Rodriguez-Vega v. Policlinica La Familia De Toa Alta, Inc.

942 F.Supp.2d 210

Gilberto RODRIGUEZ–VEGA, Plaintiff,

v.POLICLINICA LA FAMILIA DE TOA ALTA, INC., Defendant.

Luz Colon–Rivera, Plaintiff,

v.Policlinica La Familia De Toa Alta, Inc., Defendant.

Civil Nos. 11–2235 (FAB), 11–2236 (FAB).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

April 29, 2013.

Bamily Lopez-Ortiz, Lopez Toro, Law and Notary Offices, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Martha L. Martinez-Rodriguez, Manuel A. Nunez Law Office, Orlando Fernandez, Orlando Fernandez Law Offices, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER¹

BESOSA, District Judge.

Plaintiff Gilberto Rodriguez–Vega (“plaintiff Rodriguez”) and plaintiff Luz Colon–Rivera (“plaintiff Colon”) bring claims against defendant Policlinica la Familia de Toa Alta, Inc. (“defendant” or “Policlinica”) pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Docket No. 1.) Plaintiff Rodriguez brings a claim of sexual harassment and a claim of third-party retaliation. (Docket No. 30 at p. 2.) Plaintiff Colon brings a claim of a retaliatory hostile work environment, constructive discharge, and a claim of third-party retaliation. Id. Both plaintiffs also bring supplemental Commonwealth claims pursuant to Law 69, P.R. Laws Ann. tit 29, § 1321; Law 100, P.R. Laws Ann. tit 29, § 146; and Law 115, P.R. Laws Ann. tit 29, § 149–149b. Id. at pp. 2–3. Plaintiff Rodriguez also brings a supplemental claim pursuant to Law 17, P.R. Laws Ann. tit 29, § 155. Id. at p. 3.

Pending before the Court are both defendants' motions for summary judgment. (Docket Nos. 21 & 22.) For the reasons set forth below, both defendants' motions for summary judgment are GRANTED.

I. Procedural History

On December 20, 2011, plaintiff Rodriguez filed a complaint against defendant Policlinica alleging sexual harassment and third-party retaliation pursuant to Title VII and various Commonwealth laws. (Docket No. 1.) On that same day, plaintiff Colon filed a complaint against the defendant alleging a retaliatory hostile work environment, constructive discharge, and third-party retaliation. ² Complaint, Colon–Rivera v. Policlinica la Familia de Toa Alta, Inc., No. 11–2236 (D.P.R. filed December 20, 2011).³ On March 12, 2012, defendant filed a motion to consolidate the cases, which the Court granted on March 13, 2012. (Docket No. 6.)

On January 28, 2013, following discovery, defendant moved for summary judgment on each of plaintiffs' claims. (Docket Nos. 21 & 22.) On February 21, 2013, plaintiffs filed an opposition. (Docket No. 30.) On March 11, 2013, defendant replied to plaintiffs' opposition. (Docket No. 39.)

II. Summary Judgment Standard

The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment only if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A fact is “material” if it has the potential to “affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. A dispute is “genuine” when it “could be resolved in favor of either party.” Calero–Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't. of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.2004).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The party must demonstrate it through definite and competent evidence. See Maldonado–Denis v. Castillo–Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994). It must identify “portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any’ ” which support its motion. Id. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).

Once a properly supported motion has been presented, the burden shifts to the non-moving party “to demonstrate that a trier of fact reasonably could find in [its] favor.” Santiago–Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir.2000) (internal citation omitted). For issues where the opposing party bears the ultimate burden of proof, that party cannot merely rely on the absence of competent evidence, but must affirmatively point to specific facts that demonstrate the existence of an authentic dispute. See Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l., Inc., 229 F.3d 49 (1st Cir.2000).

If the non-moving party establishes uncertainty as to the “true state of any material fact, the movant's efforts should be deemed unavailing.” See Lopez & Medina Corp. v. Marsh USA, Inc., 694 F.Supp.2d 119, 123 (D.P.R.2010) (citing Suarez, 229 F.3d at 53). It is well-settled that “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” is insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). It is necessary, therefore, that “a party opposing summary judgment must ‘present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion.’ ” Maldonado–Denis v. Castillo–Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994) (internal citation omitted). In making this assessment, the Court must take the entire record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in his or her favor. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. RNK, Inc., 632 F.3d 777, 779–80 (1st Cir.2011). The Court does not, however, “make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The Court may safely ignore, however, “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, acrimonious invective, or rank speculation.” Ahern v. Shinseki, 629 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir.2010).

The First Circuit Court of Appeals has “repeatedly ... emphasized the importance of local rules similar to Local Rule 56 [of the District of Puerto Rico].” Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2007). Rules such as Local Rule 56 “are designed to function as a means of ‘focusing a district court's attention on what is—and what is not—genuinely controverted.’ ” Id. (quoting Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422, 427 (1st Cir.2006)). Local Rule 56 imposes guidelines for both the movant and the party opposing summary judgment. Loc. Rule 56. A party moving for summary judgment must submit factual assertions in “a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts, set forth in numbered paragraphs.” Loc. Rule 56(b). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must “admit, deny, or qualify the facts supporting the motion for summary judgment by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party's statement of facts.” Loc. Rule 56(c). Facts which are properly supported “by record citations as required by this rule, shall be deemed admitted unless properly controverted.” Loc. Rule 56(e). The Court, may, however, “disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific citation to record material properly considered on summary judgment.” Id. “The court shall have no independent duty to search or consider any part of the record not specifically referenced in the parties' separate statement of facts.” Id. Due to the importance of this function to the summary judgment process, “litigants ignore [those rules] at their peril.” Hernandez, 486 F.3d at 7.

III. Factual BackgroundA. Statement of Uncontested Facts

Dr. Itza Chevres (“Dr. Chevres”) is defendant Policlinica's owner and president. (Docket No. 21–1 at ¶ 3; Docket No. 30–1 at p. 2, ¶ 3.) Plaintiff Colon began working as a licensed practical nurse for the Policlinica in June or July 1998. (Docket No. 22–1 at ¶ 1; Docket No. 30–2 at p. 2, ¶ 1.) Although Dr. Chevres hired her as a nurse, plaintiff Colon also worked as a secretary and Dr. Chevres promoted her to serve as the secretaries' supervisor about four years later. (Docket No. 22–1 at ¶¶ 3–4; Docket No. 30–2 at p. 2, ¶¶ 3–4.) Plaintiff Colon's duties remained unchanged until she stopped working for the Policlinica. (Docket No. 22–1 at ¶ 6; Docket No. 30–2 at p. 2, ¶ 6.)

In 2004, Dr. Chevres' then husband, Jose Gonzalez–Amoros, wrote plaintiff Colon a note asking her to be his “secret friend.” (Docket No. 30–2 at p. 6, ¶ 1; Docket No. 39–4 at p. 5, ¶ 1.) Plaintiff Colon complained to Dr. Chevres and said that Gonzalez–Amoros was sexually harassing her. (Docket No. 30–2 at pp. 6–7, ¶¶ 2–4 & 6–7; Docket No. 39–4 at p. 5, ¶¶ 2–4 & 6–7.) Plaintiff Colon then offered her resignation, which led Dr. Chevres to meet with her about the matter. (Docket No. 22–1 at ¶ 12; Docket No. 30–2 at p. 3, ¶ 12; Docket No. 30–8 at p. 35.) They talked about the situation with Dr. Chevres' husband and Dr. Chevres told plaintiff Colon that “it was not her fault” and asked her to continue to work there. (Docket No. 22–1 at ¶ 12; Docket No. 30–2 at p. 3, ¶ 12; Docket No. 30–8 at p. 35.)

Plaintiff Rodriguez was hired on November 6, 2007 to work at the Policlinica as an accountant. (Docket No. 21–1 at ¶¶ 1 & 8; Docket No. 30–1 at pp. 1–3, ¶¶ 1 & 8 & p. 8, ¶ 2; Docket No. 39–1 at p. 8, ¶ 2.) Plaintiff Rodriguez lived with his mother, next door to Dr. Chevres, until August 2010. (Docket No. 21–1 at ¶ 2; Docket No. 30–1 at pp. 2, ¶ 2.) He used to visit Dr. Chevres' house once or twice a week; because their families were related, the two families spent time together outside of work. (Docket No. 21–1 at ¶¶ 4–5; Docket No. 30–1 at pp. 2–3, ¶¶ 4–5; Docket No. 21–2 at p. 25; Docket No. 39–3 at p. 57.) Dr. Chevres even referred to plaintiff Rodriguez as her “son.” (Docket No. 21–1 at ¶ 28; Docket No. 30–1 at p. 6, ¶ 28.) Plaintiff Rodriguez had visited Dr. Chevres' house with a previous girlfriend. (Docket No. 21–1 at ¶ 35; Docket No. 30–1 at p. 7, ¶ 35.) He felt that he could speak to Dr. Chevres about anything related to work. (Docket No. 21–1 at ¶ 28; Docket No. 30–1 at p. 6, ¶ 28.) Plaintiff Rodriguez also stated that “[a]ll employees at the office spent time jesting.” (Docket No. 21–1 at ¶ 30; Docket No. 30–1 at p. 7, ¶ 30.)

Plaintiff...