Rockstone Capital, LLC v. Caldwell

Rockstone Capital, LLC v. Morgan J. Caldwell, Jr.

No. FSTCV186036178S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk, Stamford

March 20, 2019

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Povodator, Kenneth B., J.T.R.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION re MOTION TO DISQUALIFY (#169.00)

POVODATOR, JTR

Nature of the Proceeding

Currently before the court is the plaintiff’s motion to disqualify Judge Genuario (#169.00). The motion consists of two lines, simply requesting that he be disqualified from any further participation in this case. The substantive allegations are all set forth in the supporting brief that was filed approximately 10 days later. In lieu of an affidavit, the plaintiff attached a transcript of the proceedings giving rise to this motion. During argument on March 18, 2019, when the court pointed out that Practice Book § 1-23 requires a certificate of good faith to be filed as well, counsel represented that such a document would be filed forthwith (and such a certificate has since been filed).

Both of the self-represented defendants attended argument, and both addressed the court. Both of them expressed their belief that the court had not shown any partiality during the proceeding in question, but other than their generalized perception that the court had been fair and evenhanded, they did not address the specifics of the conduct giving rise to this motion.

The applicable standards are well-established, emphasizing an objective perspective:

The standard employed by a court reviewing a claim of judicial bias "is an objective one, not the judge’s subjective view as to whether he or she can be fair and impartial in hearing the case ... Any conduct that would lead a reasonable [person] knowing all the circumstances to the conclusion that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned is a basis for the judge’s disqualification." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carlos C., 165 Conn.App. 195, 207, 138 A.3d 1090, cert. denied 322 Conn. 906, 140 A.3d 977 (2016).

"A reviewing court is mindful that ‘adverse rulings alone, provide an insufficient basis for finding bias even when those rulings may be erroneous.’ Schimenti v Schimenti, supra, 181 Conn.App. 395. ‘[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

"In his brief on appeal, the defendant has identified, in isolation, words and phrases stated by the court that he contends demonstrate judicial bias and misconduct. Our reading of the transcript of the September 14, 2016 hearing demonstrates that the defendant has taken the court’s words and phrases out of context and, in doing so, has misconstrued and mischaracterized them." Tala E.H. v. Syed I., 183 Conn.App. 224, 234-35 (2018).

"[I]t is well established that [e]ven in the absence of actual bias, a judge must disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, because the appearance and the existence of impartiality are both essential elements of a fair exercise of judicial authority ... Nevertheless, because the law presumes that duly elected or appointed judges, consistent with their oaths of office, will perform their duties impartially ... and that they are able to put aside personal impressions regarding a party ... the burden rests with the party urging disqualification to show that it is warranted. A trial court’s ruling on a motion for disqualification is reviewed for abuse of discretion ... In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling ... Reversal is required only where an abuse of discretion is manifest or where injustice appears to have been done." (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) Hoffkins v. Hart-D’Amato, 187 Conn.App. 227, 231-32 (2019).

See, also, Webster Bank, N.A. v. Frasca, 183 Conn.App. 249, 263-65 (2018).

As reflected by the submission of the transcript of the proceedings on January 30, 2019 in lieu of an affidavit, the plaintiff relies almost exclusively on the statements and actions taken on that date. The court believes it is appropriate to discuss each of the claimed transgressions, with particular emphasis on filtering out the subjective dissatisfaction of the plaintiff with the court’s comments and rulings. As discussed in the authorities above, even if a ruling were later determined to be improper, that in itself would not be indicative of bias or the appearance of bias; conversely, however, it would appear to be a significant hurdle to demonstrate that a legally proper ruling, or a ruling reflecting the proper exercise of discretion, nonetheless can be characterized as a manifestation of bias (rather than a source of frustration with an adverse ruling).

The first instance about which the plaintiff complains is when the court ordered the parties to mediation, despite the fact that the court "admittedly" had no jurisdiction to do so. (This appears to have been prior to January 30, 2019.) Assuming/accepting the representation that the court lacked the authority to do so, it is not clear how ordering parties to mediation is an indication of bias. Mediation is an integral part of the foreclosure docket, such that even if not technically applicable to this particular matter, trying to get the parties to discuss settlement— in mediation— can hardly be characterized as an outlier in terms of conduct, and has no objective suggestion of favoritism to one party or another. (More generally, see, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Mottolese, 261 Conn. 521, 531, 803 A.2d 311, 317 (2002), noting that courts favor settlement of disputes but that there should not be any coercive pressure to settle (and all that is claimed is that the court ordered mediation).) The plaintiff acknowledges that this was a "small thing" and does not attempt to explain how it reflected partiality or the appearance of partiality, instead suggesting that it was a harbinger ("portent") of things to come.

The plaintiff next complains that, on January 30, 2019, when it appeared in court ready to proceed with a hearing in damages (after the earlier granting of summary judgment as to liability), the court, sua sponte, indicated that it was considering revisiting its decision on the motion for summary judgment, potentially vacating the earlier order granting the motion. The next day, the plaintiff filed a brief (#147.00), setting forth its position with respect to the ability of the court to vacate the earlier granting of summary judgment, as well as some subsidiary issues that were identified during the course of the proceedings on January 30, 2019.

The overarching argument of the plaintiff is/was that the court lacked authority/jurisdiction to open or otherwise revisit its decision on the motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the first argument advanced was that the court lacked jurisdiction/authority, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-212 and Practice Book § 17-4, absent a motion filed by the adverse party. Recognizing that the granting of summary judgment as to liability only might be deemed interlocutory, the alternate/backup argument is that the doctrine of the law of the case discourages if not precludes the court revisiting its earlier decision, especially sua sponte.

The argument based on General Statutes § 52-212 and Practice Book § 17-4 is inapplicable, as those provisions address final judgments of the court. Granting of a motion for summary judgment, as to liability only, is interlocutory in nature, and does not come within the scope of the statute and rule. Judge Genuario specifically (and seemingly correctly) stated that the summary judgment ruling was not a final judgment, and in response, the plaintiff argued that the statute/rule applied by analogy. ("Right. I understand. I would analogize it to a final judgment and the statute [and] the Practice Book require a motion by a party.") To the extent that the plaintiff cited authorities relying on the statute and rule, those authorities are inapplicable, because they all are predicated on the existence of a final judgment, and attempting to apply procedures applicable to final judgments to a situation not involving a final judgment is to disregard the essential difference between the two. Conversely, during argument, this court identified and read from a recent Appellate Court decision, indicating that a court has inherent authority to revisit and correct earlier decisions, including revisiting a motion for summary judgment even without a formal motion being filed.

The court’s ability to reconsider prior decisions on its own accord also supports our conclusion not to reverse the court’s decision to grant the fire company’s motion to reargue. Courts can reconsider a past decision in order to correct mistakes in prior judgments. United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 197, 59 S.Ct. 795, 83 L.Ed. 1211 (1939). "It is a power inherent in every court of justice ... to correct that which has been wrongfully done by virtue of its process."

Fiano v. Old Saybrook Fire Co. No. 1, Inc., 180 Conn.App. 717, 732, 184 A.3d 1218, 1227 (2018).

Shortly after this quoted passage, the following, directly-on-point observation was made: "Thus, ...