Rogers v. Jarrett

63 F.4th 971

Kevion ROGERS, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. Jeffrey JARRETT; Jeremy Bridges; Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Defendants—Appellees.

No. 21-20200

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit

FILED March 30, 2023

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, USDC No. 4:19-CV-2330, George C. Hanks, Jr., U.S. District Judge

Matthew J. Kita, Dallas, TX, Damon E. Mathias, Mathias Raphael, P.L.L.C., Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Marlayna Marie Ellis, Office of the Attorney General, Law Enforcement Defense Division, Austin, TX, Ryan Baasch, Office of the Texas Attorney General, Solicitor General Division, Austin, TX, Jason T. Bramow, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Financial Litigation & Charitable Trusts Division, Austin, TX, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Wiener And Willett, Circuit Judges.

Don R. Willett, Circuit Judge:

A trusted prison inmate was working unsupervised in a hog barn when the ceiling collapsed, striking him in the head. He told the prison agricultural specialist that he needed medical attention. But the specialist thought the inmate looked no worse for wear and ordered him back to work. A short while later, the inmate asked another prison staffer for medical attention. The staffer radioed a supervisor. Based on the staffer's report, the supervisor, too, thought nothing serious had happened and did not immediately grant the request. The inmate's condition later worsened. He was sent to the hospital and diagnosed with a traumatic brain injury. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants based on qualified immunity. For the reasons below, we AFFIRM.

I

Kevion Rogers was a trusted inmate. Prison staff let Rogers work unsupervised and outside the prison's security fence. Rogers's daily job was to help take care of the prison's hogs. One day Rogers went into one of the prison's hog barns looking for a powder used to keep baby hogs healthy. As he was leaving, part of the barn's ceiling collapsed and hit him on the head. Rogers blacked out.

After he came to, another inmate took Rogers to see the prison's staff agricultural specialist, Jeffrey Jarrett. Rogers walked normally into Jarrett's office. And though Rogers "had dust on him," his only visible injury was a scraped knee. An agitated Rogers demanded "to go to the infirmary." But from Jarrett's perspective, Rogers "looked fine." Rogers didn't "look hurt," and spoke without a slur. Jarrett told Rogers to keep looking for the powder. Rogers walked normally out of the office. He did not see Jarrett again that morning. Jarrett's job responsibilities took him away from the prison to another unit.

Rogers tried to go on about his business. But he was "lightheaded" and had to sit down. Other inmates tried to keep him awake as he drifted "in and out of consciousness." Soon after another prison staffer arrived to get the inmates ready for lunch. Rogers told the staffer that "the ceiling collapsed on [his] head" and showed the staffer the "debris." Rogers again asked for medical attention. The staffer radioed Jarrett's supervisor, Jeremy Bridges, and informed him "that the ceiling had fallen on [Rogers's] head and that [Rogers] had sustained a head injury." Bridges radioed back to take Rogers "back to [his] bunk" so Bridges could "take a look at [him] later." But Rogers objected—he still wanted "to go eat lunch." Rogers's objection made Bridges think whatever injuries Rogers had were not "serious." Bridges radioed back that going to lunch was fine. He'd be out to check on Rogers "soon."

For whatever reason though, Rogers was still brought back to his bunk. By the time he reached his dormitory his condition had begun to deteriorate. His head and eyes had begun to swell, his face was bruising, and he was showing signs of respiratory distress. Prison staff at the dormitory thought this was "abnormal," and so Rogers was redirected to the prison's administrative building. He collapsed on the way there, began to "seize violently," and started "vomiting." Rogers "lost consciousness." Within minutes prison staff at the administrative building summoned medical assistance. Emergency medical services evacuated Rogers to a nearby hospital by helicopter. Hospital staff diagnosed Rogers with a "traumatic brain injury; no hemorrhage."¹

Rogers sued Jarrett, Bridges, and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in Texas state court. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Rogers alleged that prison staff violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by acting with deliberate indifference towards him. Under the Texas Tort Claims Act, Rogers alleged premises-liability claims. Defendants removed the case to federal court and moved for summary judgment on all claims. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on Rogers's § 1983 claims, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his TTCA claims, and remanded the case to state court. Rogers timely appealed. He argues that Jarrett and Bridges were deliberately indifferent towards his serious medical needs and thus not entitled to qualified immunity.²

II

We review summary judgment de novo.³ Courts may grant summary judgment on an issue only when "no genuine dispute as to any material fact" exists "and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."⁴ A fact dispute is "genuine" if "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for [the nonmovant] based on the evidence."⁵ "[W]e must view all evidence and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of [Rogers], the nonmovant."⁶ Still, "[c]onclusional allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation" do not count for raising a genuine fact dispute.⁷

III

Rogers contends that the district court improperly granted Jarrett and Bridges qualified immunity. We have explained before that plaintiffs bear the "burden" to "demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense."⁸ And Rogers had to meet that burden for each defendant.⁹ That means Rogers had to (1) raise a fact dispute on whether his constitutional rights were violated by the defendants' individual conduct, and (2) show those rights were "clearly established at the time of the violation."¹⁰ On this record, Rogers failed to meet either prong.

A

Rogers contends that he raised a fact dispute on a constitutional violation. He argues that both Jarrett and Bridges acted with deliberate indifference towards his serious medical needs, violating his Eighth Amendment rights in the process. But "[d]eliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet."¹¹ As the Supreme Court has explained, Rogers needed to raise a fact dispute on whether Jarrett and Bridges were each "aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists," and actually "dr[ew] the inference."¹² And serious harm isn't just any harm. Rogers's medical need had to be "so apparent that even laymen would recognize that care is required."¹³ The district court found "no evidence that would permit a jury to infer that Jarrett and Bridges had subjective knowledge of the severity of Rogers's condition." We agree with the district court.

A reasonable jury could not conclude on this record that either Jarrett or Bridges actually inferred that Rogers was at substantial risk of serious harm. As the district court noted, the record supports that both Jarrett and Bridges knew that Rogers had been hit in the head. But as recounted above, Jarrett did not perceive any apparent injury to Rogers other than a scraped knee. From Jarrett's perspective, Rogers was "look[ing] alright" and "[didn't] look hurt." Rogers "had dust on him," but did not have visible injuries, did not slur his speech, and walked normally into and out of Jarrett's office. The same goes for Bridges. All he knew about Rogers's injuries was what he'd been told over the radio: that Rogers "had sustained a head injury" after a ceiling collapse. But Bridges testified that he did not think it was a particularly severe injury since Rogers had requested "to go eat lunch" while he waited for Bridges to come see him. Indeed, Rogers did not develop severe symptoms—seizures, vomiting, and loss of consciousness—until later on. And once he did, prison staff rendered medical aid within minutes.

Rogers disagrees. He argues that fact disputes over what happened preclude summary judgment; that the district court misapplied the deliberate-indifference standard; and that Supreme Court and our caselaw compel a contrary conclusion. We are unconvinced.

First, Rogers argues "that there is a genuine issue of material fact in dispute as to what actually happened on the morning of the incident," precluding summary judgment under our decisions. But the district court analyzed Rogers's claim under his version of events. And Jarrett and Bridges do not dispute what they knew when. Rather, the only dispute on appeal is what inferences Jarrett and Bridges drew from what they knew. Because the inferences Rogers asks us to make are speculative, this argument fails.¹⁴

Second, Rogers argues that the district court misapplied the deliberate-indifference standard. In Rogers's view, "the ultimate question" that his claim turns on is "was [he] exposed to a 'substantial risk of serious harm' "? But that misstates the standard. It is not enough for Rogers to have raised a fact dispute on whether Jarrett and Bridges "actually drew the inference that [a] potential for harm existed," as Rogers argues. The Supreme Court was clear in Farmer v. Brennan: "an official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment."¹⁵ We have likewise been clear: "[L]iability attaches only if [officials] actually knew—not merely should have known—about the risk."¹⁶ Bottom line: Mere negligence is not enough.

Third,...