Robinson v. Horizon Blue Cross-Blue Shield Newjersey

KENNETH E. ROBINSON, JR., Plaintiff, v. HORIZON BLUE CROSS-BLUE SHIELD OF NEW JERSEY, VICTORIA WRIGHT-GIBSON,CHERYL CONCANNON, COLETTE WHITE, and BEATRIZ MEZA Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:12-cv-02981 (MCA) (JAD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

February 25, 2015

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION AND ORDER

JOSEPH A. DICKSON. U.S.M.J.

This matter comes before this Court upon Plaintiff Kenneth E. Robinson, Jr.'s "Motion to Amend."¹ (ECF No. 50). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78, no oral argument was heard. Upon consideration of the parties' submissions, and for the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court on May 18, 2012 alleging disparate/adverse treatment on the basis of race and sex, retaliation, wrongful termination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud/deceit, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent hiring, supervision, and training. (Complaint, ECF No. 1). Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint on June 5, 2012 (Amended Complaint, ECF No. 4). The amendment in its entirety stated,

In accordance with Local Rule 11.2, the following sentence is hereby added to the end of the Representation to the Court located on Page 18 of the Complaint, as follows: "4. No matter in controversy stated in the Complaint is the subject of any other action ending in any court, or of any pending arbitration, or of any administrative proceeding."

(Id. at 1). Horizon Blue Cross-Blue Shield of New Jersey ("Horizon"), Victoria Wright-Gibson ("Wright-Gibson"), Cheryl Concannon ("Concannon"), Colette White ("White"), and Beatriz Meza (improperly identified as "Beatriz Mesa" in the Complaint) ("Meza") (collectively, "Defendants"), filed an Answer on July 24, 2012. (Answer, ECF No. 10). Plaintiff then filed a "Motion to Strike the Entire Answer and/or Defendants' Separate Defenses to the Amended Complaint" on July 27, 2012 arguing that Defendants failed "to satisfy the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Civil Rule [sic]." (Motion to Strike, ECF No. 11, at 6).

Following the filing of that Motion, Defendants submitted a letter to the Honorable Esther Salas, U.S.D.J. on August 1, 2012 requesting that Plaintiff's Motion be stricken given Plaintiff's failure to obtain leave of Court. (ECF No. 12, at 1). Plaintiff responded the same day noting Defendants' alleged deficiencies and requested "guidance on the Motion to Strike." (ECF No. 14, at 2). On August 3, 2012 Magistrate Judge Cathy L. Waldor issued an Order setting an Initial Conference for August 23, 2012, (ECF No. 15), and stated that the Court would discuss Plaintiff'sMotion at that time. (ECF No. 16). Following said conference, Judge Waldor issued at Order denying Plaintiff's Motion to Strike and allowed him to refile his Motion "in accordance with the Court's oral instructions." (ECF No. 17). On September 19, 2012 Plaintiff re-filed his Motion to Strike Defendants' Answers pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or in the alternative a Motion for More Definite Statements pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(e) and 12(g). (ECF No. 19). Plaintiff further requested sanctions in the same Motion. (See id.).

Defendants opposed the Motion on October 1, 2012, arguing that motions to strike affirmative defenses are disfavored, (ECF No. 21, at 2), that all of their defenses were properly pled pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b)(1)(A), (id. at 4-8), that should the Court grant Plaintiff's Motion in whole or in part, Defendants should be afforded the opportunity to amend their pleadings, (id. at 8), and finally, Plaintiff's request for sanctions should be denied because Plaintiff did not seek leave of Court to move for sanctions. (Id. at 8-10). Plaintiff submitted a reply brief on October 9, 2012 asserting that Defendants' defenses were improperly pled and that "FRCP 12(g) provides that 'A [sic] motion under this rule may be joined with any other motion allowed by this rule.' Since the Court granted Plaintiff leave to 'refile his Motion;' therefore, this motion requesting sanctions is proper." (ECF No. 22, at 7).

On December 11, 2012, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion. (See Docket Entry on December 11, 2012). Pursuant to the Pretrial Scheduling Order entered by Judge Waldor on August 23, 2012, "[a]ny motion to add new parties, whether by amended or third-party complaint, must be returnable no later than 10/31/12." (ECF No. 18, at 1). In a letter to Judge Mannion dated January 30, 2013, Plaintiff requested that "the deadline of 10/31/12, to amend the pleadings and to add new parties, be amended/extended to March 13, 2013." (ECF No. 36, at 1). Judge Mannion issued an Order on March 12, 2013 extending Plaintiff's deadline to filehis Motion for leave to Amend his Complaint to March 18, 2013. (ECF No. 37). Plaintiff submitted a letter to Judge Mannion on March 15, 2013 seeking, among other things, the Court grant Plaintiff's "Motion" for leave to Amend.² (ECF No. 39, at 3). In a letter dated April 1, 2013 Plaintiff reiterated, among other things, his request that the Court grant his request to file a Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 43). Judge Mannion entered an Order on April 9, 2013 setting forth the briefing schedule for the informal requests for leave to file motions, (ECF Nos. 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, and 43), including Plaintiff's Motion to Amend. (ECF No. 46). Plaintiff was granted leave to file his Motion by April 19, 2013. (Id.). On April 19, 2013 Plaintiff filed a "Brie in support of Motion to further Amend the Complaint and join additional parties FRCP 15(a)(2), FRCP 20(a)," (hereinafter "Motion to Amend"). (ECF No. 50). Defendants filed their opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend on April 30, 2013. (ECF No. 54). Plaintiff filed his reply on May 7, 2013. (ECF No. 56).

On June 17, 2013, Judge Mannion heard oral arguments on the Motion to Strike, (ECF No. 19), as well as other motions, but not Plaintiff's Motion to Amend. (See Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on June 17, 2013). Judge Mannion denied the Motion to Strike during the oral argument and stated,

I'm relying on the case by the Chief Judge from this District, Judge Simandle's decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Hope Now Modifications, Civil Action Number 09-1204, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS cite 24657, where under Rule 12(f), District Judge Simandle states: This court joins the other districts in the Circuit that have addressed this issue by holding that the heightened pleading standard of Twombly and Iqbal does not apply to affirmative defenses. The court finds persuasive the textual analysis demonstrating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure distinguish the level of pleading required between a plaintiff asserting a claim for relief under Rule 8(a) and a defendant asserting an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c).

(Transcript of Proceedings held on June 17, 2013 before Judge Mannion, ECF No. 71, at 8).

The matter was then reassigned to this Court on September 13, 2013. (See Docket Entry on September 13, 2013). The Court held an in person status conference on November 18, 2013. (See Minute Entry on November 18, 2013). On December 23, 2013 this Court issued an Opinion on the properly filed pending Motions,³ (ECF No. 73), and entered an Order on December 26, 2013. (ECF No.74). Plaintiff appealed this Court's decision on January 9, 2014. (ECF No. 76). After having considered the parties' submissions, Judge Salas affirmed this Court's Opinion and Order on July 21, 2014. (ECF Nos. 80 and 81). On September 9, 2014 this Court scheduled an in person conference on October 9, 2014. (ECF No. 82). On October 9, 2014 Plaintiff filed, what appears to be, his personal notes, and also requested that the matter be referred to another Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 83). In Plaintiff's submission, the proposed Amended Complaint was referenced for the first time, as far as this Court can tell, since the matter was reassigned to this Court. (Id.).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) governs requests for leave to amend, allowing a party to amend its pleadings after obtaining the Court's leave or the written consent of its adversary. Under this liberal rule, the Court must "freely give leave when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see also Wright & Miller section 1484, at 676 ("Subdivision (a)(2) encourages he court to look favorably on requests to amend."). This lenient standard ensures that "a particular claim will be decided on the merits rather than on technicalities." Dole v. Arco Chem. Co., 921 F.2d 484, 487 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal citation omitted); see also Sabatino v. Union Township, No.,2013 WL 1622306, at *6 (D.N.J. April 15, 2013) (internal citations omitted) (discussing that "if the underlying facts relied upon by a party might be a proper subject of relief, that party should have the opportunity to test its claims on the merits.").

The decision to grant or deny leave to amend under Rule 15(a) is "committed to the sound discretion of the district court." Arab African Int'l Bank v. Epstein, 10 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 1993). While courts have broad discretion to decide motions to amend, they are to "heed Rule 15(a)'s mandate that amendments are to be granted freely in the interests of justice." Voilas et al. v. General Motors Corp., et al., 173 F.R.D. 389, 396 (D.N.J. 1997) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In the absence of unfair prejudice, futility of amendment, undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive, the court must grant a request for leave to amend. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 292 F. 3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002): see also Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F. 3d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that generally, leave to amend should be granted "unless equitable considerations render it otherwise unjust."). The...