Rodeheaver v. Homepro Remodelers LLC

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BRENTON RODEHEAVER, Plaintiff, v. HOMEPRO REMODELERS LLC and ROBERTO DIBENEDETTO, individually and jointly, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-1887

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

July 31, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLIAM S. STICKMAN IV, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Brenton Rodeheaver (“Rodeheaver”) filed an Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial against Defendants HomePro Remodelers LLC (“HomePro”) and Robert DiBenedetto (“DiBenedetto”) (collectively “Defendants”). (ECF No. 22). At Count I Rodeheaver claims that Defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., by failing to pay him a statutorily mandated minimum wage during his final pay period as a HomePro employee, as well as the minimum wage for performance of various job-related duties that he claims are compensable. At Count II, Rodeheaver brings a similar claim, alleging that Defendants violated Pennsylvania's Minimum Wage Act (“PMWA”), 43 P.S. § 333.101, et seq., by failing to pay him pursuant to hours worked in performance of various job-related duties that he claims are compensable. At Count III, Rodeheaver claims that Defendants violated Pennsylvania's Wage Payment and Collection Law (“WPCL”), 43 P.S. § 260.1, et seq., by failing to pay wages due to him pursuant to the same duties averred in Counts I and II. At Count IV, Rodeheaver brings a breach of contract claim, alleging that Defendants failed to provide the working hours and wages they had promised Rodeheaver. At Count V, Rodeheaver brings a claim for unjust enrichment, alleging that Defendants retained the benefit of Plaintiff s labor without compensating him for the same. Presently before the Court is Defendants' Second Motion to Dismiss Rodeheaver's Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 23). For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be denied.

I. Factual Background

Rodeheaver was employed by Defendants for approximately three months between May 2022 and August 2022. (ECF No. 22, ¶¶ 9-10). While employed by Defendants, Plaintiff's job title was “Laborer,” whereby he was responsible for reporting to job sites and performing duties related to construction and remodeling home installations. (Id. ¶ 11). Plaintiff was classified as a non-exempt employee under the FLSA and the PMWA. (Id.)^[1] Rodeheaver's hourly wage as Defendants' employee was $22.00, which Rodeheaver claims was to be paid weekly for 55 hours of work per week. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12). Additionally, on or about October 2022, DiBenedetto advanced Rodeheaver a loan of $400.00 for Rodeheaver's purchase of new tires for his personal vehicle (which he also used for work). (Id. ¶ 13).

Rodeheaver asserts that his sole supervisor would repeatedly leave work after just half of the pre-scheduled total work time for the day had passed. (Id. ¶ 14). Given that Rodeheaver was not authorized to work unsupervised, Rodeheaver alleges that his supervisor's conduct resulted in a significant diminution of his compensable working time-from 55 hours, a number asserted to have been previously agreed to by Rodeheaver and Defendants, to around but no more than 40 hours. (Id. ¶ 15).

Furthermore, Rodeheaver alleges multiple instances where he arrived at a job site and waited to commence work until his supervisor and/or a fellow employee arrived (as per Defendants' policy). (Id. ¶ 19). However, in such instances, Rodeheaver alleges that his supervisor and/or fellow employee never arrived, thus preventing him from undertaking that day's work. (Id.). On such days, Rodeheaver claims that he could only perform preparatory actions in anticipation of work, and that such actions (and his time spent waiting at job sites) constitute compensable working hours for which he has not received compensation. (Id.). Rodeheaver characterizes this as the “Work Preparation Time Deduction Practice”. (Id.).

Additionally, Rodeheaver claims that DiBenedetto had promised that Rodeheaver would be compensated at an hourly rate of $22.00 for required travel to, from, and in between job sites, and that DiBenedetto had also promised to compensate Rodeheaver for work-related gasoline expenses. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18). However, Rodeheaver claims that he never received any such compensation (which Rodeheaver characterizes as the “Gasoline Non-Reimbursement Practice”). (Id. ¶ 18). Plaintiff further asserts that he would often travel to job sites that were located in a city different from where he resided or where HomePro was situated, and that were outside of the normal, typical, and standardized fifteen-to-thirty-minute commute for a HomePro Laborer. (Id. ¶ 21). Rodeheaver asserts that he would return to his personal residence at the end of the workday, and that he was not compensated for such travel as work time (which Rodeheaver characterizes as the “Traveling Time Deduction Practice”). (Id.). Further, Rodeheaver claims that his final paycheck from Defendants was in the amount of zero dollars, which DiBenedetto allegedly justified as satisfaction for his loan. (Id. ¶ 23-24). Rodeheaver refers to this as the “Final Paycheck Time Deduction Practice”. (Id. ¶ 25).

IL Standard Of Review

A motion to dismiss filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kostv. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176,183 (3d Cir. 1993). A plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that, if accepted as true, state a claim for relief plausible on its face. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and view them in the light most favorable to a plaintiff. See Doe v. Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th 335, 340 (3d Cir. 2022); see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). Although a court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true, it is “not compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).

The “plausibility” standard required for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss is not akin to a “probability” requirement but asks for more than sheer “possibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In other words, the complaint's factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations are true even if doubtful in fact. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Facial plausibility is present when a plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that a defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Even if the complaint's well-pleaded facts lead to a plausible inference, that inference alone will not entitle a plaintiff to relief. Id. at 682. The complaint must support the inference with facts to plausibly justify that inferential leap. Id.

Generally, a court may not consider an extraneous document when reviewing a motion to dismiss. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997). If parties present matters outside the pleadings and the court does not exclude them, the motion must be converted to a motion for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). When reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, however, a court may consider attachments to it without converting the motion into one for summary judgment if they are integral to the allegations in the complaint and are authentic. See In re Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1426 (holding that a court may consider a “document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint”); ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1994) (same); Fallon v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr. of Se. Pa., 877 F.3d 487, 493 (3d Cir. 2017) (same); Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”); see also Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192,1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that a court may consider an “undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiffs claims are based on the document”).

III. Analysis

A. Counts I and II: Rodeheaver's Minimum Wage Claims Under the FLSA and PMWA

At Counts I and II, Rodeheaver alleges that Defendants failed to pay him at least $7.25 per hour for approximately 20 hours worked during his final pay period as a HomePro employee in violation of the FLSA and PMWA. (ECF No. 22, ¶ 26). Given that the PMWA's minimum wage provision “substantially parallels” that of the FLSA, the Court will analyze Count I and Count II together.^[2]

Under the FLSA and PMWA, employees are entitled to minimum compensation of at least $7.25 per hour worked. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(1)(C); 43 P.S. § 333.104(a)(1). In support of his allegation that Defendants failed to compensate him at the statutorily mandated rate, Rodeheaver has attached the final paystub he received from Defendants. (ECF No. 26-1, p. 2). Rodeheaver argues that this exhibit demonstrates Defendants' failure to pay him the gross wage of $352.67 that he had accrued during the July 2022 pay period, and that Defendants specifically “paid” Rodeheaver an amount of $0. (ECF No. 26, p. 4).

Rodeheaver has also provided a HomePro check dated July 1, 2022, in the amount of $0 (“Exhibit B”). (ECF No. 26-2). Defendants do not dispute that Exhibit B reflects Rodeheaver's compensation for work he performed during the July 2022 pay period. Instead, Defendants maintain that the amount paid by the check represents a deduction to satisfy the $400.00 loan De...