Rodwell v. Wicomico Cnty.

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TRACEY MICHAEL RODWELL v. WICOMICO COUNTY, MARYLAND

Civil Action No. DKC 22-3014

United States District Court, D. Maryland

March 19, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DEBORAH K. CHASANOW, United States District Judge

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this civil rights action is the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Wicomico County Maryland, et al. (ECF No. 36). The issues have been briefed and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background^[1]

On or about October 13, 2022, Plaintiff suffered a seizure while he was a pretrial detainee at Wicomico County Detention Center (“the Detention Center”). (ECF No. 33 ¶ 17). Two other detainees in the unit heard a noise coming from Plaintiff's cell and walked to his door to check on him. (Id. ¶ 20). They observed him lying on the ground and believed he was having a medical emergency. (Id.). Almost immediately, both men ran to the unit door and banged on it to get the attention of the correctional officers in the hallway. (Id. ¶ 21). Officers Elmer Barrall, Joseph Daly, Deniece Davis, Richard Elliott III, Zachary Emmert, Preston Foreman, Sylvester Kellman, Jacob Skarson, James Sterling, and Jonathan Watson (collectively, “Defendant Officers”) responded to the unit.^[2] (Id. ¶ 22). About a minute later, several medical staff members entered the unit. (Id. ¶ 23). They remained there for approximately 30 minutes. (Id.). Two of the Defendant Officers entered Plaintiff's cell to attend to him. (Id. ¶ 24).

Plaintiff alleges upon information and belief that Lt. Davis ordered at least two of the officers to remove Plaintiff from his cell. (Id. ¶ 25). One officer grabbed Plaintiff's ankles, another grabbed his leg, and at least one more officer picked Plaintiff up around his upper body area. (Id. ¶ 26). They laid him onto the concrete floor in the hallway. (Id. ¶ 27). Plaintiff, still suffering a seizure, involuntarily attempted to sit up several times after being laid on his back. (Id. ¶ 28). In response, the officers surrounding Plaintiff piled on top of him to force his body back down to the floor. (Id. ¶ 29). For nearly 30 minutes, the officers repeatedly forced Plaintiff to lie back down on the ground while medical staff stood by and watched. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 34).

Lt. Davis ordered that Plaintiff be restrained. (Id. ¶ 32). The handcuffs were placed on Plaintiff so tightly that they caused damage to his wrists and hands. (Id.). The handcuffs were connected to a secondary chain that was wrapped around Plaintiff's waist. (Id. ¶ 33). Plaintiff was then hoisted onto a stretcher by his wrists and pant legs. (Id. ¶ 34).

Plaintiff regained consciousness while being transported to Tidal Health Peninsula Regional Hospital in Salisbury, Maryland. (Id. ¶ 35). Plaintiff asked the transport officer, Officer Burrell,^[3] what happened to him and why his arm hurt. (Id. ¶ 36). Officer Burrell informed Plaintiff that he had a seizure, but did not have any additional information for him. (Id.). Plaintiff was examined by doctors upon arrival at the hospital but was not informed of his injuries or any care or treatment that needed to be administered upon his return to the Detention Center. (Id. ¶ 37). When he arrived back to the Detention Center, he was taken to the medical tier where he complained of pain in his left arm, left shoulder, left side of his neck, left elbow, and right hand. (Id. ¶ 38). He received only Motrin to address his injuries. (Id. ¶ 39).

Plaintiff was released from the Detention Center approximately 11 days later. (Id. ¶ 41). Upon release, he sought medical treatment from an orthopedic specialist at Peninsula Orthopedic Associates. (Id. ¶ 42). His MRI showed a torn rotator cuff and a buildup of scar tissue that caused him additional pain. (Id. ¶ 42, 57, 111). A secondary MRI also showed multiple sprains to his left hand. (Id. ¶ 43). Currently, Plaintiff wears a brace for pain management. (Id. ¶ 44). Although he was self-sufficient before this incident, his injuries made it difficult to return to work and he is now dependent on others for assistance with most daily tasks. (Id. ¶ 45).

II. Standard of Review

In reviewing the Second Amended Complaint in light of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), “the court should accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Mylan Lab'ys, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4^th Cir. 1993). Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (stating that a complaint need only satisfy the “simplified pleading standard” of Rule 8(a)).

The Supreme Court of the United States explained that “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)). Nonetheless, the complaint does not need “detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. Instead, “once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 563. To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).

III. Analysis

A. Group Pleading

Defendants contend that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff engaged in impermissible group pleading. (ECF No. 36-1, at 6-7) (citing Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4^th Cir. 1977) (dismissing superintendent of jails because plaintiff “failed to allege any personal connection between [the superintendent] and any denial of [plaintiff's] constitutional rights”); Thomas v. Maryland, No. 17-cv-1739-GJH, 2017 WL 6547733, at *6 (D.Md. Dec. 20, 2017) (dismissing officers because plaintiffs “are unable to identify even a limited group of officers actually responsible for the alleged harms”); Calhoun v. Prince George's Cnty., Md., No. 12-cv-2014-DKC, 2013 WL 3873224, at *3 (D.Md. July 24, 2013) (dismissing three officers and providing plaintiff an opportunity to file a second amended complaint with more factual detail where plaintiff “does not differentiate among the . . . three, but merely alleges that . . . he was apprehended [and beaten] by all of them”); Krell v. Queen Anne's Cnty., No. 18-cv-637-JKB, 2018 WL 6523883, at *20 (D.Md. Dec. 12, 2018) (dismissing an officer where plaintiff “refer[s] to unidentified officers and make[s] conclusory statements” including that they “refused to timely render appropriate medical assistance” and “participated in and enabled the pattern or practice and conduct which interfered with [Plaintiff's] medical treatment”)).

As Plaintiff argues, each case Defendants cite is distinguishable. (ECF No. 41, at 9-11). In Vinnedge, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed the superintendent of jails but remanded to the district court to determine whether dismissal was proper as to the individual detectives, who “clearly were in custody of the plaintiff during some period of time[.]” Vinnedge, 550 F.2d at 929.

In Thomas, the plaintiffs attributed all claims to 28 individual police officers, and “seemingly list[ed] every possible officer they [could] find, potentially including officers that were not present on the scene or omitting others that were.” Thomas, 2017 WL 6547733, at *6. Here, on the other hand, Plaintiff named only the ten officers that Defendants provided to Plaintiff as individual officers involved in the alleged use of force against Plaintiff. (ECF Nos. 12-1; 33 ¶¶ 7-16).

In Calhoun, the plaintiff's sole allegation was that he “was apprehended by the aforesaid police officers, and was beaten, about the head, body, and limbs, assaulted, battered, falsely imprisoned, and falsely arrested, by the defendants OFC SCHWEINSBURG # 3331, OFC LACOMBE # 3110, OFC BURROUGHS # 2879, OFC AVERY # 2401.” Calhoun, 2013 WL 3873224, at *3. This court found the plaintiff's allegations “far too conclusory to state an excessive force claim adequately[]” and provided the plaintiff “an opportunity to supply enough factual detail to state a claim” in a second amended complaint. Id. Here, although Plaintiff similarly does not distinguish among the ten individual officers, his allegations are more specific than simply alleging excessive force.

Finally in Krell, Judge Bredar dismissed one individual officer who had been grouped in with the other “Defendant Corrections Officers” in the complaint. Krell, 2018 WL 6523883, at *20 (citation omitted). The plaintiff alleged that the individual officer was “responsible for a pattern and practice of misconduct[]” but provided “no additional facts . . . as to her actions, omissions, or, even, presence.” Id. Unlike the “conclusory allegations made against a group of...