Rodgers v. State

2022 Ark. App. 388

654 S.W.3d 68

Daroyce RODGERS, Appellant

v.STATE of Arkansas, Appellee

No. CR-21-594

Court of Appeals of Arkansas, DIVISION IV.

Opinion Delivered October 5, 2022

Tinsley & Youngdahl, PLLC, Little Rock, by: Jordan B. Tinsley, for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Jacob H. Jones, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.

PHILLIP T. WHITEAKER, Judge

Daroyce Rodgers was convicted of second-degree escape in the Miller County Circuit Court and was sentenced as a habitual offender to twenty-five years in the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC). Because the jury found he escaped from the custody of a law enforcement agency, his conviction was classified as a Class B, rather than a Class D, felony. He appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; that the court erred in allowing lay witnesses to provide testimony on an ultimate issue of fact; that his right to speedy trial was violated; and that the statute of limitations requires reversal. We find no merit to his arguments and affirm.

I. Sufficiency Argument

Rodgers first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for second-degree escape. A person commits the offense of second-degree escape if he or she, having been found guilty of a felony, escapes from custody. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-111(a)(2) (Supp. 2021). Second-degree escape is classified as a Class B felony if, at the time of the escape, the person is in the custody of a law enforcement agency.

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-111(b)(1)(C). Otherwise, it is a Class D felony. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-111(b)(2).

Rodgers's sufficiency argument is two-fold. First, he argues that "custody" is an element of the offense and that the evidence was insufficient to prove this element; thus, he was not guilty of escape. Second, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he escaped from the custody of a "law enforcement agency"; therefore, at best, his conviction should have been classified as a Class D, not a Class B, felony.

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, consider only the evidence that supports the verdict, and affirm if substantial evidence supports it. Collins v. State , 2021 Ark. 35, 617 S.W.3d 701. Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id. With these standards in mind, we turn our attention to the evidence presented.

A. Custody

We first consider the evidence concerning custody. On March 31, 2015, a Miller County jury found Rodgers guilty of possession of cocaine with purpose to deliver, a felony. At the recommendation of the jury, the judge sentenced Rodgers to twenty years’ imprisonment in the ADC. Defense counsel asked if Rodgers was being remanded to one of the court security officers, to which the judge responded in the affirmative and directed Rodgers to have a seat.

Two court security officers, Bobby Lacefield and Bobby Forte, were in the courtroom. Officer Lacefield stepped over to Rodgers and placed his hand on his arm as he transitioned Rodgers to his seat. Instead of immediately taking a seat as directed by the court, Rodgers requested permission to hug his mother at the railing that divides the courtroom from the spectators. Officer Lacefield allowed Rodgers to approach the railing and hug his mother. Rodgers was not in handcuffs or leg restraints and that time.¹ After hugging his mother, Rodgers jumped the railing and sprinted away. Both officers attempted to capture Rodgers and were injured.² Rodgers was not immediately captured.

Rodgers first argues that this evidence was minimal and insufficient to prove that he was in custody at the time of the escape. He claims he was not physically restrained and was at liberty to move about. We disagree. Custody is defined as actual or constructive restraint by a law enforcement officer pursuant to an arrest or a court order. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-101(3)(A) (Supp. 2021). Here, Rodgers was found guilty of a felony, sentenced to incarceration, remanded to court officers, and directed by the court to have a seat. Pursuant to the order of the court, the officers were in the process of escorting Rodgers to his seat when Rodgers went to the railing to hug his mother, leaped the railing, and fled the courtroom. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State as we must do, there was sufficient evidence upon which the jury could find that Rodgers was either actively or constructively restrained.

B. Law Enforcement Agency

Rodgers next argues that there was insufficient evidence to find that he was in the custody of a "law enforcement agency" so as to classify his second-degree escape conviction as a Class B felony. Again, we disagree.

The jury heard evidence that Officers Lacefield and Forte were employees of the court security organization for the Eighth South Judicial Circuit of Arkansas. As such, their primary job duty was to provide security to the judge and other persons in the courthouse. Both officers, however, were certified law enforcement officers with the authority to enforce all Arkansas laws within the confines of the courthouse and its grounds, to arrest someone who is violating the law (with or without a paper warrant), to patrol the interior and exterior of the courthouse, and to perform law enforcement functions, including taking custody of defendants upon sentencing. In fact, Thomas Harness, the chief of court security, testified that the main difference between his court security officers and Miller County Sheriff's deputies is that court security officers are specialized officers whose jurisdiction entails the courtroom and its surroundings.

Rodgers argues that this evidence was insufficient for the jury to find that he was in the custody of a law enforcement agency at the time of the escape. He points to the evidence that Officers Lacefield and Forte had the primary responsibility of securing the courthouse, not enforcing the law. He cites Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-10-1004 (Supp. 2021) as statutory authority that law enforcement activities are not duties of a court security officer.³ He claims that since law enforcement was not their primary responsibility, Officers Lacefield and Forte, as court security officers, are not a part of a law enforcement agency.

Admittedly, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-111(b)(1)(C), the State needed to prove that Rodgers escaped from the custody of a law enforcement agency in order to convict him of B felony classification. However, the term "law enforcement agency" is not defined in the escape statutes. At trial, Rodgers requested and received a jury instruction defining a law enforcement agency as "any police force or organization whose primary responsibility as established by statute or ordinance is the enforcement of the criminal, traffic, or highway laws of this State."⁴ Rodgers does not challenge this instruction on the definition of "law enforcement agency" on appeal. ⁵

Thus, our review is limited to his sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument as the jury was instructed.

Since the issue before us has been framed as one challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Collins , supra . Here, the jury heard testimony that the officers were law enforcement officers, that their primary duty was to provide security, but their duties also required them to enforce the laws in their respective jurisdiction, i.e., the courthouse and its grounds. In fact, both Officer Lacefield and Officer Forte testified that, as court security officers, one of their duties is to enforce the law in the courtroom, including the authority to arrest someone if a law is broken. A jury, as the trier of fact, determines the credibility of witnesses and is free to believe all or part of any witness's testimony and may resolve questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence. Wright v. State , 2022 Ark. 103, 644 S.W.3d 236 ; Howard v. State , 2016 Ark. 434, 506 S.W.3d 843. Thus, despite the arguments concerning conflicting testimony highlighted by Rodgers, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the court security officers were part of a law enforcement agency.

II. Lay-Witness Testimony

Rodgers's next argument centers on the testimony of David Cotten and Thomas Harness. Cotton, one of the prosecuting attorneys in Rodgers's underlying drug-conviction trial, testified that Rodgers was in custody at the time of the escape. Harness, the chief of court security for the Eighth Judicial Circuit Court in Miller County, testified that court security officers are part of a law enforcement agency. Rodgers claims that this testimony involved the ultimate issues to be decided by the jury, and the trial court improperly allowed its admission. We review challenges to the admission or rejection of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. See Montgomery v. State , 2022 Ark. App. 329, 653 S.W.3d 21.

Arkansas Rule of Evidence 701 permits lay witnesses to testify in the form of opinions or inferences as long as those opinions or inferences are (1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear understanding of his or her testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Ark. R. Evid. 701 (2021). Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference that is otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. See Ark. R. Evid. 704 ; Marts v. State , 332 Ark. 628, 968 S.W.2d 41 (1998). Although opinion testimony on the ultimate issue is admissible, if the opinion mandates a legal conclusion or "tells the jury what to do," the testimony should be excluded. Marts , 332 Ark. 628, 968 S.W.2d 41 (citing Salley v. State , 303 Ark. 278, 796 S.W.2d 335 (1990) ).

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