Robertson v. Rivard

REGINALD ADAM ROBERTSON, Petitioner, v. STEVEN RIVARD, Respondent

Case Number 16-11422

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

July 18, 2019

Honorable David M. Lawson

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Reginald Adam Robertson pleaded guilty to carjacking, robbery, assault, and firearms offenses. After he was sentenced to prison and his state court appeals yielded no relief, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Robertson argues that the trial court erred by accepting his guilty pleas without making an adequate inquiry into the breakdown in his relationship between him and his court-appointed attorney. Because Roberston has not shown that the state courts disposed of his claims in violation of federal law, the Court will deny his petition.

I.

Robertson was charged with numerous felonies arising out of five different carjackings that had taken place in Detroit, Michigan. His attorney negotiated a plea agreement with the prosecutor in which three of the cases would be dismissed and Robertson would plead guilty in the remaining two cases to two counts of carjacking, two counts of armed robbery, one count of felonious assault, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony firearm). The parties also agreed that Robertson would be sentenced to four concurrent sentences of 9 to 20 years for carjacking and armed robbery.

Robertson initially rejected the plea offer and expressed a desire to go to trial. After a recess in the plea hearing, the parties announced that Robertson decided to plead guilty. Robertson was sworn in and informed the judge he had signed the plea forms. However, when the judge asked him whether he was satisfied with his attorney, he replied "No, not really." Hrg. Tr. at 17, ECF No. 10-8, PageID.310. When the judge asked Robertson to explain, the following exchange took place:

MR. ROBERTSON: I'm going to tell you the truth, like I wrote you in the letter, I'm not going to lie, I took the plea. But there's been a breakdown between me and Mr. Parker since I met him as my lawyer. He just started working on my case. There's no point for me to go to trial and lose.

THE COURT: Well, we've had many pretrials in these matters, and Mr. Parker was present when he argued the motions in this case.

MR. ROBERTSON: I know.

THE COURT: And you know, he's one of the most experienced attorneys in this county in criminal defense. So, you know, you don't have to go forward with this, we have trials set up.

MR. ROBERTSON: That's what I want to do?

THE COURT: You don't want to plead?

MR. ROBERTSON: I'll plead.

THE COURT: So you want to go forward?

MR. ROBERTSON: Yes, Ma'am.

Id. at 17-18, PageID.310-11.

The judge informed Robertson of the maximum penalties for the offenses to which he was pleading guilty. The judge also advised him of the rights that he would be giving up by pleading guilty. Robertson specifically stated that he had not been coerced or threatened by anyone intopleading guilty. After admitting to the factual basis for his crimes, the judge again asked Robertson if he wanted her to accept his plea in the two cases, and he stated "yes, ma'am." Id. at 25, PageID.318.

At sentencing, when Robertson was asked if he wished to make a statement, he and the judge had the following exchange:

MR. ROBERTSON: Like I was telling you the last time I came to court, I just didn't know how to present it at first, but now I do. I feel like before we get to this that I was trying to tell you that I felt like it was a conflict of interest in my case with Mr. Parker. I ain't saying that I'm not going to take this sentence, this plea. I feel like the breakdown in my communication with him — because every time he came and seen me, it was always what the prosecutor was going to do, the prosecutor this, the prosecutor that. He never told me what we were going to do. He never came up with a plan to go to trial to beat this. Because I'm not going to lie, I can't tell you that I'm innocent, because I'm scared to go to trial. I ain't never been through it before, so I don't want to go, I took the plea. Because I felt like if I went to trial and lost my life would have been gone for nothing. So that's the only reason why I took the plea. I'm not going to give it back, because I do not want — I ain't trying to go through this. I'm trying to get it over with so that I go back home and be with my family, that's it.

THE COURT: Well, all those thoughts go into your decision as to whether or not to plead guilty, which we went through at your guilty plea. I asked you all those questions. Those are the things that people weigh when deciding whether or not to take a plea agreement. That's exactly the considerations that people like you and, you know, defendants that are here on multiple cases decide, that's exactly what you do. And you did that, and you had able counsel. Mr. Parker is one of the most experienced lawyers in the building. And you did plead guilty. So I appreciate your comments.

MR. ROBERTSON: And another thing is. I know you can't use the test in court, but this is my life. I could have — there ain't no way I could prove that I'm innocent without him helping me. And that's what I felt like he wasn't trying to do, he wasn't trying to help me. So I said something about a polygraph test. He comes to me and tells me that you said no. But this is my life on the line. What if that was the only way to prove that I was innocent and you all locking up the wrong person?

THE COURT: Well, we're past that now.

MR. ROBERTSON: I know, when I first got locked up he told me no, that you said no.

Sentencing Tr. at 7-9, ECF No. 10-9. PageID.327-29.

The prosecutor interjected that Robertson was most likely referring to the fact that his attorney probably explained to him that a polygraph examination would be inadmissible in court. The prosecutor also pointed out Robertson had been involved in five different carjacking cases.

The judge sentenced Robertson in accordance with the plea and sentence agreement.

His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. People v. Robertson, No. 322032 (Mich. Ct. App. July 7, 2014); lv. den. 497 Mich. 953, 858 N.W.2d 427 (2015).

Robertson now seeks a writ of habeas corpus on the following ground:

The trial court erred in accepting Petitioner's guilty pleas without an adequate inquiry into the breakdown into his relationship with his court-appointed attorney.

Pet. at 5, ECF No.1, PageID.5.

II.

Certain provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996), which govern this case, "circumscribe[d]" the standard of review federal courts must apply when considering an application for a writ of habeas corpus raising constitutional claims. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003). A federal court may grant relief only if the state court's adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or if the adjudication "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).

"Clearly established Federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions." White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted). "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103, (2011). The distinction between mere error and an objectively unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent creates a substantially higher threshold for obtaining relief than de novo review. Mere error by the state court will not justify issuance of the writ; rather, the state court's application of federal law "must have been objectively unreasonable." Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000) (quotation marks omitted)). The AEDPA imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings and demands that state-court decisions be "given the benefit of the doubt." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010). Moreover, habeas review is "limited to the record that was before the state court." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180 (2011).

The state appellate courts' decisions were rendered in summary orders, not reasoned opinions. Nonetheless, the deference required by the AEDPA stall must be afforded. "Under [Harrington v. Richter], '[w]hen a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on its merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.'" Barton v. Warden, S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 786 F.3d 450, 460 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S.at 99). There is no such indication here. Compare Ray v. Bauman, 326 F. Supp. 3d 445, 457-59 (E.D. Mich. 2018). ADEPA deference applies to the adjudication of Robertson's claim.

A.

The warden argues that the petition should be dismissed because Robertson did not exhaust his claim. Section 2254 requires state prisoners to "fairly present" their claims as federal constitutional issues in the state courts before raising those claims in a federal habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) and (c); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999); McMeans v. Brigano, 228 F.3d 674, 680-81 (6th Cir. 2000); Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1994...