Robson v. State

1

TODD ARTHUR ROBSON v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 0764-2022

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland ^[*]

March 8, 2023

Circuit Court for Howard County Case No. C-13-CR-20-000567

Ripken, Albright, Moylan, Charles E., Jr. (Senior Judge Specially Assigned), JJ.

OPINION

Moylan, J.

Is the sentencing procedure a part of the trial? The answer to that may well be, "Yes and no." It all depends upon what one means by the term "trial." Is it what the term literally and narrowly denotes or is it what the term more broadly connotes? The term "trial" may describe an extended judicial proceeding, from the filing of criminal charges through the imposition of a punitive sanction. Such a description embraces not only the core proceeding but the entire hinterland of that core proceeding. In that broad sense, the sentencing procedure is, indeed, a part of the trial.

The term "trial" may, on the other hand, be limited austerely to the core adjudicative determination itself whereat a qualified factfinder (judge or jury) resolves the single issue of whether a criminal defendant is literally guilty or not guilty of the crime charged. Its exclusive focus is on the disputed facts of the case. That determination is not concerned with any anterior question of whether charges should have been brought or whether the defendant was properly arraigned. Nor is it concerned with any posterior question of whether a sanction should be imposed or how a new trial motion should be resolved. Those are pre-trial and post-trial phenomena. In that core sense of "trial," the sentencing procedure is not a part of the trial. It is a post-trial event.

This distinction between narrow and broad definitions of the term "trial" may frequently be dispositive of an appeal, because there are numerous and mandatory constraints and restrictions limiting what may be considered within the core heartland of the "trial" of guilt or innocence that do not inhibit decision-making in the more sweeping hinterland of the larger "trial" process. Evidentiary admissibility in the hinterland is not necessarily, and frequently is not, evidentiary admissibility in the heartland. Conversely, evidentiary inadmissibility in the heartland does not necessarily mandate inadmissibility in the hinterland. Evidence which might be strictly forbidden in the heartland may be freely acceptable in the more latitudinarian hinterland. This distinction may make all the difference. In this case, it does. The sentencing procedure being challenged took place only in the hinterland. The Hinterland Rules therefore apply.

The Contentions

The appellant, Arthur Robson, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Howard County by a jury, presided over by Judge Quincy Coleman, of Reckless Endangerment. Upon this appeal, the appellant raises the following three contentions, which we have reordered in terms of, in our judgment, their relative significance:

1. That Judge Coleman erroneously relied on an impermissible consideration when sentencing the appellant;

2. That Judge Coleman erroneously asked compound voir dire questions in a manner that allowed individual jurors to determine for themselves whether they would be prejudicially biased; and

3. That Judge Coleman erroneously refused to allow an unloaded shotgun which had been entered into evidence to go into the jury room during the jury's deliberations.

The Factual Case

On the evening of November 6, 2020, at approximately 9:00 P.M., Sheriff's Deputies Stephen Merle and Paola Sanchez set out to serve a peace order on the appellant at his home in Howard County. The appellant lived in a basement apartment near the back of a large house at the far end of a very long driveway. The deputies were in full uniform. They exited their car and began walking toward the house, where all interior lights were turned off and no porch lights were lit. As they moved around toward the rear of the house, Deputy Merle saw a large picture window in the basement with all of the interior lights turned on. That turned out to be the appellant's basement apartment.

Deputy Merle approached the door and knocked "very loudly." Deputy Sanchez stayed behind, near a fence. When no one answered, Deputy Merle knocked again, twice and very loudly. As Deputy Sanchez was looking into the picture window she informed Deputy Merle that someone was coming to the door.

Deputy Merle testified that when the door opened, "the next thing I saw was a shotgun pointed at my face." The appellant was described as holding the shotgun approximately 18 to 32 inches from the deputy's face. Deputy Merle grabbed his microphone to radio for help and yelled into the radio, "Sheriff 430. Gun." At the same time, Deputy Merle managed to unholster his own gun. He yelled at the appellant three times to "Drop the gun." The shotgun was still "pointed at my head." When the deputy then yelled, "Drop the shotgun or I'm going to fucking kill you," the appellant put the shotgun down. Deputy Merle ordered the appellant to lie on the floor and the deputy handcuffed him. By that time, other officers had arrived on the scene and assisted in arresting the appellant. Throughout the arrest process, the appellant kept asking, "What did I do?"

On cross-examination, Deputy Merle was asked precisely how the shotgun was being held by the appellant. He replied that the stock of the gun was on the appellant's right shoulder while the appellant's left hand was on the barrel. In his report written later that night, the deputy wrote that when the appellant came to the door, he pointed the shotgun at the deputy's chest. In his testimony, however, the deputy insisted that the gun was pointed at his face. In terms of Reckless Endangerment, of course, that is a distinction without a difference.

Deputy Sanchez, for her part, testified that when she heard the knock at the door, she saw the appellant walking toward the door while talking on a cell phone. A moment later, she heard Deputy Merle yell, "Whoa, gun." She drew her own gun and followed Deputy Merle into the house, just as the appellant was being arrested. She never actually saw the shotgun aimed at Deputy Merle but she did see the appellant put the gun down after Deputy Merle drew his own weapon. Deputy Sanchez also testified that she thought that the appellant was "probably intoxicated" because his speech was a "little slurred."

The appellant testified in his own defense. He testified that the shotgun was near the door because he had been using it the day before to shoot squirrels. On the evening of November 6, a very dark night, he was in bed talking on his cell phone when he heard a loud knocking at the door. He had just moved into the area and only knew three people who lived there. As he walked toward the door, he was nervous because, "I'm in the middle of nowhere and I don't know anybody and somebody's trying to get in my door." He testified that he picked up the shotgun that was leaning against the door jamb, unlocked the deadbolt, opened the door with his right hand but kept the gun pointed toward the floor. He also admitted that he had had a couple of drinks that night of Jim Beam.^[1] On the three-count indictment, the jury acquitted the appellant of First-Degree Assault, was hung with respect to the charge of Second-Degree Assault, but convicted the appellant of Reckless Endangerment.

The Verdicts And The Sentencing

The assaultive behavior of the appellant in this case lasted, at most, for a minute or two. The appellant's criminal behavior consisted essentially of his response to a knock at his door. At the sentencing hearing, the State characterized what it deemed to be the significance of the appellant's behavior:

Mr. Robson does not have any record, but the State is obviously concerned [about] the issue of bringing a firearm to the door when answering it.

(Emphasis supplied.)

The critical confrontation began as the appellant, who may have been at least slightly intoxicated, picked up a loaded shotgun as he prepared to open the door. It culminated in the way in which he pointed the shotgun, so that it was pointed in some fashion at the upper body of the person seeking entrance to the house. It lasted until the appellant was persuaded to put the gun down and to lie down on the floor.

In that brief encounter, every small detail had potentially great significance, both for the jury in determining guilt and for Judge Coleman's determination of an appropriate sentence. On the charge of First-Degree Assault, the jury acquitted the appellant. On the charge of Second-Degree Assault, the jury failed to agree on a verdict and was hung. On the charge of Reckless Endangerment, the jury convicted the appellant finding that the appellant's conduct had, indeed, recklessly endangered Deputy Merle.

With respect to the verdicts, it could plausibly be argued that the appellant got a bit of a break. The mixed verdicts were certainly less Draconic than they could have been. The defense argued for a disposition of Probation Before Judgment. The Presentence Report, albeit of the opinion that some penalty was appropriate, indicated that it would have been content with a sentence so structured that the appellant could have served his time on weekends, even suggesting that three weekends might have been adequate. The State, for its part, seemed to indicate that it would have been satisfied with a sentence for Reckless Endangerment of five years but with all but thirty days suspended followed by a period of probation.

Judge Coleman, on the other hand, took a decidedly sterner approach, based especially on the way in which the appellant had wielded and pointed the shotgun:

You know, I listened to that trial and I listened to Deputy Sheriff Merle testify when he was executing

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