Rodriguez v. State

491 S.W.3d 18

Samuel Espinoza Rodriguez, Appellant

v.The State of Texas, Appellee

NO. 01–13–00447–CR

NO. 01–13–00448–CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

Opinion issued March 10, 2016

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Overruled June 23, 2016

Samuel Espinoza Rodriguez, pro se.

Carly Dessauer, Asst. Dist. Atty., Devon Anderson, Dist. Atty.-Harris County, Houston, for the State.

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Huddle, and Lloyd.

OPINION

Rebeca Huddle, Justice

A jury found appellant Samuel Espinoza Rodriguez guilty of felony evading arrest and aggravated assault and assessed his punishment at confinement for life for the aggravated assault charge and 50 years' confinement for the evading arrest charge, to run concurrently. On appeal, Rodriguez, acting pro se, raises 14 issues. We affirm.

Background

In December 2011, complainant Jose Bribiescas was celebrating his fortieth birthday with friends at a sports bar. Rodriguez approached one of Jose's friends, Claudia Atencio, and asked if he could buy her a drink. When she refused, Rodriguez confronted Jose's friend, Larry Hernandez, demanding to know whether the two were dating. Jose told Rodriguez that they did not want any problems, which led to a scuffle. After the fight was broken up, the bar's manager asked Rodriguez to leave.

Rodriguez left the bar, but later returned with a gun. He placed the gun against Jose's chest, shot him, and walked away. The bullet punctured Jose's lung. Jose's friends dragged him underneath a pool table so that Rodriguez could not see that he was still alive.

Corporal M. Davila of Harris County Constable Precinct 6 was dispatched to the bar, and learned from witnesses that Rodriguez had left the bar in a white truck with no tailgate. Corporal Davila located the truck and followed it while waiting for backup. When backup arrived, the officers attempted to stop the truck by turning on their lights and sirens. Rodriguez sped away from the officers, driving approximately 90 miles per hour in a 35 mile per hour zone. After Rodriguez lost control of the truck and crashed it, the officers directed him to show them his hands, but Rodriguez jumped out of the truck and started running. The officers pursued Rodriguez and eventually detained him, searched the truck, and found a gun. They also returned to the bar with Rodriguez, where several witnesses identified him as the shooter.

Rodriguez was charged by complaints with aggravated assault and felony evading arrest.¹ A few months later, Rodriguez was indicted for both offenses, and on July 31, 2012, the State re-indicted him for both offenses.² After the reindictment, Rodriguez moved to dismiss his appointed counsel and to have different counsel appointed on the ground that his counsel failed to object to the re-indictment. The trial court denied the request. Rodriguez later requested that he be permitted to represent himself. The trial court permitted him to do so after holding a Faretta³ hearing at which Rodriguez's court-appointed counsel was present, and the trial court admonished Rodriguez regarding the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation, and determined that Rodriguez's waiver of counsel was competent, knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The trial court then appointed Rodriguez's previously-appointed counsel as standby counsel. Three months after the Faretta hearing, the State abandoned the evading arrest paragraph in the indictment in cause number 1356099, leaving only the aggravated assault charge in cause number 1356099 and only the evading arrest charge in cause number 1356098.

Pre-trial, Rodriguez moved to quash the indictments and to dismiss the evading arrest charge on the grounds that the charges were invalid because valid complaints and informations had not been filed. He also moved to quash the habitual offender enhancement paragraphs. The trial court denied these motions.

Rodriguez also filed several pre-trial motions which were granted. These included a “Motion for Court Reporter to Record All Proceedings,” and a “Motion to have Written Rulings Made on All Motions Filed by the Defendant.”

Before trial, Rodriguez moved for a continuance, requesting that he be permitted extra time in the law library. The trial court denied the motion.

Rodriguez appeared at trial with standby counsel and represented himself. After the jury rejected Rodriguez's self-defense theory and found him guilty on both charges, Rodriguez appealed.

Charging Instruments

In his first, ninth, and twelfth issues, Rodriguez challenges the trial court's jurisdiction and the validity of the State's charging instruments. Rodriguez argues that the trial court (1) lacked jurisdiction to hear the charges against him because valid complaints were not filed, (2) erred in denying his motion to dismiss the felony evading arrest charge, and (3) erred in denying his motions to quash the indictments. Rodriguez contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the charges against him because the State failed to file informations supported by valid complaints.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

The Texas Constitution guarantees to defendants the right to indictment by a grand jury for all felony offenses. Riney v. State, 28 S.W.3d 561, 564 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). An indictment is a written instrument presented to a court by a grand jury charging a person with the commission of an offense. Id. at 565. “An indictment is returned by a grand jury after consideration of a charge provided by the prosecutor.” Ferguson v. State, 335 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.01 –02). The presentation of a valid indictment vests the trial court with jurisdiction to hear the charges against the defendant. Ex parte Gibson, 800 S.W.2d 548, 551 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). “There is no statutory requirement for a prosecutor to file a complaint before a grand jury issues an indictment.” Id. (citing Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21).

By contrast, an information, which “is a document filed by the prosecutor with the court to charge a person with a crime,” does not require any court or grand jury review before bringing the defendant to trial. Ferguson, 335 S.W.3d at 682 (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 21.20, 21.22 ). Rather, “a sworn complaint must be provided to justify an information.” Id. (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.22 ). In Texas, only misdemeanors may be prosecuted by information. See Ex parte Krarup, 422 S.W.2d 173, 174 (Tex.Crim.App.1967). While a complaint must be filed to justify an information, there are other reasons that complaints are filed, unrelated to the filing of an information. Among other things, complaints may be filed to obtain a finding regarding probable cause for a person's arrest or continued detention. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 15.03 (magistrate may issue warrant when, among other things, a person makes an oath before them that another has committed some offense), 15.04 (“The affidavit made before the magistrate or district or county attorney is called a “complaint” if it charges the commission of an offense.”); Green v. State, 872 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (when defendant arrested without warrant, State must obtain probable cause determination from magistrate for continued detention).

We review the denial of a motion to quash an indictment de novo when reviewing a question of law. Lawrence v. State, 240 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex.Crim.App.2007). Our analysis of a jurisdictional challenge is also de novo. Dixon v. State, 455 S.W.3d 669, 674–75 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd).

B. Analysis

Rodriguez argues that informations and valid complaints stating “the time and place of the commission of the offense as definitely as can be done by the affiant” were required to vest the trial court with jurisdiction to proceed to trial on the charges against him. Rodriguez contends that the State failed to file informations against him; therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the charges against him. His argument is based on the fact that complaints were initially filed against him; from this, Rodriguez concludes that the State must have been required to prosecute him by information. Because informations supported by valid complaints were not filed, Rodriguez argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and both indictments should have been quashed.

The charges against Rodriguez were both felony charges brought by indictment, not by information. Because the charges against Rodriguez were felonies, the State was required to prosecute Rodriguez by indictment. See Riney, 28 S.W.3d at 564 (Texas Constitution guarantees right to indictment by grand jury for all felonies); Ex parte Krarup, 422 S.W.2d at 174 (only misdemeanors may be prosecuted by information). “There is no statutory requirement for a prosecutor to file a complaint before a grand jury issues an indictment.” Ferguson, 335 S.W.3d at 682 (citing Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21). And, the filing of a complaint does not necessitate the filing of an information, because a complaint may be filed for other purposes. Although the State initially filed complaints in connection with Rodriguez's arrest and continued detention, it later obtained indictments, which vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the felony charges. See Ex parte Gibson, 800 S.W.2d at 551. Rodriguez did not and does not challenge the indictments themselves. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the charges against Rodriguez and did not err in denying his motions to dismiss and to quash the indictments. See id.

We overrule Rodriguez's first, ninth, and twelfth issues.

Enhancements

In his tenth issue, Rodriguez contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions to quash the enhancement paragraphs in the indictments without holding an evidentiary hearing. He claims the enhancement paragraphs were invalid and void.

We review a...