Rogers v. City of Atlanta, CIVIL ACTION FILE NUMBER 1:16-cv-2578-TCB

214 F.Supp.3d 1314

Melva ROGERS, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF ATLANTA, George N. Turner, and James Burns, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION FILE NUMBER 1:16-cv-2578-TCB

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

Signed October 17, 2016

Samuel L. Starks, Shean Decarlos Williams, The Cochran Firm, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.

Tamara Nikki Baines, Department of Law, Atlanta, GA, Mary Aunita Prebula, Prebula & Associates LLC, Duluth, GA, for Defendants.

ORDER

Timothy C. Batten, Sr., United States District Judge

This case comes before the Court on Defendants the City of Atlanta and George Turner's (the "City Defendants") motion to dismiss [5] and Defendant James Burns's motion to stay [17].

I. Factual Background

In June 2016, Deravis Caine Rogers ("Rogers"), the son of Plaintiff Melva Rogers ("Plaintiff"), was shot and killed by Burns, an officer with the Atlanta Police Department ("APD"). Plaintiff filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Burns, the City of Atlanta, and APD Chief of Police George Turner. The factual recitation below is taken from the averments in Plaintiff's complaint, which are presumed to be true and viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff for purposes of the City Defendants' motion to dismiss. Powell v. Thomas , 643 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 2011).

On the night of the shooting, Burns was called to assist an off-duty APD officer who saw a suspicious person breaking into vehicles in the parking lot of an apartment complex. As Burns drove into the apartment complex, he observed a car driven by Rogers heading toward him. Burns activated his car's blue lights, chirped the siren, and positioned his patrol car in an attempt to stop Rogers's car. When the vehicle did not stop, Burns jumped out of his patrol car and fired his weapon into Roger's vehicle, fatally striking Rogers in the head.

Rogers was unarmed at the time. An APD investigation into the shooting determined that Burns shot into Rogers's vehicle without knowing if the driver was the same person suspected of breaking into cars at the apartment complex. The investigation further concluded that Burns violated APD policies and used excessive force by shooting into the vehicle.

In count one of the complaint, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for Defendants' violation of Rogers's rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Count two seeks exemplary damages for the same violations, which Plaintiff alleges were done with actual malice and with willful and wanton indifference to and deliberate disregard for Rogers's constitutional rights. Count three, captioned "violation of statutory civil rights (claim for compensatory damages)," alleges that Burns's shooting of Rogers was done with actual malice and with willful and wanton indifference to and deliberate disregard for Rogers's unspecified "statutory rights."

Count four asserts a § 1983 claim against the City of Atlanta pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). In support of this claim, Plaintiff alleges that the City maintains "persistent and widespread practice[s]" of (1) allowing APD officers to "cover up the use of excessive force despite the lawful authority to use such force," "use unreasonable and deadly force without justification," and "violate the [APD]'s own policies and procedures"; (2) "failing to properly train and supervise [APD] officers"; and (3) "ratifying and condoning the unlawful and illegal activity of [APD] officers." She further avers that the City was "aware of and deliberately indifferent to" these various problems, "thus creating a culture within the [APD] wherein violating citizen's [sic] civil rights was not only tolerated, but also encouraged." Finally, count five asserts a claim for attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

On August 31, 2016—after the filing of Plaintiff's complaint—Burns was indicted on charges (including felony murder) stemming from the shooting.

II. The City Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

A. Legal Standard

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Chaparro v. Carnival Corp. , 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012). This pleading standard does not require "detailed factual allegations," but it does demand "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. Under Rule 12(b)(6), a claim will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The Supreme Court has explained this standard as follows:

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal citation omitted). Thus, a claim will survive a motion to dismiss only if the factual allegations in the pleading are "enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

As noted above, when considering a motion to dismiss, the allegations in the pleading must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the pleader. Powell , 643 F.3d at 1302. But the Court need not accept as true "labels and conclusions," "formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action," nor legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal , 129 S.Ct. at 1949–50 ; Chaparro , 693 F.3d at 1337. Thus, evaluation of a motion to dismiss requires two steps: (1) eliminate any allegations in the pleading that are merely legal conclusions, and (2) where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, "assume their veracity and ... determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. at 1950.

B. Analysis

1. Plaintiff's Claims Against Turner

Plaintiff does not oppose the motion to dismiss insofar as it seeks dismissal of the individual-capacity claims against Turner, but she indicates that she would like to dismiss those claims without prejudice by motion. See [13] at 2. If that remains the case, Plaintiff is ordered to file a notice, stipulation, or motion—as appropriate under Rule 41(a)—by October 31, 2016. If she does not do so, the Court will treat the claims against Turner as having been abandoned and will dismiss those claims without prejudice. See LR 7.1(B); Holland v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. , 51 F.Supp.3d 1357, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2014).

In light of Plaintiff's representation that she does not intend to pursue any claims against Turner in his individual capacity at this time, and further because any official-capacity claims against Turner are tantamount to claims against the City, see Busby v. City of Orlando , 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991), the Court will address the remainder of the motion only insofar as it pertains to the City.

2. Plaintiff's Claim for Punitive Damages Against the City

The motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for exemplary damages against the City is both unopposed and meritorious. See Rollison v. Gwinnett County , 865 F.Supp. 1564, 1570 (N.D. Ga. 1994) ("Municipalities cannot be liable for punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."). That aspect of the motion will therefore be granted.

3. The City's Monell Liability

The balance of the motion seeks dismissal of the claims against the City on the ground that Plaintiff's complaint fails to meet "the rigorous standard set forth in Monell ...." [5] at 7. "As a municipality, the City cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations committed by its officers." Hoefling v. City of Miami , 811 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2016). Instead, a municipality is liable under § 1983 and Monell only where it "had a policy, custom, or practice that caused the deprivation" complained of. Id. Such liability may be established, among other ways, by showing that (1) the municipality's legislative body enacted an official policy on point, (2) final policymakers for the municipality "have acquiesced in a longstanding practice that constitutes the entity's standard operating procedure," or (3) someone with final policymaking authority adopts or ratifies the unconstitutional act or decision of a subordinate. Id.

The City's motion appears to conflate the differing standards governing motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. Indeed, the vast majority of the cases relied upon by the City involve a plaintiff's failure to adduce evidence to support a § 1983 claim, not a failure to adequately plead such a claim in the first instance.¹ At the pleading stage, as noted above, the burden is on the plaintiff not to conclusively prove the municipality's liability, but only to come forward with factual averments that are specific enough to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level," Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and "allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged," Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. It is well settled that these pleading standards apply in all civil cases and that § 1983 complaints need not satisfy any heightened pleading standard. Hoefling , 811 F.3d at 1276–77 ; see also Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics & Intelligence & Coordination Unit , 507 U.S. 163, 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993).

The complaint in this case adequately pleads facts that, if true, would allow a jury to conclude that Burns's use of deadly force was not justified under the circumstances. Although the City correctly points...