Rodriguez v. Crosby

543 P.3d 206

2024 UT App 7

Veronica RODRIGUEZ, Appellant,

v.Krista Leeann CROSBY, Appellee.

No. 20210789-CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed January 11, 2024

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable Mark S. Kouris, No. 200905265

Peter R. Mifflin and Victor Jackson, Attorneys for Appellant

Mark L. Anderson and Alan K. Beal, Attorneys for Appellee

Judge John D. Luthy authored this Opinion, in which Judges Michele M. Christiansen Forster and Amy J. Oliver concurred.

Opinion

LUTHY, Judge:

[1] ¶1 A plaintiff suing for general damages—often referred to as pain and suffering or noneconomic damages—arising from an automobile accident usually must have sustained an injury that meets a particular threshold. See Utah Code § 31A-22-309(1)(a); see also Pinney v. Carrera, 2020 UT 43, ¶¶ 35–36, 469 P.3d 970 (describing categories of damages). Following a 2017 car accident in which Veronica Rodriguez’s daughter (Child) sustained a broken wrist, Rodriguez filed a lawsuit seeking general damages on behalf of Child against Krista Leeann Crosby, the individual who caused the accident. Crosby moved for summary judgment, asserting that Child’s injury did not meet the statutory threshold for bringing such a suit.

¶2 Rodriguez responded, arguing that there was at least a material dispute of fact as to whether Child’s injury satisfied the threshold requirement—both under the version of the statute in effect at the time of the accident and under an amended version of the statute in effect at the time of the anticipated trial. The district court agreed with Crosby, granted summary judgment in her favor, and dismissed Rodriguez’s claim with prejudice, holding that the earlier version of the statute applied and that Child’s injury did not meet the threshold requirement under that version of the statute. We see no error or abuse of discretion in the court’s ruling, and we therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶3 In September 2017, Rodriguez and Child were passengers in a van driving eastbound toward an intersection when Crosby, heading westbound, turned left in front of their moving vehicle in the intersection and caused a collision. As a result of the collision, Child suffered fractures in her right wrist.¹ Child’s injuries did not require surgery, but a cast was placed on her arm for approximately six weeks, after which "[n]o additional treatment was recommended" and she apparently understood "that healing was complete."

¶4 Nearly three years later, in August 2020, Rodriguez, on behalf of Child, filed suit against Crosby alleging general damages due to Crosby’s negligence. As to threshold injuries, Rodriguez’s complaint alleged that Child sustained "injury to her right wrist," "medical expenses exceeding $3.000," and "a lifelong injury" due to Crosby’s negligence.

¶5 Crosby retained a medical expert, Dr. Newton, to provide testimony regarding Child’s injury. He examined Child and prepared a report containing his medical findings. In his report, Dr. Newton concluded that Child’s wrist fractures, which he categorized as "torus fractures with buckling but no significant angulation," were "apparently well healed with some residual pain symptoms." Dr. Newton noted Child’s ongoing subjective complaints of pain and addressed whether they were supported by objective findings:

There are some ongoing vague wrist complaints. Healing is complete and adequate. I cannot really define a structural diagnosis for the ongoing symptoms. Subjective symptoms do exceed what we would typically expect; however, I feel that there is a likelihood that these symptoms will eventually resolve but may require some treatment.

Dr. Newton acknowledged that Child’s "[w]rist strength is less than ideal and is somewhat pain limited" and that "[h]er motion is also somewhat limited as compared to the contralateral side." But he opined that the reason for this was that Child had "not gained confidence" with regard to the wrist and that "there is some anxiety component that is hindering her progress." So although Dr. Newton was of the opinion that "there should not be any long-term consequences" of the fractures, he did recognize that "there is progress to be made." To that end, he recommended six to eight "visits of physical therapy to reassure [Child] and give her confidence in … her wrist capacity" and an "exercise program," which he said "should be employed until she feels that the wrist is normal."

¶6 In 2021, two and a half months before the scheduled trial, Crosby filed a summary judgment motion asserting that she was "not liable for general damages as a matter of law as [Child] failed to meet the statutory threshold requirement" in effect, in 2017, at the time of the accident. The 2017 list of qualifying threshold injuries included those resulting in "death," "dismemberment," "permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective findings," "permanent disfigurement," and "medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000." Utah Code § 31A-22-309(1)(a) (2017). Pointing to Dr. Newton’s report and the fact that Rodriguez’s initial disclosures showed a total of only $929.50 in incurred medical expenses, Crosby asserted that Rodriguez had failed to provide evidence to support that Child "suffered a permanent partial disability or incurred medical expenses in an amount exceeding $3000.00."

¶7 Rodriguez opposed Crosby’s motion, arguing that because the determination of whether a plaintiff satisfies the threshold injury requirement is made as of the time of trial, the court should apply a then newly amended version of the threshold injury statute—the 2021 version—which had added "a bone fracture" to the list of qualifying threshold injuries. Id. § 31A-22-309(1)(a) (2021). Rodriguez also argued, in the alternative, that even under the 2017 version of the statute (1) "[t]here is a question of fact as to whether a broken arm constitutes dismemberment" and thus qualifies as a threshold injury; (2) a jury could find that Child’s ongoing symptoms years after the accident showed a permanent impairment; and (3) considering Dr. Newton’s physical therapy recommendations, it was "not impossible" that Child would "incur at least $3,000 of medical expenses prior to trial."

¶8 After a hearing on the matter, the district court granted Crosby’s motion for summary judgment, determining that the 2017 version of the statute applied and that Rodriguez had not produced evidence to support a finding of any of the threshold injuries listed in that version. Specifically, the court noted that Child’s medical expenses had not reached the $3,000 threshold, and it reasoned that a permanent impairment could not be shown by Child’s complaints of ongoing pain where she had "quit seeing any provider" and had not "even attempted to try to get it fixed." The court then entered a written order dismissing Rodriguez’s claim with prejudice. Rodriguez now appeals that order.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶9 On appeal, Rodriguez contends that the district court erred in granting Crosby’s motion for summary judgment, including by applying the wrong version of the threshold injury statute. "We review the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment for correctness, granting no deference to the district court." Noor v. State, 2019 UT 3, ¶ 18, 435 P.3d 221 (cleaned up). Likewise, "determining which version of a statute applies is a matter of statutory interpretation, which presents a question of law which we review for correctness." State v. Walker, 2013 UT App 198, 1 12, 308 P.3d 573 (cleaned up).

[2] ¶10 Beyond her claims regarding the propriety of summary judgment, Rodriguez asserts error in the district court’s decision to dismiss her claim with prejudice. "A district court’s decision to dismiss with prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Watson Pharms, Inc., 2019 UT App 31, ¶ 12, 440 P.3d 727.

ANALYSIS

I. Retroactivity of the Statutory Amendment

[3] ¶11 Rodriguez first contends that the district court erred by applying outdated law to the undisputed facts of the case. Specifically, she contends that the court should have applied the current version of Utah Code section 31A-22-309 (the version that became effective in 2021 and would have been in effect at the time of trial) as opposed to the version in effect at the time of the accident—the key difference between the versions being that the current version includes "a bone fracture" among the enumerated threshold injuries for which a cause of action may be maintained. Compare Utah Code § 31A-22-309(1)(a) (2017), with id. (2023).

[4] ¶12 "The courts of this state operate under a statutory bar against the retroactive application of newly codified laws." State v. Clark, 2011 UT 23, ¶ 11, 251 P.3d 829; see also Utah Code § 68-3-3. The only exception to this bar occurs when the newly codified law "is expressly declared to be retroactive."² Utah Code § 68-3-3. The legislature did not make the statutory change at issue here explicitly retroactive; thus, the district court was required to apply the version of the statute "as it exist[ed] at the time of the event regulated by the law in question." Clark, 2011 UT 23, ¶ 13, 251 P.3d 829.

¶13 Therefore, to determine whether the district court applied the correct statute, we must consider what event is regulated by the statute. In this regard, the Utah Supreme Court has explained as follows:

On matters of substance the parties’ primary rights and duties are dictated by the law in effect at the time of their underlying primary conduct (e.g., the conduct giving rise to a criminal charge or civil claim). When it comes to the parties’ procedural rights and responsibilities, however, the relevant underlying conduct is different: the relevant occurrence for such purposes is the underlying procedural act (e.g., filing a motion or seeking an appeal). The law governing this procedural occurrence is thus the law in effect at the time of the procedural act, not the law in place at the time of

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