KAYLA ROBINSON, Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, et al, Defendants.
Case No. 4:17-CV-156 PLC
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION
August 12, 2020
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Kayla Robinson's motion for attorney fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 [ECF No. 158] and motion for bill of costs [ECF No. 157]. Defendant Angela Hawkins ("Defendant") opposes the motion for attorney fees. [ECF No. 167]
I. Background
In November 2016, Plaintiff filed an action against five1 defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging constitutional violations arising from a traffic stop and strip search performed by Defendant, then an officer with the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (SLMPD). [ECF No. 3] In her first amended complaint, Plaintiff alleged the following six counts: unreasonable search and use of excessive force against Defendant (Counts I and II); municipal liability claims against the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners (Counts III, IV, V); and civil conspiracy
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against Defendant, Officer Swinton, and Lieutenant Colonel O'Toole. [ECF No. 18]
Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on her section 1983 claim for unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. [ECF No. 50] The defendants sought summary judgment on all counts. [ECF No. 53] This Court denied Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. [ECF No. 84] As to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Court: (1) denied summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims for unreasonable search, excessive force, and civil conspiracy; (2) dismissed Plaintiff's official capacity claims against Defendant and Officer Swinton; and (3) dismissed Plaintiff's municipal liability claims against the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners and its individual members. [Id.]
Defendant and Officer Swinton filed an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Robinson v. Hawkins, 937 F.3d 1128 (8th Cir. 2019). The Eighth Circuit: (1) affirmed this Court's denial of summary judgment on Plaintiff's unreasonable search claim; (2) and reversed this Court's denial of summary judgment on Plaintiff's civil conspiracy and excessive force claims. Id. at 1138.
The Court held a three-day trial on Plaintiff's unreasonable search claim, and the jury found in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant. The jury awarded Plaintiff $200,000 in actual damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. The Court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict. [ECF No. 155]
Plaintiff moves for attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, litigation costs and expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920, and post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. [ECF No. 158] More specifically, Plaintiff asserts that she is the prevailing party and requests: (1) reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $640,205.00 with a lodestar multiplier of 1.5, for a total
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of $960,307.50; (2) $6,254.14 in costs and expenses; and (3) a post-judgment interest at a rate of 1.43 percent.2 [ECF No. 159] Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party but argues that Plaintiff's counsel's hourly rates are unreasonable and the hours worked on this matter are excessive. [ECF No. 159]
II. Standard for awarding fees under Section 1988
42 U.S.C. section 1988(b) provides that a district court, "in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs" in a section 1983 action. A plaintiff prevails "when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff." Lefemine v. Wideman, 133 S. Ct. 9, 11 (2012) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992)).
A party seeking attorney fees "'bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.'" El-Tabech v. Clarke, 616 F.3d 834, 842 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)). The party seeking the award must submit evidence supporting the requested hours and rates, making "a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary[.]" Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
To determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees, courts employ the "lodestar" method
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and multiply the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate.3 Id. at 433. The lodestar "provides an objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer's services," but does not end the inquiry. Id. Various considerations may lead a district court to adjust the fee "upward or downward," but many of these calculations will have been "subsumed within the initial calculation of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate." Id. at 434 & n.9. A district court has "broad discretion" in determining the amount of an attorney fee award. Keslar v. Bartu, 201 F.3d 1016, 1017 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
III. Discussion
A. Hourly rate
Plaintiff requests hourly rates of: $500.00 for attorneys, Jeremy Hollingshead, Nicholas Dudley, and Thomas Applewhite; $400 for attorney John Moffitt; $300 for attorneys Katie Rhoten, Benjamin Coudret, and Taylor Pike; $150 for "trial paralegal" Jessica Rials and law clerks Benjamin Coudret4 and Matthew Williams; and $100 for paralegals Brandi Cross and Melissa Heisner. [See ECF No. 159-29] In support of her request, Plaintiff submits a 2019 survey of billing rates published by Missouri Lawyers Weekly, which provides that the median hourly rates
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at St. Louis law firms are $390 for partners and $298 for associates.5 [ECF No. 159-22] Additionally, Plaintiff's attorneys filed affidavits setting forth their legal education and legal experience to support their requested hourly rates.
Defendant challenges only the requested $500 per hour rate of attorneys Hollingshead, Dudley, and Applewhite. She argues that $500 per hour is unreasonable because: (1) it is higher than the prevailing standard for similar work within the St. Louis market; and (2) Plaintiff's attorneys' resumes and experience do not support such a rate. Defendant asserts that a reasonable rate for Mr. Hollingshead and Mr. Dudley is between $375 and $400 per hour, and a reasonable hourly rate for Mr. Applewhite is between $300 and $350 per hour.
A reasonable hourly rate is usually the ordinary rate for similar work in the community where the case has been litigated. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Arkansas, 674 F.3d 990, 995 (8th Cir. 2012). When determining reasonable hourly market rates, district courts may rely on their own experience and knowledge of prevailing rates in the community. See Hanig v. Lee, 415 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2005). Additionally, "the special skill and experience of counsel should be reflected in the reasonableness of the hourly rates." Hendrickson v. Branstad, 934 F.2d 158, 164 (8th Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted). "A reasonable fee is 'one that is adequate to attract competent counsel, but ... [that does] not produce windfalls to attorneys.'" McDonald v. Armontrout, 860 F.2d 1456,
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1458 (8th Cir. 1988) (alterations in original) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984)).
1. Jeremy Hollingshead and Nicholas Dudley
In his affidavit, Mr. Hollingshead, the lead attorney in this case, attested that he graduated from University of Missouri - Columbia law school in 2007 and joined the Missouri Bar in 2008. [ECF No. 159-23 at ¶¶ 2 & 16] Since 2014, "nearly all of [his] personal practice ... has been devoted to civil rights cases[.]" [Id. at ¶ 5] Mr. Hollingshead stated that he has litigated "well in excess of 500 cases in various state and federal court jurisdictions" and has "tried to verdict (as first chair) approximately 20 jury trials[.]" [Id. at ¶¶ 6 & 10]
Mr. Dudley submitted an affidavit stating that he graduated from the University of Minnesota law school in 2010 and joined the Missouri Bar the same year. [ECF No. 159-24 at ¶ 2] Mr. Dudley averred that he has "been directly involved in litigating approximately 100 civil rights cases including cases brought pursuant to the Missouri Human Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983" and he has "tried (as first chair) approximately 15 jury trials." [Id. at ¶¶ 5 & 8]
In her reply brief, Plaintiff acknowledges that, in May 2020, a Missouri circuit court reduced Mr. Hollingshead's and Mr. Dudley's requested hourly rates to $400 per hour. [ECF No. 177 at 6 (citing Harrison v. Harris Stowe University, No. 1722-CC01238)] Plaintiff suggests that the instant case is distinguishable from Harrison, and therefore warrants a higher hourly rate, because it is a section 1983 case tried in federal court and not a retaliatory discharge claim tried in state court. Plaintiff further argues that, between the time of the Harrison trial in December 2019 and Plaintiff's trial in February 2020, Mr. Hollingshead and Mr. Dudley gained considerable trial experience justifying a higher hourly rate.
Plaintiff fails to adequately support her claim that Mr. Hollingshead's and Mr. Dudley's
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requested hourly rates are reasonable. To the contrary, the 2019 billing rate survey from Missouri Lawyers Weekly demonstrates that $500 per hour is considerably higher than the median rates for law partners in St. Louis. Moreover, their reported hourly rates in that survey were $400 per hour, not $500 per hour. To the extent that Plaintiff argues that her attorneys should receive a higher rate for section 1983 cases than they do for employment discrimination cases, she fails to provide any supporting authority.
Recent decisions by this District further support a reduction in Mr. Hollingshead's and Mr. Dudley's hourly rates. In Holmes v. Slay, the court reduced attorney Jon Loevy's hourly rate from $520...
