Rohrback v. Commonwealth

JEFFREY ROHRBACK APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

2015-SC-000696-MR

Supreme Court of Kentucky

AUGUST 24, 2017

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

ON APPEAL FROM MASON CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE STOCKTON B. WOOD, JUDGE

NO. 14-CR-00058

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

AFFIRMING

Appellant, Jeffrey Lynn Rohrback, appeals from a judgment entered by the Mason Circuit Court pursuant to a conditional guilty plea to first-degree rape. For this offense, Rohrback was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. He appeals as a matter of right. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b). Rohrback alleges that the circuit court erred: 1) by denying his motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement; and 2) by denying his motion to enforce a plea agreement.

For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment and sentence of the Mason Circuit Court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 31, 2014, Maysville Police Department Detective Jered Muse visited Rohrback's apartment as part of an investigation into the alleged rapeand sexual abuse of a ten-year-old girl. Detective Muse requested that Rohrback accompany him to the police station, which was across the street from Rohrback's apartment. Rohrback agreed and the pair walked back to the police station for questioning.

At the beginning of the interview, Detective Muse informed Rohrback that he was free to leave and informed him of his Miranda rights. Approximately one hour into the interview, the topic of a polygraph examination came up. At that point, Rohrback stated that "I want to go. I want to leave." However, Detective Muse continued to question Rohrback. At the end of the interview, Detective Muse asked if he could photograph Rohrback's apartment. Rohrback agreed and the two walked over to the apartment together.

Several hours later, Rohrback returned to the lobby of the police station and requested to speak with Detective Muse. Once in the interview room, Detective Muse reminded Rohrback that he was free to leave at any time. Miranda warnings were not repeated by Detective Muse for Rohrback's second interview. After making several incriminating statements, Rohrback concluded the interview and returned home.

Shortly thereafter, Detective Muse again visited Rohrback's apartment and asked him if he was willing to write a letter of apology to the victim. Subsequently, Rohrback accompanied Detective Muse to the police station where he wrote a letter of apology, which included incriminating statements. After completing the letter, Rohrback was arrested by Detective Muse.

In April 2014, Rohrback was indicted by the Mason County grand jury for two counts of first-degree rape, two counts of first-degree sexual abuse, and for being a second-degree persistent felony offender. After indictment, Rohrback moved to suppress his oral and written statements to Detective Muse arguing that they were obtained in violation of "[his] Miranda Rights, Right to Counsel and Right to Remain Silent." The circuit court held a hearing to consider Rohrback's claims. After hearing testimony from Detective Muse, the circuit court concluded that Rohrback was not in custody when interviewed by the police and as such denied the motion to suppress.¹

After the denial of his motion to suppress, Rohrback withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a conditional guilty plea. Rohrback pled guilty to a single count of first-degree rape. The remaining charges were dismissed. For this offense, the Commonwealth recommended a total sentence of twenty years, and the circuit court sentenced Rohrback accordingly. Rohrback now appeals as a matter of right.

ANALYSIS

I. The Circuit Court Properly Denied Rohrback's Motion to Suppress.

Rohrback argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress.² Initially, he contends that his confessions to police should have been suppressed due to inadequate Miranda warnings. Rohrback also claims that the police failed to discontinue questioning when he requested to end the interview. We reject both arguments.

Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.27 governs motions to suppress evidence. Davis v. Commonwealth, 484 S.W.3d 288, 290 (Ky. 2016). RCr 8.27(2) mandates that the circuit court "conduct a hearing on the record and before trial on issues raised by a motion to suppress evidence." Appellate review of the circuit court's ruling on a suppression motion "is a two-step process that first reviews the factual findings of the trial court under a clearly erroneous standard." Welch v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 407, 409 (Ky. 2004) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996)).³ Second, the Court "reviews de novo the applicability of the law to the facts found." Id.

Having reviewed the circuit court's factual findings, we find that they are supported by substantial evidence. The circuit court's order accurately summarized each of Rohrback's interviews with the police. Accordingly, our review of the record establishes that the circuit court's factual conclusions are supported by the evidence. Moreover, we agree with the circuit court's legal conclusion that Rohrback was not in custody during any of the relevant times.

A. Rohrback Was Not in Custody for Miranda Purposes

Rohrback contends that Detective Muse gave him inadequate Miranda warnings which downplayed the availability of an attorney during the questioning.⁴ However, Rohrback was not even entitled to Miranda warnings as he was not in custody when questioned by police.

The Supreme Court "has determined that a suspect under custodial interrogation must be given notice of the right against self-incrimination, with such notice being contained in the Miranda warnings." Fugett v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 604, 616 (Ky. 2008) (citing United States v. Crossley, 224 F.3d 847, 861 (6th Cir. 2000)). Thus, the necessity of that notice arises from the fact that the suspect was subjected to a custodial interrogation. "It is the 'compulsive aspect of custodial interrogation, and not the strength or content of the government's suspicions at the time the questioning wasconducted' that implicates Miranda." United States v. Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, 704 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 346, 96 S. Ct. 1612, 1616 (1976)). Custodial interrogation has been defined as "questioning initiated by law enforcement after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom of action in any significant way." Fugett, 250 S.W.3d at 618 (quoting Commonwealth v. Lucas, 195 S.W.3d 403, 405 (Ky. 2006)).

"[T]he initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned." Jackson v. Commonwealth, 187 S.W.3d 300, 310 (Ky. 2006) (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 320, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1528-29 (1994)). "[T]he ultimate inquiry is simply whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Id. See also Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S. Ct. 457, 465 (1995). ("[W]ould a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave[?]"). Additionally, "[a] custody determination cannot be based on bright-line rules, but must be made only after considering the totality of the circumstances of each case." Jackson, 187 S.W.3d at 310.

Regarding the circumstances of Rohrback's first interview, Detective Muse went to Rohrback's home to ask if he would accompany him across the street to the police station for questioning. Subsequently, Rohrback voluntarily accompanied Detective Muse to the police station. Once in the interview room,Detective Muse informed Rohrback that he was free to leave at any time. There is no suggestion by Rohrback that he was restrained or threatened with the use of physical force during his interview. At the close of the interview, Rohrback left the police station without hindrance. After reviewing the totality of Rohrback's first interview, we cannot say that there was a restraint on his liberty to the degree associated with a formal arrest, as required to constitute custody. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S. Ct. 711, 714 (1977) (defendant was not in custody when questioned at police station, where he went voluntarily, was informed he was not under arrest, and was permitted to leave the station after his interview).

Nor was Rohrback in custody during his second interview with police. Not long after his first interview, Rohrback returned to the police station of his own volition and requested to speak with Detective Muse. After Rohrback and Detective Muse reentered the interview room, Detective Muse again reminded Rohrback that he was free to leave at any time. After a thirty-minute interview, Rohrback left the police station and walked home. A review of the totality of the circumstances clearly establishes Rohrback was not in custody during this second, voluntary encounter. See United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 1155, 1164 (5th Cir. 1993) (defendant not in custody where he "voluntarily appeared at the police station, gave the statement, and left the station of...