Robinson v. Dep't of Homeland Sec.

1

RUSSELL ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, CUSTOMS AND B PROTECTON, Defendant.

No. 3:22-cv-0021

United States District Court, D. Virgin Islands, St. Thomas And ST. John Division

April 20, 2023

Russell Robinson, PRO SE ST. THOMAS, U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS Plaintiff,

Kimberly L. Cole, Esq. ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY OFFICE THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY ST. THOMAS, U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS For Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROBERT A. MOLLOY CHIEF JUDGE

BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Mot.) (ECF No. 14), filed on June 6, 2022. Defendant moves the Court to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion (see ECF No. 16), but the Court determined that the document was filed incorrectly and instructed Plaintiff to re-file. See Notice of Corrected Docket Entry dated June 7, 2022. The record is devoid of any re-filing. This matter is ripe for adjudication. For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant Defendant's motion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that he owns an aircraft “parked at the Cyril E. King Airport, located in St. Thomas, VI, under signed [sic] parking contract with the Virgin Islands Port Authority (“VIPA”).” Complaint (Compl.) (ECF No. 1) at ¶ 5. Plaintiff also alleges that he had a “legally issued” VIPA Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) badge, which was “due to expire on March 25, 2022.” Compl. at ¶ 10. Plaintiff's claim in this proceeding centers around this aircraft and SIDA badge/ramp access.

On or about November 29, 2021, Plaintiff was arrested and charged with conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. See United States v. Robinson, Case No. 3:21-cr-00027 (D.V.I.). According to the United States, a little over a week later, agents of the Caribbean Air and Marine Branch (CAMB) of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in St. Thomas obtained information that, “in March of 2008 the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revoked Plaintiff's commercial pilot and mechanic licenses due to a 2007 conviction for various charges involving conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, conspiracy to import cocaine, and money laundering conspiracy.” Declaration of Jeffrey David Rincon (Declaration) (ECF No. 15-1) at ¶ 4; Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss (Mem.) (ECF No. 15) at 2.

The United States also states that, after meeting with CAMB agents in St. Thomas on December 9, 2021, officials of the Virgin Islands Port Authority (VIPA) “decided not to renew or revoke Robinson's Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) badge, which had provided him with ramp access at the Cyril E. King Airport in St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands. CBP was not involved in the issuance of the SIDA denial/revocation letter.” Declaration at ¶ 5; Mem. at 2. Plaintiff alleges that when he called VIPA on March 3, 2022, to initiate the process to renew his badge, he was informed that VIPA was unable to issue him a pilot's badge, based upon paperwork provided to VIPA from the CBP that the FAA had revoked Plaintiff's pilot license “some time ago.” Compl. at ¶ 11.

As part of CBP's criminal investigation of Plaintiff related to the United States v. Robinson, 3:21-cv-00027 (D.V.I.), proceeding, “[o]n March 8, 2022, CAMB agents detained the aircraft and assisted the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in processing the seizure of Robinson's aircraft as part of an ongoing DEA investigation. CAMB initiated the seizure and on that same day transferred the aircraft over to DEA so they could conduct the administrative forfeiture process and/or any criminal proceeding.” Declaration at ¶ 6.^[1] On March 7, 2022, and March 14, 2022, CBP received two administrative tort claims filed by Plaintiff alleging that CBP intentionally interfered with his right to contract and do business because it coerced or instructed the VIPA into revoking and/or denying his SIDA badge at the Cyril E. King Airport. ECF Nos. 1-3 and 1-4. In the second claim, Plaintiff also alleged that CBP caused damage to his aircraft (N37CK) during the seizure. See ECF No. 1-3. CBP reviewed the administrative claims and, on March 30, 2022, served Plaintiff with notice that the claims had been denied. See ECF No. 1-2. On April 6, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant case alleging that the CBP unlawfully interfered with his VIPA SIDA bade and that the CBP/DEA's seizure of his aircraft is an unlawful taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Compl. at ¶¶ 14, 22, and 25. Thereafter, Plaintiff received a Notice of Seizure, dated May 3, 2022, from the DEA. See ECF Nos. 13-1 and 13-2. The United States moves to dismiss the complaint in this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and/or failure to state a claim. Mot. at 1.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure challenges the court's jurisdiction over the case. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction exists. Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991). Where the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction of the court, a party may move to dismiss pursuant Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Under Rule 12(b)(1), a party may present either a facial or factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, but a factual challenge typically is brought only after the defendant files an answer or has engaged in discovery. See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891-92 (3d Cir. 1977). When a factual attack is procedurally premature, the Court usually treats the motion as a facial challenge. Askew v. Trustees of Gen. Assembly of Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith Inc., 684 F.3d 413, 417 (3d Cir. 2012) (“As the defendants had not answered and the parties had not engaged in discovery, the first motion to dismiss was facial.”).

In a facial challenge, the Court “will consider ‘whether the allegations on the face of the complaint, taken as true, allege facts sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court.'” Nellom v. Delaware Cty. Domestic Rels. Section, 145 F.Supp.3d 470, 476 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006)). In addition to the complaint, the Court may also consider “documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). When considering a factual challenge, the court “may consider evidence outside the pleadings.” Id. In addition, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims. Moreover, the plaintiff will have the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.” Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891.

A complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When reviewing a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court construes the complaint “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." In re Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). The Court must accept as true all the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2004). “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1271 (2011).

The Supreme Court set forth the “plausibility” standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and refined this approach in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts “‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement of relief.'"" Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

To determine the sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard, the Court must take the following three steps:

First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”

Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 674, 679).

III. DISCUSSION

As the Court construes Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff seeks...