Rogers v. Albert

541 S.E.2d 563

208 W. Va. 473

H. John ROGERS, Who Sues on His Own Behalf and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff Below v. James M. ALBERT, Who is Sued in His Official Capacity as Administrative Director of the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of West Virginia; the Honorable David M. Buzzard, the Honorable Mark A. Kerwood and the Honorable William D. Anderson, All of Whom are Sued in Their Official Capacities as Magistrates of the Magistrate Court of Marshall County, West Virginia; and John Doe, Nos. 1-3 Inclusive; and Jane Doe, Nos. , Defendants Below

No. 27680.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted September 19, 2000.

Decided December 13, 2000.

H. John Rogers, Esq., New Martinsville, Pro Se.

John M. Hedges, Esq., Byrne & Hedges, Morgantown, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM:

This case comes to the Court on certified question from the Circuit Court of Marshall County, and presents the following issue: "Is Rule 1(b), as amended, of the Administrative Rules for the Magistrate Courts of West Virginia constitutional?" Plaintiff below, H. John Rogers, argues that Rule 1(b)(1), which sets forth certain minimum standards governing the availability of magistrates to conduct initial appearance and bail proceedings outside of normal office hours, is facially unconstitutional because it potentially denies individuals who are arrested without a warrant an opportunity to promptly appear before a magistrate. The circuit court answered the certified question in the affirmative, and we likewise conclude that Rule 1(b)(1) conforms to constitutional requirements.

I. BACKGROUND

Rogers was stopped on suspicion of driving under the influence on Friday, February 17, 1995, and was placed under arrest for obstructing an officer at approximately 11:25 p.m. that same evening. Rogers was then taken to the Northern Regional Jail, where he arrived some two hours later, at 1:26 a.m. on Saturday. Because a magistrate was not immediately available, Rogers' initial appearance did not take place until approximately 7 a.m. the following morning. It is undisputed that the requirements of Rule 1(b)(1) were satisfied. Rogers was later acquitted of charges stemming from this incident.

Rogers subsequently initiated the present civil action, seeking, inter alia,¹ declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that he had been deprived of his constitutional right to a prompt initial appearance before a magistrate following a warrantless arrest.² The circuit court certified the present question to this Court, finding that the time standards of Rule 1(b)(1) are constitutional.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

As this Court stated in syllabus point one of Gallapoo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 197 W.Va. 172, 475 S.E.2d 172 (1996), that "[t]he appellate standard of review of questions of law answered and certified by a circuit court is de novo." See A & M Properties, Inc. v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 203 W.Va. 189, 191, 506 S.E.2d 632, 634 (1998); King v. Lens Creek Ltd. Partnership, 199 W.Va. 136, 140, 483 S.E.2d 265, 269 (1996).

III. DISCUSSION

Rule 1(b) of the Administrative Rules for the Magistrate Courts of West Virginia was promulgated by this Court in substantially its present form in December 1989,³ and establishes minimum standards regarding when magistrates must be available outside of normal office hours to hear certain matters requiring expedited proceedings. Rule 1(b) requires that one magistrate in each county, on a rotating basis, be on call at all times during nighttime and weekend hours. Subparagraph (1) of this rule, the provision at issue in this case, further directs that the on-call magistrate must contact the jail and juvenile detention facilities serving the county at regular intervals to ascertain whether anyone has been recently arrested, or whether someone already confined to jail has become able to post bond.⁴ The rule states in mandatory language that "[i]f an arrest has been made or if a prisoner is able to post bond, the magistrate shall proceed immediately to the magistrate court offices to conduct an initial appearance and to set bail for such person, or to accept bond for someone already in jail." Rule 1(b)(1) (emphasis added). As we recently admonished, "magistrates must follow the `on call' schedule in Rule 1 scrupulously." In re McCormick, 206 W.Va. 69, 78, 521 S.E.2d 792, 801 (1999).

Plaintiff Rogers argues that Rule 1(b)(1) is constitutionally deficient, in that it implicitly sanctions "gaps" in magistrate availability of up to fifteen hours in duration.⁵ More specifically, he asserts that this Court's decision in State ex rel. Harper v. Zegeer, 170 W.Va. 743, 296 S.E.2d 873 (1982), compels that we employ our rule-making⁶ and supervisory⁷ authority so as to impose a system of magistrate availability which insures that arrested persons are afforded an immediate initial appearance before a neutral judicial officer. In other words, Rogers contends that the constitutional and statutory right to prompt presentment necessitates that magistrates be available round the clock to conduct initial appearances. Although we are sensitive to the concerns expressed by the plaintiff in this case, we do not discern from Harper, or any of the other authority cited by Rogers, a constitutional imperative to abandon the scheme set forth in Rule 1(b)(1).

In Harper, the Court was confronted with the question of whether the criminal punishment of chronic alcoholics for public intoxication violated the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained in Article III, § 5 of the West Virginia Constitution. The Harper Court, in its initial opinion granting habeas corpus relief, held that while "[t]he State has a legitimate right to get [chronic alcoholics] off the streets or out of whatever public area in which they might be gamboling," the criminal punishment of such persons was nevertheless unconstitutional. 170 W.Va. at 749, 296 S.E.2d at 878. On rehearing, the Court in Harper was subsequently asked by the petitioner to "detail minimum constitutional requirements for jailing those arrested for public intoxication." Harper, 170 W.Va. at 752, 296 S.E.2d at 881. In broadly outlining existing procedures bearing upon the arrest and detention of alcoholics for public intoxication, the Court, in an addendum to its original opinion, spoke to the constitutional and statutory requirement of prompt presentment:

Presentment before a judicial officer before incarceration on a criminal charge is basic to due process. It has been a fundamental principle of English law since the affirmation of the Magna Carta by King John in 1215 that no freeman shall be imprisoned except as prescribed by the law of the land. The Magna Carta, which was confirmed some thirty times during the Middle Ages, 2 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law at 219 (7th ed.1956), is but of historical interest, but the constitutions of the United States and West Virginia and the fundamental concept of due process is the law under which we live today. U.S. Const. amend. V; W. Va. Const. art. 3, § 10. Also recognized in our organic law is the requirement of probable cause prior to the seizure of persons. U.S. Const. amend. IV; W. Va. Const. art. 3, § 6.

The Legislature, elaborating upon these guarantees of due process, enacted a statute in 1965 which requires that all executive law enforcement officers "making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint, or any person making an arrest without a warrant for an offense committed in his presence, shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before a [magistrate] of the county in which the arrest is made." (Emphasis added). W. Va.Code § 62-1-5. In State v. Mason, 162 W.Va. 297, 249 S.E.2d 793 (1978), we held that this statutory provision is mandatory. The requirement of prompt presentment after arrest for a judicial determination of probable cause is also mandated by Rule 5(a) of our Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that: "an officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before a magistrate within the county where the arrest is made." (Emphasis added). Thus, it is the law of West Virginia that no person may be imprisoned or incarcerated prior to presentment before a judicial officer and the issuance of a proper commitment order. The disposition of persons accused of crime is prescribed by law, not by the caprice of executive and judicial authorities.

Id. at 753, 296 S.E.2d at 883 (footnote omitted).

As we indicated in Harper, a variety of constitutional and statutory rights are vindicated by an initial appearance before a neutral judicial officer. The most immediate constitutional interest protected by a prompt initial appearance is the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, provided by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article III, § 6 of the West Virginia Constitution, which in this context requires that persons arrested without a warrant be promptly presented to a magistrate for a determination of probable cause prior to any extended period of incarceration. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95 S.Ct. 854, 863, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) (holding that Fourth Amendment requires a prompt judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to an extended pretrial detention following a warrantless arrest); see also State v. Persinger, 169 W.Va. 121, 134-35 & n. 12, 286 S.E.2d 261, 269-70 & n. 12 (1982).

A prompt initial appearance is likewise required under W. Va.Code § 62-1-5 (1997) and West Virginia Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a), both of which demand that an arrestee be brought before a judicial officer "without unnecessary delay." As this Court has observed, the purpose of these rules of procedure is "to ensure that the police do not use the delay to extract a confession from a...