Rodriguez v. State

155 Conn.App. 462

110 A.3d 467

Delfina Cuapio RODRIGUEZ et al.

v.STATE of Connecticut.

David Tremper

v.State of Connecticut.

Nos. 35406

35570.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 16, 2014.

Decided Feb. 24, 2015.

Lorinda S. Coon, Hartford, for the appellant in both appeals (defendant).

Timothy P. Pothin, for the appellee in AC 35570 (plaintiff), with whom was Marisa A. Bellair, New Haven, for the appellee in AC 35406 (plaintiff Delfina Cuapio Rodriguez, administratrix of the estate of Modesto Palafox Munoz).

BEACH, KELLER and PRESCOTT, Js.

Opinion

PRESCOTT, J.

In these two consolidated negligence actions arising out of a serious motor vehicle accident, the defendant state of Connecticut (state) appeals from the judgments of the trial court denying motions to set aside jury verdicts rendered in favor of the plaintiffs Delfina Cuapio Rodriguez, administratrix of the estate of Modesto Palafox Munoz, and David Tremper.¹ The dispositive issue in these appeals is whether the court improperly instructed the jury regarding the scope of the state's sovereign immunity from suit in an action brought by the plaintiffs pursuant to General Statutes § 52–556.² Because we conclude that the court's instructions did not provide the jury with proper guidance and a clear understanding of the issues it was to decide, we reverse the judgments and remand the cases for further proceedings.³

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our consideration of these appeals. These two actions arise out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on September 2, 2008, at approximately 7 a.m. near exit 41 on the southbound portion of Interstate 95 in Orange. At that time, a tractor trailer owned by B.C. Trucking, Inc., and driven by William Clifford, struck from behind three vehicles that had slowed as they approached metal debris in the left and center travel lanes of the highway near the Marsh Hill Road overpass. The collision killed Munoz, a passenger in a Nissan Quest, and seriously injured Tremper, the driver of a Subaru Outback.⁴

On or about October 28, 2008, Tremper brought an action against Clifford and B.C. Trucking, Inc., for personal injuries arising out of the accident. In turn, Clifford and B.C. Trucking, Inc., filed an apportionment complaint against the state and Leviticus Morey, a Department of Transportation (DOT) employee who, at the time of the accident, was operating an orange DOT service truck on Interstate 95 near exit 41 as part of his duties with DOT as a service patrol operator. Specifically, Morey was tasked that morning with the responsibility to patrol the interstate to find and remedy unsafe driving conditions such as debris in the road and to assist stranded motorists.

Tremper subsequently withdrew his action against Clifford and B.C. Trucking, Inc., after settling his claims with them and exchanging mutual releases. On April 23, 2009, Tremper initiated a direct action against the state pursuant to § 52–556. In his second amended complaint, Tremper alleged that the manner in which Morey negligently “stopped and positioned his truck on the highway incident to the operation of [Morey's truck]” required Tremper to “[move] his vehicle to the center lane of the highway where vehicles had slowed in front of him,” and that his vehicle was then struck in the rear by a tractor trailer. Specifically, Tremper alleged that Morey was negligent in the following ways:

“(a) he stopped and/or positioned defendant's vehicle on a public highway in a dangerous manner without proper warning and safeguards;

“(b) he made unsafe movements upon the highway incidental to the operation of a state owned motor vehicle;

“(c) he caused defendant's vehicle to obstruct moving traffic on the highway, making it unsafe for other motorists;

“(d) he placed defendant's vehicle on the highway so as to direct traffic to the middle and left lanes, thereby creating a dangerous bottleneck;

“(e) he used defendant's vehicle to close a lane of traffic without proper warnings or safeguards, making the highway dangerous for motorists in the right lane and middle lane of travel;“(f) he placed defendant's vehicle on the highway so as to direct traffic toward debris in the road, thereby creating a dangerous bottleneck;

“(g) he failed to follow established safety procedures and/or standards for diverting traffic on the highway while operating a state owned motor vehicle; [and]

“(h) he failed to take reasonable measures to warn motorists of the presence of defendant's vehicle in the traveled portion of the highway....”

The state then filed an apportionment complaint against Clifford and B.C. Trucking, Inc. The state's apportionment complaint alleged that the injuries and damages suffered by Tremper were caused by the negligence of Clifford, and that any damages awarded should be apportioned between the state and the apportionment defendants.

On July 20, 2009, Rodriguez, individually and as the administrator of the estate of Munoz, brought a similar action, pursuant to § 52–556, against the state, alleging that Morey's actions were a proximate cause of Munoz' death and her corresponding loss of consortium as his spouse.⁵ The specifications of negligence in Rodriguez' second amended complaint were identical to those set forth in Tremper's second amended complaint.

In response to the action filed by Rodriguez, on July 2, 2012, the state filed a notice of apportionment against Clifford and B.C. Trucking, Inc., alleging that the injuries suffered by the plaintiff's decedent were caused by the negligence of Clifford and B.C. Trucking, Inc., and that any damages should be apportioned between the state and those nonparties.⁶

In both actions, the state asserted by way of a special defense⁷ that the “allegations of negligence which do not relate to ‘operation’ of a motor vehicle by the [state] employee, within the meaning of General Statutes § 52–556, are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.”

These two actions were consolidated for trial and tried before a jury.⁸ At trial, the following facts were essentially undisputed, some of which were disclosed by a grainy DOT video that was shown to the jury.⁹ Just before the accident occurred, Morey was driving his state vehicle in the right lane of Interstate 95 southbound near the Marsh Hill Road overpass. Morey observed cars taking evasive actions to get around a piece of debris in the roadway. The debris was partly in the center and left lanes of the highway. Morey first pulled his truck onto the right shoulder of the highway beyond the location of the debris, and then backed up his vehicle along the shoulder until it was near the debris in the road. He then pulled his vehicle forward and out into the right travel lane, thereby creating a barrier obstructing further travel in that lane. Shortly thereafter, and before the accident occurred, Morey illuminated all of the emergency lights on his vehicle and the left directional arrow on the arrow board attached to his truck.¹⁰ The plaintiffs never contended at trial that the accident was caused by any operation or movement of Morey's truck before he positioned the vehicle in the right lane and turned on the directional arrow to the left.

At trial, the plaintiffs also called James Bragdon, a traffic engineering consultant, to testify as an expert witness. The state moved to preclude his testimony on the ground that his opinions related to the “the proper procedure for traffic control related to debris on the highway,” rather than the negligent operation of a state motor vehicle. Accordingly, the state argued that Bragdon should not be permitted to testify because his proffered opinions related to allegations of negligence that fell outside the limited waiver of sovereign immunity contained in § 52–556.

The court denied in part the state's motion to preclude.¹¹ Bragdon then testified in front of the jury regarding fundamental safety principles of temporary traffic control activities that should be employed in circumstances, such as those in the present case, in which debris obstructs a portion of the highway. Bragdon testified that these standards are contained in the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices published by the Federal Highway Administration. Most significantly, Bragdon testified that Morey failed to comply with these traffic control safety standards by positioning his truck in the right lane, and then activating the left directional arrow on the arrow board, thereby directing traffic toward the center lane that was blocked. Bragdon also opined that Morey, in the exercise of due care, should have positioned his vehicle directly behind the debris and activated his arrow panel in both directions.

The state filed requests to charge on the scope of the state's sovereign immunity.¹² The state also requested a charge on the proper use of the opinions offered by Bragdon. No jury interrogatories were requested by any of the parties or submitted to the jury.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Tremper in the amount of $225,000 in economic damages¹³ and $2.5 million in noneconomic damages, and found that Clifford was 70 percent responsible and the state was 30 percent responsible. The court denied the state's motion to set aside the verdict, and, after adjudicating other posttrial motions, rendered judgment in favor of Tremper and against the state in the amount of $775,030.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Rodriguez, in her representative capacity, in the amount of $11,288.91 in economic damages and $4 million in noneconomic damages. Again, the jury concluded that Clifford was 70 percent responsible and the state was 30 percent responsible. The court denied a motion to set aside the verdict and other posttrial motions, and rendered judgment in favor of Rodriguez and against the state in the amount of $1,203,386.67.

The state appealed from the judgments and the denial of its motions to set aside the verdicts in each case, and this court ordered the appeals...