Rogers v. Hamilton

Latoya Rogers, Plaintiff, v. Michael Hamilton, Individually and as an Employee/Agent/Servant ofSouth Carolina State Association of Letter Carriers, Inc.,And National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO;South Carolina State Association Of Letter Carriers, Inc.,National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-2807

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DIVISION

June 14, 2021

ORDER AND OPINION

Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation ("R & R") of the Magistrate Judge (Dkt. No. 74) recommending the Court grant Defendants' partial motion to dismiss and remand Plaintiff's remaining state law claims. For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts the R & R as the Order of the Court.

I. Background

On December 18, 2021, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint bringing claims against Defendants for: (1) breach of the Fair Duty of Representation ("DFR") in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 159; (2) defamation; and (3) assault.¹ (Dkt. No. 63). Plaintiff is a letter carrier employed by the United States Postal Service ("USPS"). (Dkt. No. 63 at ¶ 63). Plaintiff is a member of Defendant National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO ("NALC") labor union. (Id. at ¶ 3). The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Hamilton is employed by the USPS and is thePresident and Union Representative of Branch 3902 of Defendant South Carolina State Association of Letter Carriers, Inc. ("SCSALC"), a branch of NALC that that incorporates Charleston, South Carolina. (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 8-9). The Amended Complaint alleges NALC and SCSALC (collectively the "Unions") are the exclusive bargaining representatives of all city letter carriers employed by the USPS in South Carolina. (Id. at ¶ 10).

Plaintiff was removed from her job as a letter carrier after her involvement in a car accident while completing her route on May 22, 2018. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-14). Plaintiff alleges her Union Representative, Defendant Hamilton, told her he would appeal her removal from the USPS. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-16). Plaintiff alleges that on September 17, 2018, she met with Defendant Hamilton to discuss her removal. (Id. at ¶ 22). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Hamilton pushed back his chair, leaned back, unbuckled his belt, and told Plaintiff performing a sexual act on him was what she needed to do for him to fulfill his obligations as a Union Representative. (Id. at ¶¶ 24-25). Plaintiff alleges she felt shocked, scared, intimidated, embarrassed, and humiliated, and she feared bodily harm from Defendant Hamilton. (Id. at ¶¶ 28-29). Plaintiff alleges that after the meeting, Defendant Hamilton called her and made sexual comments, stating she would have to give him sexual favors in exchange for his help getting her job back. (Id. at ¶¶ 33-36).

Plaintiff alleges on September 20, 2018 she reported Defendant Hamilton's conduct to the North Charleston Police Department. (Id. at ¶ 37). Plaintiff alleges her counsel sent Defendant SCSALC a certified letter dated later September 28, 2018 informing it of Defendant Hamilton's alleged sexual harassment. (Id. at ¶ 38). Plaintiff alleges Defendant SCSALC informed Defendant Hamilton in October 2018 about Plaintiff's allegations but failed to take steps to investigate or protect Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 40). Plaintiff alleges that in a letter dated December 3, 2018, Defendant NALC was again notified of Plaintiff's sexual harassment claims against Defendant Hamilton andPlaintiff's objections to Defendant Hamilton's involvement in her reinstatement. (Id. at ¶ 49). Plaintiff alleges the Unions took no action to investigate her harassment complaint. (Id. at ¶ 50).

Plaintiff alleges an arbitration hearing took place on December 4, 2018 that resulted in Plaintiff being reinstated as a letter carrier for the USPS. (Id. at ¶¶ 51-52). Plaintiff alleges she was placed in the same branch as Defendant Hamilton and was denied the ability to transfer. (Id. at ¶¶ 49-54). Plaintiff alleges that in January 2020, Defendant Hamilton made false statements about Plaintiff's work performance and false accusations about Plaintiff to get Plaintiff fired. (Id. at ¶¶ 58-59). Plaintiff alleges that she again informed management of Defendant Hamilton's previous and ongoing harassment. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that in March 2020, while driving on her letter carrier route, an unknown man stopped to inquire if she was the one making complaints about Hamilton. (Id. at ¶ 60). Plaintiff believes Defendant Hamilton requested that this person frighten and intimidate Plaintiff. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that around March 20, 2020, Defendant Hamilton threw a satchel of mail in a threatening manner to frighten and intimidate her. (Id. at ¶ 61). Plaintiff alleges the Unions breached the DFR by failing to fulfill Plaintiff's requests that grievances be filed against Defendant Hamilton. (Id. at ¶ 78).

On January 8, 2021, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's DFR claim failure to state a claim. (Dkt. No. 69). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition and Defendants filed a reply. (Dkt. Nos. 72, 73). On April 23, 2021, the Magistrate Judge issued an R & R recommending the Court grant Defendants' motion to dismiss and remand Plaintiff's remaining state law claims. On May 7, 2021, Plaintiff filed objections to the R & R. (Dkt. No. 75). On May 21, 2021, Defendants filed a response to Plaintiff's objections. (Dkt. No. 76). On June 4, 2021, Plaintiff filed a reply in support of her objections. (Dkt. No. 77). The matter is ripe for the Court's adjudication.

II. Legal Standard

The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court that has no presumptive weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The Court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). This Court must make a de novo determination of those portions of the R & R Plaintiff specifically objects. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Where Plaintiff fails to file any specific objections, "a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). In the absence of objections, the Court need not give any explanation for adopting the Magistrate Judge's analysis and recommendation. See, e.g., Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983) ("In the absence of objection . . . we do not believe that it requires any explanation."). Plaintiff filed objections and the R & R is reviewed de novo.

III. Discussion

Upon a careful review of the pleadings, briefing, the R & R, and objections to the R &R, the Court finds the Magistrate Judge comprehensively addressed the issues to conclude that Plaintiff's DFR claim is time-barred and that the allegations in the Amended Complaint fail to state a claim for violation of the DFR. Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge's findings. (Dkt. No. 75).

Pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Fair Labor Relations Act ("FLRA"), labor unions have the exclusive status of bargaining representative for its members and are held to a duty of fair representation ("DFR"). 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). Under the DFR, the exclusive agent's statutory authority to represent all members of a designated unit includes a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretionwith complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (NLRA provision prohibiting unfair practices by unions). "A breach of the [DFR] occurs only when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190. To be arbitrary, "a union's conduct toward its member must be so far outside a wide range of reasonableness as to be wholly irrational, and examination of a Union's performance must be highly deferential to allow unions ample latitude in the performance of their representative duties. Martin v. Potter, 69 Fed. Appx 108, 111 (4th Cir. 2003). To be considered discriminatory conduct, the discrimination must be "intentional severe, and unrelated to legitimate union objectives." Bakos v. American Airlines, Inc., 266 F. Supp.3d 729, 744 (E.D. Pa. 2017). To sustain a bad faith claim, a plaintiff must produce evidence that the union's conduct was grossly deficient. Martin, 60 Fed. Appx. at 111. In addition, a plaintiff must show that the alleged breach injured the plaintiff. Gullaksen v. United Air Lines, 68 F. Supp. 3d 66, 71 (D.D.C.).

There is a six-month statute of limitations period for DFR claims. Flowers v. Int'l Longshoreman's Ass'n Local 1422, No. 2:19-cv-00254-DCN-MGB, 2019 WL 6093255, at *7 (D.S.C. June 4, 2019), adopted by 2019 WL 3927444 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2019). The statute of limitations begins to run on a DFR claim when "the claimant discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the acts constituting the alleged violation." Walter Irving Banks v. International Union of Operating Engineers Local 99, 200 F. Supp. 3d 70, 74 (D.D.C. 2016). The claim arises when the plaintiff could first successfully maintain a suit based on that cause of action, or when the claimant discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the acts constituting the alleged violation. Gilfillan v. Celanese Ag, 24 F. Appx. 165, 167 (4th Cir. 2001). Generally, the claim arises when the plaintiff could firstsuccessfully maintain a suit based on that cause of action or when the claimant discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the acts constituting the alleged violation. Id. (internal...