Robison v. Dep't of Ins., Fin. Inst. & Prof'l Registration

587 F.Supp.3d 885

Bryan Travis ROBISON, Plaintiff,

v.DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, FINANCIAL INSTITUTION AND PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATION, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 4:18-cv-1527-MTS

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

Signed February 23, 2022

Chelsea Kay Merta, Lotus Law and Legal Services LLC, St. Louis, MO, Elizabeth Ramsey, Law Office of Robert Brooks Ramsey LLC, Kirkwood, MO, for Plaintiff.

Benjamin Walker, Ogletree Deakins PC, Kansas City, MO, Justin Michael Hicks, Attorney General of Missouri, Jefferson City, MO, Richard Norman Groeneman, Gerald Jackson, Office of the Attorney General of Missouri, St. Louis, MO, for Defendant Kevin Davidson.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MATTHEW T. SCHELP, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Doc. [156]. The sole remaining claim in this case is asserted under 42 U.S.C § 1983, Doc. [129], against Defendants John Huff, Carrie Couch, Mary Johnson, Kevin Davidson, and Karen Crutchfield (collectively, "Defendants") based on allegations that while working at the Department of Insurance, Financial Institutions and Professional Registration ("DIFP"), Defendants revoked Plaintiff's professional license without due process. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies Plaintiff's Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Bryan Robison held a license as a general bail bond agent that was set to expire on August 8, 2016. As a general bail bond agent, Plaintiff was able to employ dozens of Missourians as bail bond agents who worked under his authority to write "powers of attorney" for criminal defendants granted bond within the state. Two bond forfeiture judgments were entered against Plaintiff on March 24, 2016 and April 1, 2016.¹ See Doc. [156-20]; Doc. [156-21]. On or about April 8, 2016, Plaintiff sent sworn affidavits to DIFP stating he had two unsatisfied judgments against him.² Doc. [156-19] at 5. Plaintiff attested to the same in May, June, and July 2016 affidavits. Id. at 6–8.

DIFP posts two lists: (1) the Qualified General Bail Bond Agent list ("Qualified List") and (2) the Licensed Bail Bond and General Bail Bond Agent list. These lists are separate and updated weekly. Plaintiff appeared on the Qualified List on April 15, 2016; April 22, 2016; April 29, 2016; and May 6, 2016. Plaintiff was removed from the Qualified List on May 13, 2016; May 20, 2016; May 26, 2016; June 12, 2016; and June 17, 2016.

In mid-June, Plaintiff learned from one of his agent-employees that he was removed from the Qualified List. In other words, Plaintiff no longer was authorized to write bonds in the State of Missouri under his license. According to Plaintiff, he then called employees at DIFP to speak about his license. Plaintiff reappeared back on DIFP's Qualified List starting June 24, 2016. A call log note dated June 29, 2016, between a Pemiscot County clerk and Defendant Johnson, the Manager of Investigations with DIFP, noted Plaintiff's status as qualified bail bond agent. A June 30, 2016, email from Defendant Couch, the Director of Consumer Affairs Division of DIFP, to Defendant Huff, the Director of DIFP states:

3. Bryan Robison—General Bail Bond Agent has unsatisfied bail bond judgments and was removed from the qualified list because of the unsatisfied judgments (which were past appeal time). He called late last week and argued that he shouldn't be removed until the judgments are 6 months old, based on his interpretation of Section 374.763, RSMo. I agreed to place him back on the qualified list while we review the issue again to make sure we are proceeding as required or allowed under the law.

Doc. [156-25].

In July 2016, Plaintiff submitted his application to renew his general bail bond agent license and Defendant Crutchfield, an Investigator with DIFP, was assigned to investigate Plaintiff's renewal application.³ After the investigation, Defendant Crutchfield submitted her report (the "Report") to DIFP's legal section on July 28, 2016 recommending refusal of renewal because Plaintiff did not meet the qualifications for surety on bail bonds since he had outstanding bond forfeiture judgments against him in Missouri. See Doc. [156-17]. On July 29, 2016, Defendant Huff signed an Order Refusing to Renew General Bail Bond Agent License (the "Order"). Doc. [156-26]. The Order specifically stated that Plaintiff was disqualified from licensure as a general bail bond agent because he failed to meet the qualifications as a surety as set forth in Missouri Supreme Court Rule 33.17(f) due to his admissions of having $16,000.00 of unsatisfied judgments on four bail bonds during April, May, June, and July of 2016.

Also, on July 29, 2016, Defendant Davidson, an Investigator with the DIFP, sent twenty-three letters to Plaintiff's bond agent-employees, that state, in pertinent part:

Effectively immediately, [Plaintiff] is no longer authorized to conduct general bail bond business in the State of Missouri. Therefore, you are no longer able to write a power of attorney under the authority of [Plaintiff].... You may not write bail bonds until you have notified this office of the name of your new general bail bond agent.

Doc. [156-14]. On the same day, DIFP issued its weekly lists; Plaintiff was removed from the Qualified List but named on the Licensed General Bail and Bail Bond Agent List. Doc. [160-8] at 146. According to Plaintiff, he understood the language of Davidson's July 29th letter to mean that his license was revoked, and he ceased writing bonds and also authorizing bonds written by his agent-employees as of July 29, 2016, which was ten days before his license was set to expire. Based on these facts, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants prematurely revoked his professional license without due process.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

"A court must grant a motion for summary judgment if the moving party shows that there are no genuine disputes of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Bedford v. Doe , 880 F.3d 993, 996 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Mere allegations, unsupported by specific facts or evidence beyond the nonmoving party's own conclusions, are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment." Thomas v. Corwin , 483 F.3d 516, 526–27 (8th Cir. 2007).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that Defendants prematurely revoked his professional license without due process in two circumstances: first, when Plaintiff was removed from the Qualified General Bail Bond Agents list without notice and an opportunity to be heard, and second, when Defendant Davidson sent a letter on July 29, 2016 ("the Letter") to several bail bond agents writing that Plaintiff was no longer authorized to write bonds in the state of Missouri before his license expired.

1. The Letter

First, Plaintiff argues that the undisputed facts show the Letter revoked his license. If true, due process required notice and an opportunity to be heard before revocation of Plaintiff's license,⁴ and it is undisputed that Plaintiff was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to issuance of the Letter.⁵ Clearly then, whether the Letter revoked Plaintiff's license is a "material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). However, whether the Letter did in fact "revoke" Plaintiff's general bail bond license is disputed because "while the letter did not use any derivative of the word ‘revoke,’ the ‘effective immediately’ language could lead a reasonable person to believe that [Plaintiff] could not conduct business under his license as of that date, July 29, 2016." Robison v. Dep't of Ins., Fin. Institutions & Pro. Registration , 437 F. Supp. 3d 725, 734 (E.D. Mo. 2020) ; Doc. [52] at 15. Therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate here. Anderson , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986) (explaining "disputes over facts that might affect the outcome" will properly preclude summary judgment).

Although the Court has already concluded summary judgment is not warranted based on a disputed reading of the Letter, the Court finds it necessary also to discuss why summary judgment is similarly not proper here based on Plaintiff's interpretation of the law.

Plaintiff points to Mo. Rev. Stat. § 374.763.1 and argues Defendants prematurely revoked his license and violated statutory law because six months did not elapse between the March/April 2016 forfeiture judgments entered against him and the issuance of: (1) Defendant Crutchfield's Report issued on July 28, 2016, (2) Defendant Huff's Order refusing to renew issued on July 29, 2016, and (3) the Letter issued on July 29, 2016. Plaintiff argues Defendants failed to honor the six-month "grace period" following forfeiture judgments pursuant to § 374.763.1. The statute states:

If any final judgment ordering forfeiture of a defendant's bond is not paid within a six-month period of time , the court shall extend the judgment date or notify [DIFP] of the failure to satisfy such judgment. The director shall draw upon the assets of the surety, remit the sum to the court, and obtain a receipt of such sum from the court. The director may take action as provided by section 374.755, regarding the license of the surety and any bail bond agents writing upon the surety's liability.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 374.763.1 (emphasis added). Essentially, the statute "instructs a court as to what action it must take if a surety fails to pay a forfeited bond within six months of final judgment." State v. Michael R. Thomas Bail Bond Co. , 408 S.W.3d 794, 796 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting State v. Michael R. Thomas Bail Bond Co. , 367 S.W.3d 632, 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) ). In such cases, once a final judgment has been unsatisfied for six months ,...