Rockwell v. Davis

KWAME ROCKWELL, Petitioner, v. LORIE DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent.

Civil Action No. 4:14-CV-1055-O

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH DIVISION

August 18, 2016

(death-penalty case)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Kwame Rockwell ("Rockwell") petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus, raising eight claims and contending that his conviction and death sentence are unconstitutional. Having reviewed the record, the briefs, and the exhibits tendered by the parties, the Court concludes that Rockwell is not entitled to relief under the standards prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), DENIES the petition, and DISMISSES this action with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

In January 2012, Rockwell (at times "the appellant" or "the defendant") was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Daniel Rojas in the course of committing robbery. See Tex. Penal Code § 19.03(a)(2).¹ The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ("CCA") affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion on direct appeal. Rockwell v. State, No. AP-76737, 2013 WL 6529575(Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 11, 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2724 (2014). The Court takes the following recitation of facts from that opinion:

The appellant was the co-owner of a used car business located next to a Valero gas station and convenience store in Fort Worth. The car business was struggling and in danger of losing the lease on the property, but the appellant and several other employees noticed the Valero next door was always busy and did a big check-cashing business. The men decided to commit robbery at the convenience store because they thought a large amount of cash was stored there.

Appellant's co-conspirator, Chance Smith, testified that the appellant set up a meeting with Smith and told him to bring another man because the appellant wanted them to help him commit the robbery. The appellant told the participants who would be involved and what their roles would be. He brought walkie-talkies to the car lot before the offense and said they were to be used during the robbery. The appellant and his co-conspirators engaged in several botched attempts at the robbery in the days leading up to the offense. The appellant told Smith that he (the appellant) would carry a gun so he could shoot anyone who recognized them, and another man would carry a gas can to burn the store, eliminating any evidence. There was testimony that the appellant was known to carry a gun frequently.

On March 23, 2010, Valero employee Daniel Rojas arrived at the convenience store early in the morning to open for the day and let a Mrs. Baird's delivery driver, Jerry Burnett, into the store to restock the shelves. Surveillance video showed that around 6:20 a.m., three men wearing dark clothing and black ski masks entered the store. The first man carried a gun, the second man carried a bag, and the third man carried a red gas can and stayed near the front door.

The first man shot Burnett in the head where he stood in an aisle of the store, and then the first and second men forced Rojas to open the cash register and give them a large bundle of cash that was in a freezer in the store's office area. The first man then shot and killed Rojas in the office area. A customer pulled up outside, and the three masked men quickly left. As they ran out, the first man pointed his gun at the customer outside but did not shoot.

The man with the gun and the man with the bag were about the same height, but the man with the gun had dark skin and the second man had light skin. The shooter used his left hand to shoot both Burnett and Rojas. The appellant was a left-handed, dark-skinned African American; Randy Seibel was a right-handed, light-skinned Caucasian; and Tyrone Thomas was a right-handed African American who was noticeably shorter than the other two men.

When police arrived, Burnett was still alive. He was taken to the hospital where he died ten days later.

Three cars belonging to the appellant, Smith, and Tim Thomas (another accomplice) were seen on surveillance video arriving at Smith's apartment between 7:05 a.m. and 7:50 a.m. on the morning of the offense. The appellant did not return to work at the car lot after the offense.

Four days later, the appellant was approached by uniformed officers in San Antonio while he was sitting in his truck. He jumped out of the vehicle and ran away. He barricaded himself in a convenience store restroom, yelling that he would kill himself. When police broke the door open, the appellant was holding a piece of broken glass to his throat. As they handcuffed him, the appellant told police, "Just f ----- kill me, man. I'm going to die in there anyway."

The evidence at trial showed that the day before the offense, the appellant, who owed his ex-wife a large amount of money, told her that he would pay her some of it the next day. Someone from the car lot also arranged to have the car Smith said was used in the offense towed from where it was parked at the appellant's cousin's vacant house later on the day of the offense. Smith testified that the appellant met him after the offense and gave him money to pay the tow-truck driver.

In the river behind the appellant's apartment complex was found a black, hooded sweatshirt, similar to those seen on the surveillance video from the convenience store. On it was a partial DNA profile from which the appellant could not be excluded.

Id. at *2-3.

While the appeal was pending, the Office of Capital Writs ("OCW")² filed Rockwell's application for state habeas relief on September 17, 2013. The convicting court signed its findings and recommendation on September 8, 2014. 4 SHCR 1678-1754.³ The CCA adopted theconvicting court's findings and conclusions and denied Rockwell's application on December 17, 2014. Ex parte Rockwell, No. WR-80,232-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 17, 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished).

The Court appointed federal counsel, and Rockwell filed his federal petition on December 10, 2015, raising eight claims for relief. See Pet., ECF No. 9. Respondent filed her Answer with Brief in Support on May 11, 2016. See Ans., ECF No. 14. The parties do not dispute that all of Rockwell's claims were previously adjudicated on the merits in state court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a federal habeas petitioner challenges a prior state court adjudication on the merits, the AEDPA bars relitigation of the claim in federal court unless it: (1) is "contrary to" federal law then clearly established in the holdings of the Supreme Court or "involved an unreasonable application of" such law; or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts" in light of the record before the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996)⁴; Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 97-98 (2011). This determination is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. § 2254(d)(2); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). These conditions are meant to be difficult to meet and stop short of imposing a complete bar on the relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102.

A state court's decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts governing law or confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a different result. Coleman v. Thaler, 716 F.3d 895, 901 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000)). A state court'sapplication of law is "unreasonable" when the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular case. Id. at 901-02. The petitioner must show that the state court ruling "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Richter, 562 U.S. at 103; see also White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014). Thus, "even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Richter, 562 U.S. at 102; Woodall, 134. S. Ct. at 1702 (stating a "merely wrong" holding or "clear error" will not suffice).

Factual determinations in a state court's decision are presumed correct, and a petitioner bears the burden of rebutting them by clear and convincing evidence. See § 2254(e)(1); Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15 (2013). A "decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); § 2254(d)(2). A "state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance." Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 15 (citing Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010)). The presumption of correctness attaches to explicit findings of fact as well as "unarticulated findings which are necessary to the state court's conclusions of mixed law and fact." Pippin v. Dretke, 434 F.3d 782, 788 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Pondexter v. Dretke, 346 F.3d 142, 148 (5th Cir. 2003)).

III. CLAIMS

Rockwell raises eight claims in his petition: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence of mental illness in mitigation; (2) trial counsel was ineffective forfailing to investigate and present evidence of his illegal steroid use in mitigation; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to rebut the State's theory that he was the "mastermind" behind the capital murder; (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to rebut the testimony of Teresa Jackson, his ex-wife; (5a) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal the denial of...