Rogers v. State

323 Ga.App. 647

747 S.E.2d 213

ROGERS

v.The STATE.

No. A13A0880.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

July 31, 2013.

Joseph Scott Key, McDonough, for Appellant.

James Alan Dooley, James David McDade, for Appellee.

BARNES, Presiding Judge.

After a bench trial, the trial court found Anthony Markette Rogers guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine. Rogers appeals, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the methamphetamine because his consent to search was the product of an unreasonably prolonged detention. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

“In reviewing a trial court's order on a motion to suppress, we construe the evidence most favorably to uphold the court's findings and judgment.” Humphreys v. State, 304 Ga.App. 365, 696 S.E.2d 400 (2010). Construed in that manner, the evidenceshows that on the night of March 27, 2007, an officer with the City of Douglasville Police Department was on patrol duty on Interstate 20. The officer was assigned to the F.I.N.D. (Felony Interception and Narcotics Detection) unit and had conducted “ thousands” of traffic stops over the course of his career, including many stops where the occupants were transporting illegal drugs. While parked in a stationary position perpendicular to the highway, the officer saw a vehicle pass his patrol car that failed to maintain its lane. The officer began following the vehicle, observed that it was weaving within its own lane of travel, and initiated a traffic stop.¹

When the officer approached the passenger side of the stopped vehicle, he noted that there were three occupants—a driver, a front seat passenger, and a rear seat passenger. The officer observed that the driver, later identified as Rogers, appeared nervous and was “moving around quite a bit inside [the] vehicle”; that the front seat passenger also appeared nervous, was sitting “like a statue” in his seat, and was attempting to avoid eye contact; and that the rear seat passenger appeared to be pretending to be asleep. The officer also observed that there were multiple air fresheners “strategically” placed throughout the vehicle,² which the officer testified was often an indicator of illegal drug activity.³ Additionally, the officer testified that he smelled the faint odor of burning or burnt marijuana coming from inside the vehicle, an odor that he was familiar with based on his 10 years of experience as a police officer.

The officer asked Rogers for his license and registration, had him step out of the vehicle, and patted him down for weapons. As the officer explained the reason for the traffic stop and inquired about his travel itinerary, Rogers appeared “excessively” nervous and was shaking and sweating despite the temperature being only about 55 degrees.

At that point, the officer walked back over to the vehicle, where the two passengers remained seated inside. The officer asked the two passengers to produce their driver's licenses and inquired about their travel itinerary. Neither passenger had any form of identification.

After briefly speaking with the passengers, the officer walked back over to where Rogers was standing. While completing a written warning citation for the traffic violation, the officer asked Rogers for consent to search the vehicle, which he provided.

After receiving Rogers's consent to search the vehicle, the officer had the other two passengers get out of the vehicle and patted them down for weapons. The officer then searched the vehicle and discovered 194.74 grams of methamphetamine hidden in a container under the front passenger seat. No marijuana was found.

Rogers and the two passengers were arrested and charged with trafficking in methamphetamine. Rogers moved to suppress the methamphetamine found in his vehicle, and at the hearing on the motion, the officer testified to the events as set out above. The State also introduced into evidence a recording of the traffic stop made from the video camera mounted inside the officer's patrol car. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and after a bench trial in which most of the evidence was stipulated to by Rogers, the court found him guilty of the charged offense. The trial court later denied Rogers's motion for new trial, resulting in this appeal.

In his sole enumeration of error, Rogers maintains that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Rogers does not contest that the officer had articulable suspicion for stopping his vehicle based on his failure to maintain his lane and weaving within his own lane of travel. See Steinberg v. State, 286 Ga.App. 417, 418–419(1), 650 S.E.2d 268 (2007) (failure to maintain lane provides officer with articulable suspicion to justify traffic stop); Veal v. State, 273 Ga.App. 47, 50, 614 S.E.2d 143 (2005) (“The police can stop drivers who engage in erratic driving behavior, even if it is simply weaving within a lane.”) (footnote omitted). Rather, he maintains that the officer unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop before requesting and receiving permission to search the vehicle, rendering his consent to search invalid as the product of an illegal detention. We are unpersuaded.

“The officer's purpose in an ordinary traffic stop is to enforce the laws of the roadway, and ordinarily to investigate the manner of driving with the intent to issue a citation or warning.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Richbow v. State, 293 Ga.App. 556, 558, 667 S.E.2d 418 (2008).

[T]o pass constitutional muster, the duration of a traffic stop cannot be unreasonably prolonged beyond the time required to fulfill the purpose of the stop. A reasonable time to conduct a traffic stop includes the time necessary to verify the driver's license, insurance, and registration, to complete any paperwork connected with the citation or a written warning, and to run a computer check for any outstanding arrest warrants for the driver or the passengers.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hall v. State, 306 Ga.App. 484, 486(2), 702 S.E.2d 483 (2010). While conducting these tasks, an officer is authorized to question the driver and passengers and even to “ ask ... questions wholly unrelated to the traffic stop ..., so long as the questioning does not prolong the stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete the purpose of the traffic stop.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Sommese v. State, 299 Ga.App. 664, 669(1)(b), 683 S.E.2d 642 (2009). See Young v. State, 310 Ga.App. 270, 272–273, 712 S.E.2d 652 (2011). Furthermore, as “an extension of the constitutionally valid detention resulting from the traffic stop,” an officer can order the driver and passengers out of the vehicle. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Sommese, 299 Ga.App. at 669(1)(a), 683 S.E.2d 642. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414–415, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997); State v. Williams, 264 Ga.App. 199, 203, 590 S.E.2d 151 (2003).

If an officer prolongs the traffic stop beyond the time reasonably required to fulfill the initial purpose of the stop, then the continued detention of the vehicle and its occupants amounts to a second detention. Richbow, 293 Ga.App. at 558, 667 S.E.2d 418. For the officer's continued detention of the vehicle and its occupants to be constitutionally valid, the officer must have a reasonable articulable suspicion of other illegal activity. Id. See Young, 310 Ga.App. at 272, 712 S.E.2d 652.

Here, the trial court was authorized to find from the facts as set out above that the officer did not unreasonably prolong the duration of the traffic stop before asking Rogers for consent to search his vehicle. There was evidence that...