Robertson v. Univ. of Akron Sch. of Law

CLARK A. ROBERTSON, PLAINTIFF, v. UNIVERSITY OF AKRON SCHOOL OF LAW, et al., DEFENDANTS.

No. 5:20-cv-1907

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division

August 20, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HONORABLE SARA LIOI UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In this civil rights action, plaintiff Clark Robertson (“Robertson”), through his attorney, alleges that the following state entities and/or individuals violated his rights under federal and state law: University of Akron School of Law (“UAL”); and Christopher J. Peters (“Dean Peters”), Charles Oldfield (“Dean Oldfield”), John C. Green (“Green”), Dale E. Gooding, Jr. (“Gooding”), James P. Weber (“Weber”), Todd R. Hough (“Hough”) Thomas A. Gedeon (“Gedeon”), and Thomas Wayner (“Wayner”) (collectively “UA Individuals”). Robertson also raises federal and state claims against two private actors: Summa Health System (“Summa”) and Thomas Gspandl M.D. (“Dr Gspandl”) (collectively “Summa Defendants”).

Now before the Court are the following fully briefed motions: (1) the motion of UAL and UA Individuals for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. No. 11 (MJP), Doc. No. 14 (Opposition), Doc No. 17 (Reply)); (2) the motion of Summa Defendants for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. No. 16 (MJP), Doc No. 20 (Opposition), Doc. No. 23 (Reply)); and (3) Robertson's motion to voluntarily dismiss certain claims (Doc. No. 21 (MTD), Doc. No. 22 (UAL and UA Individual's response).)

I. Background

Robertson is a 69-year old resident of Ohio “with a mental health disability of anxiety [, ]” for which he received disability benefits until he reached retirement. (Doc. No. 1 (Complaint) ¶ 3.) Robertson holds several college degrees, including a law degree from an accredited law school. (Id.) He began attending UAL in 2017, having received a three-year scholarship. (See Id. ¶ 9.) Robertson maintains that, throughout his time as a student at UAL, Deans Peters and Oldfield, and others harassed and ridiculed him on the basis of his age and mental health disability. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 10.)

In November 2017, Dean Oldfield advised Robertson that if he wanted to maintain his academic standing at UAL he would have to submit to a psychiatric examination at the Cleveland Clinic. (Id. ¶ 11.) “Defendant police officers” placed Robertson in custody and transported him to the Cleveland Clinic, Akron Campus. (Id.) The examining psychiatrists determined that Robertson suffered from anxiety but did not have a mental illness that would warrant involuntary commitment under Ohio law. (Id.) Following Robertson's release, Dean Oldfield forced Robertson to obtain counseling services from the university and, without cause, inspected his locker and bassoon case. (Id. ¶ 13.)

In March 2018, Robertson filed a complaint with the United States Department of Education Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) alleging discrimination based upon age and disability. (Id. ¶ 14.) Robertson and UAL participated in a mediation session with mediator Barb[a]ra Baker (“Baker”) of the Federal Mediation & Conciliation Service (“FMCS”). (Id. ¶ 15.) At the conclusion of the mediation session, Robertson agreed not to pursue the matter further because of stress. (Id.) Robertson alleges that, following the mediation, certain AU Individuals continued to harass Robertson, and on August 17, 2018, Dean Oldfield warned Robertson that he “was going to fuck his crazy ass.” (Id. ¶ 16.)

On the morning of August 29, 2018, Robertson called Baker and advised her that he wanted to file a claim of retaliation against UAL because it was discriminating against him on the basis of his age. (Id. ¶ 17.) During the telephone call, Robertson informed Baker that he “did not want to commit suicide” and that if the university “want[ed] to push [him to the edge] . . . [he] will put them on the map . . . it will absolutely be a nasty mess.” (Id.) According to Robertson, the “nasty mess”, and the act of “putting [UAL] on the map”, referred to his plan to take legal action against UAL. (Id.)

Following the telephone call, Baker called Carolyn Brommer (“Brommer”), Baker's superior at FMCS, and reported Robertson's call. (Id.) Brommer then contacted UAL and forwarded a tape recording of the telephone call. (Id. ¶ 18.) After listening to the recording, Deans Peters and Oldfield contacted University of Akron Police Department and requested that officers take Robertson into custody. (Id. ¶ 20.) Hough, Gedeon, Wayner, and Weber-all University of Akron police officers (collectively “UA Officers”)-responded to the call. (Id. ¶ 20, see Id. ¶ 7.) Robertson assured UA Officers that he had no intention of committing suicide and that he only wanted to “get his day in court.” (Id. ¶ 21.) Nevertheless, UA Officers “pink-slipped” Robertson, referring to the pink colored slip filled out by a healthcare professional to involuntarily commit a mentally ill person for psychiatric evaluation over a period of 72 hours, and transported him to Summa's emergency department. (Id. ¶ 22.)

On August 29 and 30, 2018, Summa conducted an “unwanted and unmerited involuntary psychiatric assessment of Robertson. (Id. ¶ 24.) On August 30, 2018, Summa “pink-slipped” Robertson and transferred him, over objection, to Summa's psychiatric hospital. (Id. ¶ 25.) Summa then directed Robertson to sign a voluntary admission form. (Id.) Summa ultimately admitted Robertson to its psychiatric hospital and held him for 18 days despite his requests to be released. (Id.) Robertson was eventually released after he contacted the Hotline for the Veteran's Administration (“VA”) and the VA intervened on his behalf. (Id. ¶ 26.)

During Robertson's stay at the psychiatric hospital, Summa and Dr. Gspandl caused an affidavit to be filed in probate court seeking a court order forcing Robertson to take antipsychotic medication. (Id. ¶ 27.) Dr. Gspandl threatened Robertson that he would be hospitalized for a long time if he refused to take the medication. (Id.) According to Robertson, he eventually agreed to take the medication, though he did so under duress. (Id.)

On August 30, 2018, UAL and Green, the Interim President of UAL, advised Robertson in writing that he was no longer permitted on the UAL campus and informed him that there would be a hearing on a conduct violation to determine whether Robertson should be permanently excluded from UAL. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 28.) Robertson requested that he be permitted the assistance of counsel and the right to be heard at the scheduled disciplinary hearing. Because UAL and Deans Peters and Oldfield denied these requests, Roberts elected not to attend the hearing. (Id. ¶¶ 29-30.) Robertson was excluded from UAL and has been unable to complete his legal studies. (Id. ¶ 31.) He filed the instant action on August 26, 2020.

II. Robertson's Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Claims

On November 27, 2020, UAL and UA Individuals filed their motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Summa Defendants filed their Rule 12(c) motion on January 28, 2021. On March 5, 2021, Robertson filed a motion by which he seeks leave to voluntarily dismiss certain claims against certain defendants.^[1] While Robertson cites Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) as the basis for his motion, Rule 41(b) is reserved for motions to dismiss entire actions. See Dix v. Atos IT Sols. & Servs., Inc., No. 1:18-cv-275, 2020 WL 6064646, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 17, 2020) (“Rule 41 provides only for dismissal of ‘actions,' not ‘claims.'”) (citing Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 286 F.2d 782, 785 (6th Cir. 1961)). Where, as here, a plaintiff requests leave to dismiss discrete claims from the litigation, Rule 21 is the appropriate procedural vehicle. See Wilkerson v. Brakebill, 3:15-cv-435, 2017 WL 401212, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 30, 2017) (“A plaintiff seeking to dismiss only one defendant from an action must move the Court to do so under Rule 21.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); EQT Gathering, LLC v. A Tract of Prop. Situated in Knott Cty., Ky., No. 12-cv-58, 2012 WL 3644968, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 24, 2012) (“Rule 21 permits only the Court . . . to dismiss fewer than all of the claims or parties.”).

Rule 21 provides, in relevant part, that “[o]n motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 21. “Pursuant to Rule 21 courts consider whether allowing withdrawal would be unduly prejudicial to the moving party.” Wilkerson, 2017 WL 401212, at *2-3 (noting that the analysis is similar to that performed under Rule 41 where the “relevant determination . . . is whether the defendant would suffer ‘plain legal prejudice' as a result of the dismissal”) (quotation marks and citations omitted). In evaluating the potential prejudice under Rule 41, courts often consider factors such as: (1) “the defendant's effort and expense of preparation for trial, ” (2) “excessive delay and lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiff in prosecuting the case, ” (3) “insufficient explanation for the need to take a dismissal, ” and (4) “whether a motion for summary judgment has been filed by the defendant.” Grover v. Eli Lily & Co., 33 F.3d 716, 718 (6th Cir. 1994); see Walther v. Florida Tile, Inc., 776 Fed.Appx. 310, 316 (6th Cir. 2019). Given that the decision to permit dismissal under either rule turns on the existence of prejudice, consideration of these same factors is also appropriate in the context of a Rule 21 motion. See, e.g., Wilkerson, 2017 WL 401212, at *3 (“When evaluating a motion for dismissal under Rule 21 . . . courts should . . . consider Rule 41 standards as guidance in evaluating potential prejudice to the non-movant.”) (citing Arnold v. Heyns, No. 13-cv-14137, 2015 WL 1131767, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 11, 2015)). “In general, a motion to dismiss should be granted unless a...