Robinson v. State

Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Adrian G. Soud, Judge. LT Case No. 16-2017-CF-003961-AXXX

Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, and Robert J. Pearce, III, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and David Welch, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The issues in this speedy trial case are whether (a) the four factors in Melton v. State, 75 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1954), were met; and (b) what remedy is required if a violation of the right to speedy trial is established. Based on the panel's opinions, (a) Chief Judge Edwards and Judge Makar agree that the Melton factors were met while Judge Boatwright disagrees, finding that factors one and three were not met; (b) all judges agree that if the Melton factors

were met the remedy for a violation of the right to speedy trial under applicable precedent is to discharge the defendant, see State v. Williams, 791 So.2d 1088, 1091 (Fla. 2001); (c) all judges agree that Robinson did not comply with the procedural requirements of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191, Florida's speedy trial rule, which would have entitled him to a discharge; (d) parts III (A)-(B) of Judge Boatwright's opinion-in which Chief Judge Edwards and Judge Makar join-analyze and pass upon the question of whether Williams remains valid or should be reconsidered; and (e) all judges concur in the certification of the following question of great public importance:

WHETHER THE HOLDING IN STATE V. WILLIAMS, 791 So.2d 1088, 1091 (Fla. 2001), SHOULD BE MODIFIED TO CLARIFY THAT FLORIDA RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3.191 DOES NOT ESTABLISH SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO AUTOMATIC DISCHARGE AFTER EXPIRATION OF THE RULE'S PRESCRIBED TIME PERIOD

REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions; QUESTION CERTIFIED.

EDWARDS, CJ, concurs with opinion.

BOATWRIGHT, J., concurs in part, dissents in part with opinion.

MAKAR, J., concurs in part and in result with opinion.

EDWARDS, C.J., concurring.

Appellant, Deangelo George Robinson, appeals the order denying his motion for discharge based on the claimed expiration of the speedy trial period found in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191.^[1] Florida Department of Law Enforcement ("FDLE") agents forcefully arrested, then searched, Robinson in Suwannee County pursuant to a Duval County warrant for his arrest on attempted murder and firearm charges.^[2] That Duval County warrant was the sole basis for pursuing and arresting him. Put another way, absent that warrant, FDLE's detention and search of Robinson would have completely lacked probable cause. After FDLE had him in handcuffs, they discovered drugs on his person and a search of his car revealed more illegal drugs and firearms. For reasons unexplained, Duval County's attempted murder charges against him were put on the back burner. Robinson was turned over to Suwannee County where he was convicted and received a 20-month prison sentence on the drug and firearm possession charges. The issue on appeal is whether postponing prosecution of the charges for which a defendant is initially arrested stops the speedy trial clock. For the reasons explained below we hold that it does not. We are compelled to reverse and remand for the trial court to grant Robinson's motion for discharge.

BACKGROUND FACTS

On March 29, 2015, Robinson's son accidentally hit another child with a homemade toy sword on a playground. That child's father asked Robinson's son to quit swinging that sword around. When Robinson learned of this event, he drove to the other child's apartment and confronted that child's father. It was alleged that after some discussion, Robinson retrieved a pistol from his car, walked up to that child's father and shot him in the head. Several witnesses identified Robinson as the shooter, leading the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office ("JSO") on April 7, 2015 to obtain a warrant for his arrest for the crimes of attempted murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Thus, the references to the Duval County charges and the Duval County warrant throughout this opinion.

FDLE Search and Takedown

Robinson proved to be elusive. The JSO sought assistance from the FDLE to try to locate and arrest Robinson on the active Duval County warrant. In late October of 2015, the FDLE determined that he was attending a large music festival in Suwannee County. The FDLE contacted the Suwannee County Sheriff's Office, advised they were bringing in FDLE teams to apprehend Robinson, and requested assistance in executing the Duval County warrant. The JSO did not participate in the Suwannee County operation.

On November 2, 2015, members of the FDLE's Special Operations Group^[3] ("SOG") in one vehicle, followed Robinson from the music festival back to a Suwannee County motel. The deputies waited in a separate vehicle parked at an adjacent restaurant, 4050 yards away from where the takedown was to occur. Those Suwannee County deputies would later testify that FDLE ran the entire operation, that FDLE was there specifically to arrest Robinson, and that the only reason for approaching and apprehending Robinson was to execute the Duval County warrant. Robinson was not on Suwannee County's radar at all for any local matters at that time.

With guns drawn, FDLE agents approached Robinson near his vehicle, took him to the ground, and placed him in handcuffs.^[4] The first Suwannee deputy took about ten seconds to run over to where the takedown had already occurred, arriving after the FDLE had Robinson on the ground in handcuffs. The second Suwannee deputy reached the scene a few seconds later. FDLE agents told the deputies there was a gun in Robinson's vehicle; the deputies went to the car and confirmed that. As FDLE officers patted down the handcuffed Robinson, they found illegal drugs which they handed over to the deputies. A more detailed search of the vehicle revealed more drugs and firearms. The first Suwannee County deputy prepared one probable cause affidavit that said in part, "[a]fter arrest of the defendant, vehicle was found to have a concealed firearm, plain view, drugs in the center portion vehicle between the seats." The same deputy prepared another probable cause affidavit that said, "[t]he Suwannee County Sheriff's Office assisted FDLE in an arrest of the above-named defendant for murder in Jacksonville, Florida."

Booked and Convicted on "Local Charges"

That same day, November 2, 2015, FDLE turned Robinson over to Suwannee County so that he could be booked into their jail. Initially, the Suwannee deputies expected that Robinson would be transported to Jacksonville to face the charges set forth in the active Duval County warrant. At some point, it was agreed that Suwannee County would prosecute Robinson on the drug and firearms possession crimes, which were termed the "local charges." No explanation was given for delaying Robinson's prosecution on the more serious Duval County charges. The paperwork prepared by the Suwannee County deputies reflected that Robinson was being booked into their jail only on the local charges. The deputies were unable to include detailed information in their booking reports about the Duval County charges because they never had a copy of that warrant.

Robinson was charged and convicted in Suwannee County on the local drug and firearms charges. He was sentenced to serve 20.4 months in prison. Two days before the end of that sentence, he was transported to Jacksonville on April 28, 2017. On the following day he went through the first appearance process where he was formally charged and booked on the Duval County attempted murder and firearm charges set forth in the April 2015 Duval County warrant.

Robinson filed a motion for discharge, claiming that the November 2, 2015 takedown and detention by FDLE was an arrest for speedy trial rule purposes and that the speedy trial period had run before he was formally charged on the Duval County charges on April 29, 2017. The trial court scheduled a hearing during which the State presented the testimony of the two Suwannee County deputies and Robinson testified on his own behalf.

After receiving evidence and entertaining argument of counsel, the trial court ruled that the speedy trial time had not run because, "the [Duval County] warrant was not served upon the defendant at the time FDLE officers and Suwannee sheriff's officers approached him on November 2, 2015." The trial court found that it was "very clear that April 28th of 2017 was the date that the defendant was served with a [Duval County] warrant and was detained or arrested, rather, on that warrant, notwithstanding the approach of November 2, 2015." The trial court's February 6, 2020 written order stated that the motion for discharge was denied for reasons stated on the record, referring obviously to the statements above. ^[5]

Robinson ultimately entered a "best interest" guilty plea on the Duval County charges. On October 13, 2022, he was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to serve 20 years in prison on the attempted murder charge and a concurrent 15 years on the firearms charge with 1994 days of jail credit.

This timely appeal followed.^[6]

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"A trial court's ruling on a speedy trial-based motion for discharge presents mixed questions of fact and law." Davis v. State, 253 So.3d 1234, 1236 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (citing State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So.2d 297, 301 (Fla. 2001)). "The trial court's factual findings must be sustained if supported by competent, substantial evidence, but its legal conclusions are subject to de novo review." Id. There are no...