Robinson-Williams v. C H G Hosp. W. Monroe, L.L.C.

MARGIE ROBINSON-WILLIAMS, Plaintiff v. C H G HOSPITAL WEST MONROE, L.L.C., Defendant

CIVIL No. 3:19-CV-00912

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Monroe Division

August 31, 2021

DOUGHTY, DISTRICT JUDGE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

JOSEPH H.L. PEREZ-MONTES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court is a Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceeding (ECF No. 28) filed by Defendant C H G Hospital West Monroe, L.L.C., doing business as Cornerstone Specialty Hospitals West Monroe (“Cornerstone”). ECF No 28. Plaintiff Margie Robinson-Williams (“Robinson-Williams”) filed a motion for mediation.

Because the parties' arbitration agreement states that arbitration is the sole means to resolve Robinson-Williams's claims, Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration should be granted. ECF No. 28. Because mediation is not a condition precedent to arbitration in this case, Robinson-Williams's Motion to Vacate Arbitration and Stay Proceedings (for mediation) (ECF No. 32) should be denied. Because the arbitration is binding, Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings (ECF No. 28) should be denied and this action should be dismissed with prejudice.

I. Background

Plaintiff Robinson-Williams filed a complaint against Cornerstone pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Robinson-Williams, \ an LPN employed by Cornerstone, alleges her supervisor, Mark Fuller discriminated against her due to her race (using racial slurs and cursing) and retaliated against her. ECF No. 1. Robinson-Williams contends she was fired the day after she filed a grievance. ECF No. 1.

Robinson-Williams filed an EEOC charge on July 26, 2018, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation in 2017 and 2018. ECF No. 1-2 at 3. The EEOC found no evidence of statutory violations and notified Robinson-Williams of her right to sue. ECF No. 1-2 at 1.

Robinson-Williams then filed this Complaint. ECF No. 1. Cornerstone answered and filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings. ECF Nos. 15, 28, 29, 33. Robinson-Williams filed an opposition titled “Motion to Vacate Arbitration and Stay Proceedings, ” asking the Court to order mediation instead. ECF Nos. 32, 36.

II. Law and Analysis

A. The alleged factual basis for Robinson-Williams's claims of discrimination and retaliation.

Cornerstone contends Robinson-Williams's claim is covered by its Employment Dispute Resolution Program (“EDR Program”), which Robinson-Williams agreed to when she was hired and annually thereafter. Cornerstone contends its EDR Program provides for arbitration as the sole means to resolve Robinson-Williams' claims of discrimination and retaliation.

Robinson-Williams contends that, in November 2017, after she pointed out a leaking IV and needle-site redness to Fuller (who was responsible for the IV), Fuller used racial slurs and cursed her in front of others. (ECF No. 1 at 2; No. 1-2 at 8). Robinson-Williams filed a complaint concerning Fuller's behavior in November 2017, through the EDR Program. ECF No. 1-2 at 8; No. 32 at 2. Fuller's behavior was also reported by a visiting nursing student. ECF No. 1-2 at 3. Robinson-Williams contends that Fuller was told to apologize to her. ECF No. 1-2 at 3.

Robinson-Williams alleges she was then left off the work schedule in January 2018. ECF No. 1-2 at 4. The scheduler (“Brenda”) was Fuller's mother-in-law. ECF No. 1-2 at 4. When Robinson-Williams reported to work on January 6, 2018, the “first supervisor” (“Tim”) added her back onto the schedule for the day and she began working (ECF No. 1-2 at 4). But when Fuller arrived at work later that day, he ordered Robinson-Williams to leave the grounds because she was “not on the schedule.” ECF No. 1-2 at 4.

Robinson-Williams clocked out, and filed a grievance through the EDR Program on January 6, 2018. ECF No. 1-2 at 4; No. 32 at 2. As a result, on January 7, 2018, the Cornerstone CEO (“Chris”) called Robinson-Williams and told her she had been placed “on leave” and was not to return to work until further notice. ECF No. 1-2 at 8. Robinson-Williams contends she was suspended without pay. Robinson-Williams contends she was then fired on January 12, 2018. ECF No. 1-2 at 4.

Robinson-Williams contends the stated reason for her termination was for “being too loud in the patient care area” on January 6, 2018. ECF No. 1-2 at 4.

B. Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration should be granted but the Motion to Stay Proceedings should be denied.

Defendant Cornerstone contends Robinson-Williams agreed to its EDR Program which includes arbitration as the sole remedy for her claims of discrimination and retaliation.

The final step of the EDR Program is arbitration. ECF No. 29 at 16. The 201516 edition of the EDR Program states that arbitration “is the sole means to resolve the claims and disputed identified in the Clams Covered by the Agreement section below.” ECF No. 29 at 30. “The Claims covered by this Agreement include, but are not limited to, . . . claims for discrimination (including, but not limited to, race, color, sex, religion, national origin, age, marital status, or medical condition, handicap or disability); claims for retaliation or harassment, . . . .” ECF No. 29 at 31. Thus, the arbitration clause includes the claims made by Robinson-Williams for discrimination and retaliation.

In general, federal law requires federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements. See Robertson v. Intratek Computer, Inc., 976 F.3d 575, 579 (5th Cir. 2020), pet. for cert. filed (U.S. 6/10/21). In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) “as a response to judicial hostility to arbitration.” See Robertson, 976 F.3d at 579 (citing CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 97 (2012)); 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.. Section 2 of the FAA provides that written arbitration agreements are generally “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. See Robertson, 976 F.3d at 579. Section 2 thus obligates courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms “unless the FAA's mandate has been overridden by a contrary congressional command.” See Robertson, 976 F.3d at 579 (citing CompuCredit, 565 U.S. at 98).

To show a “contrary statutory command, ” the party opposing arbitration must show that “Congress intended to preclude a waiver of a judicial forum” for the claims at issue. See Robertson, 976 F.3d at 579 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)). If “Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by a given statute to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, ” the Supreme Court has said “that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history.” See Robertson, 976 F.3d at 579 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). Throughout this inquiry, courts should keep “in mind that ‘questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.' ” See Robertson, 976 F.3d at 579 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26).

The Supreme Court recently “stressed that the absence of any specific statutory discussion of arbitration or class actions is an important and telling clue that Congress has not displaced the Arbitration Act.” See Robertson, 976 F.3d at 579 (citing Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1627 (U.S. 2018)).

Robinson-Williams has not cited any statutory or jurisprudential authority to show the Arbitration Act has been displaced in Title VII cases, and the Court has found none.

A court may find that parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute only where: (1) there is a valid agreement to arbitrate and (2) the dispute falls within the scope of the agreement. See American Heritage Life Insurance Co. v. Lang, 321 F.3d 533, 537 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Gross v. GGNSC Southaven, L.L.C., 817 F.3d 169, 176 (5th Cir. 2016). Where the contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a “presumption of arbitrability” such that “ambiguities ... [are] resolved in favor of arbitration.” Tittle v. Enron Corp., 463 F.3d 410, 418 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, 1073 (5th Cir. 2002), opinion supplemented, 303 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2002)).

Defendant submitted copies of its Employment Dispute Resolution Program with its motion. ECF No. 29 at 12. Defendant also submitted Robinson-Williams's 2012 agreements, signed both before and after she began employment, to abide by the EDR Program. ECF NO. 33-1 at 7, 9. Defendants contend, and submitted an affidavit from its Human Resources Director, Kimberlee Mendez, to show that Robinson-Williams agreed annually, online, to updated versions of the EDR Program on March 27, 2013, March 4, 2014, June 29, 2015, February 26, 2016, and June 15, 2017. ECF No. 33-1 at 4.

Robinson-Williams alleges she does not recall signing the EDR Program agreement, contends she must have been under duress when she signed it, and claims the agreement is unfair (ECF No. 32). However, Robinson-Williams does not deny that her signature is on the agreements, and has not alleged what duress she was under. Robinson-Williams has not shown that her agreement to the EDR Program is invalid.

Because Robinson-Williams' discrimination and retaliation claims fall within the scope of Cornerstone's EDR Program agreement, which states that arbitration is the sole and exclusive remedy for Robinson-Williams's claims Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration (ECF No. 28) should be granted.^[1] Compare Williams v. Cintas Corporation, 2005 WL 8158449, at *1 (N.D. Tex. 2005), affd, 169 Fed.Appx. 180 (5th Cir. 2006), cert. den., 549 U.S. 944 (2006) (plaintiff's Title VII cla...