Rodriguez-Narvaez v. Pereira

552 F.Supp.2d 211

Alicia RODRIGUEZ-NARVAEZ, Plaintiffs v. Miguel PEREIRA, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 04-1939 (FAB).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

September 12, 2007.

Order Denying Motion to Amend October 26, 2007.

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Francisco R. Gonzalez-Colon, Francisco J. Gonzalez-Magaz, F.R. Gonzalez Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Anabelle Quinones-Rodriguez, Department of Justice, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

BESOSA, District Judge.

On September 9, 2004, plaintiff Alicia Rodriguez-Narvaez ("Rodriguez-Narvaez"), filed this complaint against Miguel Pereira ("Pereira"), in his personal and official capacity as Secretary of the Administration of Corrections ("AOC"), and Rafael D. Santiago ("Santiago")(collectively "defendants"), in his personal and official capacity as Deputy Secretary of the AOC, alleging political discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as supplemental state law claims (Docket No. 1). On October 16, 2006, defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), arguing that plaintiff failed to state a claim under Puerto Rico's Law 100 (Docket No. 28). On October 19, 2006, plaintiff opposed the motion (Docket No. 31). On February 12, 2007, defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff failed to establish a cause of action under section 1983 (Docket Nos. 52-53). On March 16, 2007, plaintiff opposed the motion (Docket No. 71). For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings and GRANTS in part and DNIES in part defendants' motion for summary judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a member of the New Progressive Party ("NPP"). Defendants are members of the opposing Popular Democratic Party ("PDP"). Plaintiff started working for the AOC in 1999. On December 16, 1999, she was appointed to a trust position within AOC by then Secretary Zoe Laboy. On September 7, 2000, plaintiff was reinstated to a career position as Executive Officer of Administration. On July 12, 2001, a letter was sent to plaintiff stating that her appointment to the position of Executive Officer for Administration had not been done in accordance with the Personnel Act or the AOC's recruitment procedures and that she would be reclassified to a position of Administrative Aide III. Plaintiff appealed the decision to JASAP.

While her appeal was still pending, in August 2004, plaintiff competed for a promotion to the position of Executive Officer of Administration. Santiago interviewed plaintiff for the position, however, Carlos Caballero ("Caballero'') was eventually chosen to fill the position. Caballero is retired from the military and is a member of the PDP. Plaintiff did not appeal from this determination.

On September 27, 2005, JASAP rendered a decision on plaintiffs appeal regarding her reclassification. JASAP ordered her reinstatement to the position of Executive Officer for Administration. On November 16, 2005, plaintiff was reinstated to the position and awarded back pay from July 15, 2001 through November 30, 2005. Plaintiff continued in that position until November 30, 2006, when she retired after thirty years of government service.

DISCUSSION

A. Judgment on the Pleadings Standard

Motions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) "should be evaluated under the familiar standard applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss." Fotos v. Internet Commerce Express, Inc., 154 F.Supp.2d 212, 213 (D.N.H.2001); Canty v. Old Rochester Regional School District, 54 F.Supp.2d 66, 68 (D.Mass.1999). The Court's inquiry is limited and should focus not on whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail but rather whether he should be entitled to offer evidence to support a claim. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). A motion for judgment on the pleadings should only be granted if "it clearly appears according to the facts alleged, that the plaintiff cannot recover on any viable theory." Garita Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 958 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir.1992); see also Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 530 (1st Cir.1995).

B. Summary Judgment Standard

The court's discretion to grant summary judgment is governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56 states, in pertinent part, that the court may grant summary judgment only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); See also Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir.2000).

Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Once a properly supported motion has been presented before the court, the opposing party has the burden of demonstrating that a trial-worthy issue exists that would warrant the court's denial of the motion for summary judgment. For issues where the opposing party bears the ultimate burden of proof, that party cannot merely rely on the absence of competent evidence, but must affirmatively point to specific facts that demonstrate the existence of an authentic dispute. See Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l, Inc., 229 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2000).

In order for a factual controversy to prevent summary judgment, the contested facts must be "material" and the dispute must be "genuine". "Material" means that a contested fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under governing law. The issue is "genuine" when a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party based on the evidence. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). It is well settled that "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" is insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. It is therefore necessary that "a party opposing summary judgment must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion." Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994).

In making this assessment, the court "must view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging in all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir.1990). The court may safely ignore "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990).

C. Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

The only argument defendants raise in their motion is that the Court should dismiss plaintiffs claims under Law 100 insofar as it specifically excludes from coverage an agency which is an arm of the state, such as the AOC. They further argue that because the AOC is exempted, the defendants in their individual capacities are also exempted as they are employees of an arm of the state.

Law 100 seeks to prevent discrimination in the workplace by reason of age, race, color, religion, sex, social or national origin, social condition, political affiliation or political or religious ideas. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29 § 146. Its definition of employer specifically excludes government agencies from coverage expect if they "operat[e] as private business or enterprises." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29 § 151(2). Because the AOC is considered an arm of the state, see, e.g., Padilla Cintron v. Rossello Gonzalez, 247 F.Supp.2d 48, 56-59 (D.P.R. 2003), any claims against it or the defendants in their official capacities must be dismissed.

Law 100 does not, however, exclude the defendants in their individual capacities. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has expressly considered the question of supervisor liability under Law 100. Specifically, in Rosario Toledo v. Distribuidora Kikuet, 151 D.P.R. 634 (2000), the Court held that, contrary to the majority interpretation of Title VII, Puerto Rico's law against discrimination in the workplace, Law 100, does provide for the imposition of supervisor liability on the president of a corporation when he is the supervisor of the plaintiff, and is personally responsible for causing the plaintiffs injury. The Court later extended its decision to include, not only the actual employer or the owner and the president of the corporation, but also any other person responsible for the illegal conduct, without distinction. See Rosario Toledo v. Distribuidora Kikuet, Inc., 153 D.P.R. 125 (2000); See also Pacheco Bonilla v. Tooling & Stamping, Inc., 281 F.Supp.2d 336 (D.P.R.2003). This ruling was not limited, as defendants argue, to supervisors working for covered entities. It applies to any supervisor responsible for an act of discrimination. Moreover, in a recent opinion, this Court has already found that government defendants can be liable under law 100 in their individual capacities. See Vega Marrero v. Consorcio Dorado-Manati Civil No. 05-2354(FAB), pp. 25-28, 552 F.Supp.2d 157, 170-72, 2007 WL 5173968 (D.P.R. February 5, 2007).

Accordingly, plaintiffs Law 100 claims are hereby dismissed against defendants in their official capacities, but remain against defendants in their individual capacities.

D. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

1. Section 1983 Claims

1. Section 1983 affords redress against a person who, under color of state law, deprives another person of any federal' constitutional or statutory right." Omni...