, she saw Pettit and another teacher, Carolyn Matthews, standing at the bottom of the stairs. According to A.R., Matthews told her to jump down the last few remaining steps to the gym floor. Pettit testified that he, however, did not recall Matthews being inside the gym, much less standing beside him, when the incident occurred, and he never heard any adult in the gym tell A.R. to run into the bleachers or to jump down from the bleacher stairs to the floor. Matthews testified that she was inside the school when the incident occurred but was not standing at the bottom of the bleacher stairs. Matthews also stated that she never instructed A.R. to jump down from the bleacher's landing to the gym floor.

¶5. Upon jumping down the last several steps of the bleachers and landing on the gym floor, A.R. experienced pain in her right knee. Winters, Cook, and Pettit then managed to detain T.B. until police officers arrived. Following the incident, A.R. sought medical treatment for her right knee. She later underwent surgery on the knee.

¶6. On September 19, 2018, Robertson, as A.R.'s guardian and next friend, filed a lawsuit against the School District. Robertson alleged that the School District had acted negligently under Mississippi Code Annotated section 37-9-69 (Rev. 2019) by failing to (1) "hold [T.B.] to strict account for disorderly conduct at the school"; (2) "use ordinary care and take reasonable steps to minimize foreseeable risks to [A.R.]"; and (3) "provide a safe school environment for [A.R.]." Following discovery, the School District moved for summary judgment. After a hearing, the circuit court entered a judgment on the School District's motion. The circuit court found that the only disputed fact was whether Matthews had told A.R. to jump down the bleacher stairs to the gym floor. Even assuming that fact to be true, however, the circuit court concluded that no genuine issues of material fact existed to show that the School District had (1) "breached its ministerial duty ... to hold [T.B.] to strict account for disorderly conduct"; (2) "breached its ministerial duty ... to prevent bullying or harassing behavior by [T.B.]"; or (3) "failed to use ordinary care and take reasonable steps to minimize foreseeable risks to [A.R.]." The circuit court therefore granted the School District's summary judgment motion. Aggrieved, Robertson appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7. "We review an order granting summary judgment de novo." Smith v. Baker , 321 So. 3d 575, 581 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, we recognize that "[s]ummary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact[,] and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Wood v. Reynolds , 316 So. 3d 208, 211 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Wright v. R.M. Smith Invs. L.P. , 210 So. 3d 555, 557 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) ). The movant "bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists." Id. at (¶17) (quoting Bolden v. Murray , 97 So. 3d 710, 714 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) ). Where the movant demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the nonmoving party "must rebut by producing significant probative evidence showing that there are indeed genuine issues for trial." Id. (quoting Miller v. Myers , 38 So. 3d 648, 651 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) ). A "genuine" dispute arises when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant." Id. (quoting Brown Lakeland Props. v. Renasant Bank , 243 So. 3d 784, 790 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) ).

DISCUSSION

¶8. Robertson asserts that the School District breached its ministerial duties to A.R. under section 37-9-69 and that as a direct result of the breach, A.R. suffered harm. According to Robertson, genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the School District complied with its duty under section 37-9-69 to (1) "use[ ] ordinary care and [take] reasonable steps to minimize foreseeable risks to [A.R.]"; (2) "exercise[ ] ‘reasonable efforts’ in supervising the students involved in [the subject] incident"; and (3) "[hold T.B.] to strict account for disorderly conduct at the school." Robertson contends that these disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment.

¶9. As this Court has previously explained,

The MTCA provides the exclusive civil remedy against a governmental entity for acts or omissions which give rise to a suit. Any tort claim filed against a governmental entity or its employee shall be brought only under the MTCA, and a school district is a governmental entity under the MTCA. Under the MTCA, sovereign immunity is waived for claims for money damages arising out of the torts of governmental entities and their employees, unless they are explicitly exempted from this waiver under Section 11-46-9(1) of the Mississippi Code. Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-46-9(1) [(Rev. 2019)] exempts discretionary but not ministerial duties from immunity.

A ministerial duty is a duty that is positively designated by statute, ordinance, or regulation. Section 37-9-69 states that each superintendent, principal[,] and teacher in the public schools of this state shall hold the pupils to strict account for disorderly conduct at school, on the way to and from school, on the playgrounds, and during recess. The Mississippi Supreme Court has found that [s]ection 37-9-69 ... imposes upon school districts a ministerial duty to use ordinary care and to take reasonable steps to minimize foreseeable risks to students thereby providing a safe school environment. The school is not an insurer of the safety of pupils, but has the duty of exercising ordinary care, of reasonable prudence, or of acting as a reasonable person would act under similar circumstances.

J.E. v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist. , 264 So. 3d 786, 791 (¶¶12-13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶10. Although the circuit court recognized the School District's ministerial duty under section 37-9-69 to hold students to strict accountability for disorderly conduct at school, the court concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed to show a breach of this duty. The circuit court further concluded that no genuine issues of material fact existed to show that the School District either failed to use ordinary care in its actions or failed to take reasonable steps to minimize the foreseeable risks to A.R.

¶11. A.R. admitted that prior to her mother's phone call to the high school on the morning of May 5, 2017, the school administration had no reason to know about or suspect a potential threat against her. A.R. stated that she and T.B. had been friends and that T.B. had never before threatened or attempted to harm her. Upon learning about the potential threat from another parent after A.R. had departed for school, A.R.'s mother telephoned the school and spoke to a secretary, who immediately informed the assistant principal, Winters, about the situation. Winters testified that he then promptly passed along the information to the principal, Cook. With only about fifteen minutes until A.R.'s bus arrived at the high school, Cook and Winters formulated a plan to address the still-developing situation. Winters testified that he and Cook planned to escort A.R. and T.B. to different areas of the school and to question the two students separately about the alleged threat.

¶12. Along...