Rodriguez v. Mennonite Gen. Hosp.

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ARCELIS MIRANDA RODRIGUEZ on behalf and as legal guardian of minor P.V.M. and ARNEL ABRAHAM VALENTIN MIRANDA, Plaintiffs, v. MENNONITE GENERAL HOSPITAL, INC., DR. RAMON DOMINGUEZ ROCHE, his wife JANE DOE and their CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP, THE MEDICAL PROTECTIVE COMPANY d/b/a MEDPRO GROUP INC. and/or MEDPRO, INSURANCE COMPANY A, INSURANCE COMPANY B, INSURANCE COMPANY C, INSURANCE COMPANY X, INSURANCE COMPANY Y AND INSURANCE COMPANY Z, Defendants.

No. Civil. 21-01286

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico

June 9, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER

GINA R. MÉNDEZ-MIRÓ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending is Mennonite General Hospital, Inc.'s ("Defendant" or "Hospital") Third Motion for Summary Judgment for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction as to [Plaintiff] Arnel Valentin Miranda. (Docket No. 82). Defendant claims this Court lacks diversity jurisdiction since co-plaintiff Arnel Valentin Miranda ("Mr. Valentin"), a military serviceman who joined the United States Army out of Puerto Rico ("ARMY") was stationed in Hawaii at the time the filing of the Complaint (Docket No. 1). Defendant avers that Mr. Valentin failed to surmount the presumption that military servicemen retain the domicile they had at the time of entry into the military. Defendant's request for summary judgment is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 15, 2021, Plaintiffs Arcelis Miranda Rodríguez, on behalf of minor P.V.M., and Mr. Valentín (together, “Plaintiffs”) filed an action for medical malpractice against Defendant. (Docket No. 1). Plaintiffs invoked the Court's diversity jurisdiction on the grounds of: (a) complete diversity of citizenship between Plaintiffs, who are residents of Florida and Hawaii, and Defendant, a resident of Puerto Rico; and (b) the claim exceeds $75,000.00. (Docket No. 1 ¶ 1.2). Plaintiffs listed Mr. Valentin's residence at the state of Hawaii. (Docket No. 1 ¶ 2.2). Mr. Valentín's physical address, at the time of the filing of the Complaint, was 91-809 Makule Rd, Ewa Beach, HI 96706. (Docket No. 1 ¶ 2.2).

On January 31, 2023, Defendant filed a Third Motion for Summary Judgment for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction as to [Plaintiff] Arnel Valentin Miranda (Docket No. 82). Defendant posits that Mr. Valentín, a military serviceman, was domiciled in Puerto Rico at the time when the Complaint was filed, regardless of his residence in Hawaii. (Docket No. 82 at 7). Plaintiffs, in Defendant's view, failed to establish complete diversity as the Hospital is also domiciled in Puerto Rico.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 governs motions for summary judgment. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). There is a genuine dispute in a material fact “if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the non-moving party.” Johnson v. University of Puerto Rico, 714 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Thompson v. Coca-Cola Co., 552 F.3d at 175); see also Sánchez v. Alvarado, 101 F.3d 223, 227 (1st Cir. 1996); Rivera-Muriente v. Agosto-Alicea, 959 F.2d 349, 352 (1st Cir. 1992). In turn, a fact is material “if it has the potential of determining the outcome of the litigation.” Maymi v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority, 515 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422, 426 (1st Cir. 2006)). In making its determination, the Court will look to “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and any affidavits. . .” Johnson, 714 F.3d at 52 (citing Thompson, 522 F.3d at 175).

The movant has “the initial burden of ‘demonstrate[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact' with definite and competent evidence.” Arroyo-Ruiz v. Triple-S Management Group, 258 F.Supp.3d 240, 245 (D.P.R. 2017) (quoting Campos v. Van Ness, 711 F.3d 243, 247-48 (1st Cir. 2013)). “Once the moving party has properly supported [its] motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, with respect to each issue on which [it] has the burden of proof, to demonstrate that a trier of fact reasonably could find in [its] favor.” Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir. 1997)). Indeed, the non-movant is required to “present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion.” Martínez-Rodríguez v. Guevara, 597 F.3d 414, 419 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50, 56 (1st Cir. 2008)).

Further, the Court must “draw [] all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party while ignoring conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.” Smith v. Jenkins, 732 F.3d 51, 76 (1st Cir. 2013). The Court must also refrain from engaging in assessing the credibility or weight of the evidence presented. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135 (2000) (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.”).

Local Civ. R. 56

Local Civ. R. 56 also controls motions for summary judgment. See Local Civ. R. 56. In sum, it requires from the non-movant to “admit, deny or qualify the facts supporting the motion for summary judgment by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party's statement of material facts.” Local Civ. R. 56(c). If the fact is not admitted, “the opposing statement shall support each denial or qualification by a record citation. . .” Id. In its opposing statement, the non-movant can include additional facts supported by record citations. See Id. In turn, the movant “shall submit with its reply a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts, which shall be limited to any additional fact submitted by the opposing party.” Local Civ. R. 56(d). In its statement, the movant shall admit, deny, or qualify those additional facts. See Id. Any denial and qualification that the movant raises must be supported by a record citation. See Id.

Failure to comply with Local Rule 56(c) gives the Court the ability to accept a party's proposed facts as stated. See Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007); Natal Pérez v. Oriental Bank & Trust, 291 F.Supp.3d 215, 219 (D.P.R. 2018) (“If a party improperly controverts the facts, Local Rule 56 allows the Court to treat the opposing party's facts as uncontroverted.”). Litigants ignore Local Rule 56(c) at their peril. See Id.

III. FINDINGS OF FACT

Foremost, the Court finds Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Proposed Statement of Additional Material Facts as to the Third Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 97-1) unpersuasive. Instead of refuting Plaintiff's proposed additional statement of facts (Docket No. 91-5 at 5-7) with record citations, as required by Rule 56, Defendant's strategy is striking Mr. Valentín's Statement Under Penalty of Perjury (Docket No. 91-1) by opining that it's a sham affidavit. (Docket No. 97). There is no basis for this conclusion.

As a general matter, “an affidavit is equivalent to other forms of evidence, such as deposition testimony.” Ayala v. Kia Motor Corporation, Civil No. 19-1150, 2022 WL 4719145 at *3 (D.P.R. 2022) (citing 10A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2727 (3d ed. 2011)). However, when a party or an interested witness “has given clear answers to unambiguous questions in discovery, [they] cannot create a conflict and resist summary judgment with an affidavit that is clearly contradictory, unless there is a satisfactory explanation of why the testimony [has] changed.” Escribano-Reyes v. Professional Hepa Certificate Corp., 817 F.3d 380, 386 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Hernández-Loring v. Universidad Metropolitana, 233 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2000)) (internal quotations omitted); Colantuoni v. Alfred Calcagni & Sons, Inc., 44 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1994). This being said, “[a] subsequent affidavit that merely explains, or amplifies upon, opaque testimony given in a previous deposition is entitled to consideration in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.” Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Service, Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 26 (1st Cir. 2002); see also Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1007 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[W]here the deposition testimony is ambiguous or incomplete, as it is here, the witness may legitimately clarify or expand upon that testimony by way of an affidavit.”).

Notably, Defendant did not develop argumentation as to contradictions, or demonstrative or manifest discrepancies, in Mr. Valentín's affidavit with prior testimony. As such, the Court deems Defendant's argument waived. See Zannino, 895 F.2d at 17 (“[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.”); Rivera-Gomez, 843 F.2d at 635 (quoting Paterson-Leitch Co., 840 F.2d at 990 (“Judges are not expected to be mindreaders. Consequently, a litigant has an obligation ‘to spell out its arguments squarely and distinctly,' or else forever hold its peace.”).

Nevertheless, the Court examined Mr. Valentín's deposition testimony and affidavit, and couldn't identify contradictions that would deem Mr. Valentín's affidavit a sham. The Court DENIES Defendant's request to strike Mr. Valentín's Statement Under Penalty of Perjury.

After crediting only material facts supported by accurate record citations, the Court finds the following facts are uncontested:

1. On June 15, 2021, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint. (Docket No. 1).

2. Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Valentín “is a citizen of the United States, and resident of the state of Hawaii.” (Docket

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