Robinson v. City of N.Y.

208 A.D.3d 587

173 N.Y.S.3d 307

In the Matter of Carlos ROBINSON, appellant,

v.CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., respondents.

2020–08466

Index No. 721070/19

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Submitted—May 17, 2022

August 10, 2022

Raskin & Kremins, LLP, New York, NY (Michael F. Kremins of counsel), for appellant.

Sylvia O. Hinds–Radix, Corporation Counsel, New York, NY (Jeremy W. Shweder and Eva L. Jerome of counsel), for respondents.

FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, J.P., JOSEPH J. MALTESE, PAUL WOOTEN, LARA J. GENOVESI, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50–e(5) for leave to serve a late notice of claim, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kevin J. Kerrigan, J.), entered May 6, 2020. The order, in effect, denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50–e(1)(a), a party seeking to sue a public corporation must serve a notice of claim on the prospective defendant within 90 days after the claim arises (see Matter of Newcomb v. Middle Country Cent. Sch. Dist., 28 N.Y.3d 455, 460, 45 N.Y.S.3d 895, 68 N.E.3d 714 ). "In determining whether to grant a petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim or to deem a late notice of claim timely served nunc pro tunc, the court must consider all relevant circumstances, including whether (1) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, (2) the claimant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the public corporation in its defense on the merits" ( Brown v. City of New York, 202 A.D.3d 783, 783, 158 N.Y.S.3d 864 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see General Municipal Law § 50–e[5] ; Matter of Reddick v. New York City Hous. Auth., 188 A.D.3d 890, 890, 132 N.Y.S.3d 317 ). The presence or absence of any factor is not determinative (see Matter of Newcomb v. Middle Country Cent. Sch. Dist., 28 N.Y.3d at 460, 45 N.Y.S.3d 895, 68 N.E.3d 714 ; Etienne v. City of New York, 189 A.D.3d 1400, 1402, 134 N.Y.S.3d 738 ).

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion when it, in effect, denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding. The petitioner failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for service of the late notice of claim, which was a nullity, as it was made without leave of court (see Matter of Thomas v. New York City Hous. Auth., 200 A.D.3d 1051, 155 N.Y.S.3d 807 ), or for the fact that this proceeding was commenced more than two months after expiration of the 90–day statutory period. Moreover, the petitioner's ignorance of the law and unsubstantiated claim of law office failure by his attorney do not constitute a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim and the delay in commencing this proceeding (see Matter of Lugo v. GNP Brokerage, 185 A.D.3d 824, 826, 127 N.Y.S.3d 527 ; Matter of Nunez v. Village of Rockville Ctr., 176 A.D.3d 1211, 1214, 111 N.Y.S.3d 71 ).

Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the respondents did not acquire timely, actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the petitioner's claim. The petitioner's contention that the respondents acquired actual knowledge of the claim based on allegations that the respondents’ employees "were directly involved in the accident ... without more, such as a report or other evidence demonstrating that the [respondents] acquired timely, actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim, is without merit" ( Etienne v. City of New York, 189 A.D.3d at 1401–1402, 134 N.Y.S.3d 738 ; see Brown v. City of New York, 174 A.D.3d 800, 801, 106 N.Y.S.3d 141 ). Moreover, the mere alleged existence of reports...