Roebuck v. Geico Cas. Co.

BETTY JEAN ROEBUCK v. GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY

No. 2360-2019

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

September 21, 2021

Circuit Court for Cecil County Case No.: C-07-CV-19-000013

Berger, Wells, ^[**] Gould, JJ.

OPINION ^[*]

GOULD J.

This case involves the availability of uninsured motorist insurance coverage to a Delaware resident under a policy issued to a Maryland resident. The policyowner added her mother, a Delaware resident, to the policy as an "additional driver" of the covered automobile. The mother was subsequently injured in an auto accident in which she was a passenger in another car that was not insured by the subject policy. After settling with the driver's insurance company for the policy limits, the mother sought recovery under the insured benefits of her daughter's policy. When the daughter's insurance company denied coverage, the mother filed suit in the Circuit Court for Cecil County. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the daughter's insurance company, finding that the mother was not an insured entitled to uninsured motorist benefits under the policy. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND

Appellant Betty Jean Roebuck sustained bodily injuries and incurred damages after she was involved in an automobile accident in Delaware. Ms. Roebuck was a passenger in a car driven by John J. Rodriguez, and Mr. Rodriguez's negligence was the cause of the accident.

Mr Rodriguez was insured through State Farm Mutual Insurance Company ("State Farm"). The State Farm policy had a bodily injury liability limit of $15, 000 per person, which was insufficient to cover all of Ms. Roebuck's damages. After settling with State Farm for the policy limit, Ms. Roebuck turned to appellee GEICO Casualty Company ("GEICO") for uninsured motorist ("UIM") benefits under an automobile policy (the "Policy") issued to Ms. Roebuck's daughter, Erica Renee Roebuck ("Daughter").

The Auto Insurance Policy

Daughter purchased the Policy in 2015. The Policy listed Daughter as the "Named Insured," and in August 2016, Ms. Roebuck, who was residing in Delaware, was added to the Policy as an "Additional Insured" on the declarations page, resulting in an increase in the six-month premium of approximately 20 dollars. The Policy was in effect at the time of the accident.

Relevant here, the Policy contains the following provisions:

LOSSES WE WILL PAY

We will pay damages for bodily injury and property damage caused by an accident which the insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of that vehicle.

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PERSONS INSURED

This coverage applies to the following persons as insureds:

1.You and your relatives;

2.Any other person occupying an insured auto with your consent;

3.Any other person entitled to recover damages because of bodily injury to a person described in 1. or 2. above.

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Insured means:

(a) You and your spouse if a resident of the same household;

(b) Your relative if a resident of your household;

© Any other person while occupying an owned auto;

(d) Any person who is entitled to recover damages because of bodily injury or property damage sustained by an insured under (a), (b), or (c) above.

If there is more than one insured, our limit of liability will not be increased.

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You and your means the policyholder named in the Declarations or his or her spouse if a resident of the same household."

"Relative" is defined as:

Relative means a person related to you who resides in your household.

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Insured auto is an auto:

(a) Described in the Declarations and covered by the Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability coverages for this policy;

(b) A temporary substitute auto; or

© Operated by you or your spouse if a resident of the same household. . . .

GEICO's Denial of Ms. Roebuck's Claim

GEICO denied Ms. Roebuck's claim for UIM benefits on the basis that Ms. Roebuck did not fall under the above definition of "insured," prompting Ms. Roebuck to file suit in the Circuit Court for Cecil County. Ms. Roebuck's complaint contained two counts. In Count One, Ms. Roebuck sought a declaratory judgment, requesting that the court find that the UIM coverage extended to her, and in Count Two, Ms. Roebuck sought damages for breach of contract.

Ms. Roebuck moved for summary judgment, claiming she was entitled to UIM coverage under the Policy and under Maryland law, pursuant to Sections 19-501(d) and 19-509(c)(1) of the Insurance Article ("IN") of the Annotated Code of Maryland (2011, 2017 Repl. Vol.). GEICO cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing that it properly denied coverage to Ms. Roebuck, both under the Policy and the applicable statute.

The Trial Court's Summary Judgment Ruling

On January 16, 2020, the court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order (the "Opinion") denying Ms. Roebuck's motion and granting GEICO's motion. The Opinion first identified the provisions of the statute-found in IN § 19-509-applicable to UIM coverage. The court then analyzed the relevant terms of the Policy. The court concluded that only Daughter was the "policyholder" and that Ms. Roebuck's designation as an "additional driver" did not transform her into a policyholder. As such, the court found that Ms. Roebuck was not entitled to UIM coverage under the Policy.

Ms. Roebuck timely noted an appeal, and presents us with the following question:

Did the trial court err in failing to determine that the Appellant was a "named insured" under Md. Code Ann., Insurance § 19-501(d), and therefore entitled to underinsured motorist benefits pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Insurance § 19-509(c)(1), under an automobile insurance policy issued by the Appellee, where the Appellant was specifically listed on the declarations page of that insurance policy?

For the reasons set forth below, we answer that question in the negative and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court's grant of summary judgment without deference. Myers v. Kayhoe, 391 Md. 188, 203 (2006). Our review involves a determination of (1) "whether a dispute of material fact exists," and (2) "whether the trial court was legally correct." Frederick Rd. Ltd. P'ship v. Brown & Sturm, 360 Md. 76, 93 (2000) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Md. Rule 2-501(f). For the purposes of summary judgment, "[a] material fact is 'a fact the resolution of which will somehow affect the outcome of the case.'" USA Cartage Leasing, LLC v. Baer, 202 Md.App. 138, 174 (2011) (quoting Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 171-72 (2007)), aff'd, 429 Md. 199 (2012). "[W]e independently review the record to determine whether the parties properly generated a dispute of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Myers, 391 Md. at 203. "We view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and construe any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts against the moving party." Rhoads v. Sommer, 401 Md. 131, 148 (2007).

DISCUSSION

Ms Roebuck does not contend that any of the material facts are genuinely disputed. To the contrary, she maintains that this case was ripe for summary judgment. Ms. Roebuck also did not challenge the circuit court's finding that the Policy, as written, does not include her in the UIM coverage. Instead, she points out that the definition of "named insured" under IN § 19-501 "means the person denominated in the declarations in a motor vehicle liability insurance policy." Ms. Roebuck contends that she's a "named insured" because she is denominated on the declarations page, even though she is listed not as a "named insured," but rather as an "additional driver." To that end, she notes that IN § 19-509 does not specify that one must be denominated specifically as a "named insured" in order to qualify as such; that is, any denomination on the declarations page would suffice. And on the premise that a "named insured" qualifies as an "insured" under the Policy, Ms. Roebuck maintains that she is entitled to UIM benefits under the Policy.

We begin our discussion with the principles of statutory construction that guide our inquiry. Our objective in interpreting any statute is to understand and implement the General Assembly's intent. See, e.g., Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 661 (2006). We start with the statute's plain language which, if clear and unambiguous, will be enforced as written. Id. "We pay attention to the statute's grammar and sentence structure" and avoid constructions that are "illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense." Bartenfelder v. Bartenfelder, 248 Md.App. 213, 235 (2020) (citation omitted). If the words are ambiguous, we look at the statute's structure (including, in some instances, its title), context, relationship with other laws, and legislative history, among other indicia of intent. Stoddard, 395 Md. at 662-63.

At issue in this case are two provisions of the Insurance Article: IN §§ 19-209(c)(1) and 19-506. Section 19-509(c)(1) states:

In addition to any other coverage required by this subtitle, each motor vehicle liability insurance policy issued, sold, or delivered in the State after July 1, 1975, shall contain coverage for damages, subject to the policy limits, that:

(1) the insured is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured motor vehicle[.]^[1]

Notably the word "insured" is not defined in the statute, but its meaning was explained by the Court of Appeals in Mundey v. Erie Ins. Grp., 396 Md. 656, 669 (2...