Roland v. City of N.Y.

HARRY ROLAND, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW YORK; JOHN DOE 1; JOHN DOE 2; ALEXANDER; JOSETTE McCLEAN; ERIC GONZALEZ; JOHN DOE 3; andLORNA McALLISTER, Defendants.

19-CV-2240 (PKC) (SMG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

June 4, 2019

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:

On April 12, 2019, Plaintiff Harry Roland ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, currently incarcerated at Upstate Correctional Facility, filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights during his post-arrest detention and his state criminal trial resulting from his July 22, 2016 arrest. Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants McAllister, Gonzalez, and McClean, as well as Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment claim, are dismissed. His § 1983 Fourth Amendment claims, based on Plaintiff's unlawful pretrial detention and prosecutorial use of jail telephone recordings allegations, will proceed.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was arrested without a warrant on July 22, 2016 for unspecified charges. (Complaint, Dkt. 1, at ECF¹ 6 ¶ 1.)² He arrived at Brooklyn Central Booking ("BCB") atapproximately 11:00 p.m. on July 22, 2016, but was not arraigned until July 26, 2016 at 4:30 p.m. (Id. at ECF 6-8 ¶¶ 2, 10, 13.) While at BCB, Plaintiff refused to submit to an iris scan and DNA sample.³ (Id. at ECF 6 ¶¶ 3-5.) As a result of these refusals, he was subjected to "bullpen therapy" (id. at ECF 7 ¶ 6), and his arraignment was postponed repeatedly, resulting in a post-arrest detention of nearly four days (88 hours) (id. at ECF 6-8 ¶¶ 2, 10, 13). Plaintiff was ultimately arraigned without submitting to the iris scan or providing a DNA sample. (Id. at ECF 8 ¶ 11.) Defendant Acting Justice Lorna McCallister remanded Plaintiff to the Rikers Island Correctional Facility ("Rikers Island"). (Id. at ECF 7 ¶ 10.)

While awaiting trial at Rikers Island, Plaintiff's telephone calls were monitored and recorded. (Id. at ECF 9 ¶ 5.) Plaintiff knew that his calls were being recorded, but believed that the monitoring and recording was done for security purposes. (Id.; see also id. (noting that Defendant Josette McClean, a Rikers Island investigator, testified at Plaintiff's trial that inmate phone calls were monitored for security purposes).) However, in addition to the monitoring done by Rikers Island for security purposes, the recordings of Plaintiff's phone calls were also used by the Office of the Kings County District Attorney ("DA's Office") for trial purposes. (See id. at ECF 9 ¶ 2 (noting that 14 months after Plaintiff was indicted, he "was handed a disk containing calls [Plaintiff] made at Rikers Island that the office of the Kings County District Attorney was planning to use against Roland at his upcoming trial").) At trial, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se,learned during his cross-examination of Defendant McClean that the DA's Office had subpoenaed Rikers Island for Plaintiff's recorded phone calls for a three-month period. (Id. at ECF 9 ¶¶ 3-4.) Neither Defendant McLean nor the DA's Office knew what information was contained in the calls before they were subpoenaed. (Id. at ECF 9 ¶ 4; see also id. ("McLean made it clear at [Plaintiff's] trial that her first time listening to the calls was the day of her testimony . . . .").) According to Plaintiff, the DA's Office sent the subpoena after it had sent "a notice of readiness for trial" to Plaintiff's attorney, so that neither Plaintiff nor his attorney were aware of the subpoena being issued. (Id. at ECF 10 ¶ 6.) Plaintiff seeks damages. (Id. at ECF 11.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a district court "shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Upon review, a district court shall dismiss a prisoner's complaint sua sponte if the complaint "is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 134 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that under the PLRA, sua sponte dismissals of frivolous prisoner complaints are not only permitted but mandatory). Likewise, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court shall dismiss an in forma pauperis action where it is satisfied that the action "(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

In reviewing a pro se complaint, the Court is required to read it liberally and interpret it as raising the strongest arguments it suggests. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). "Thisis particularly so when the pro se plaintiff alleges that [his] civil rights have been violated." Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant #1, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Courts must read pro se complaints with "special solicitude" and interpret them to raise the "strongest arguments that they suggest." Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-76 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, at the pleadings stage of the proceeding, the Court must assume the truth of "all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations in the complaint." Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-80 (2009)).

However, a complaint must plead enough facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Although "detailed factual allegations" are not required, "[a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (quotations and citations omitted). Similarly, a complaint is insufficient to state a claim "if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Id. (brackets and quotations omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Fourth Amendment Unlawful Pretrial Detention Claim

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Acting Justice Lorna McAllister, the three John Doe BCB Defendants, and Alexander, a BCB officer, violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights by delaying his arraignment after Plaintiff refused to submit to an iris scan or provide a DNA sample.(See Complaint, Dkt. 1, ECF 6-8 ¶¶ 3-11; see also id. at ECF 11.) Plaintiff brings his Fourth Amendment claim pursuant to § 1983. (Id. at ECF 11.)

A. Defendant McAllister

Plaintiff names Acting Justice Lorna McAllister as one of the defendants in this matter. (Id. at ECF 4.) "It is well settled that judges generally have absolute immunity from suits for money damages for their judicial actions." Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991), and Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225-26 (1988)). Plaintiff's claims against Defendant McAllister relate to her role in arraigning Plaintiff. (See Complaint, Dkt. 1, ECF 7 ¶ 10.) These actions were executed in her capacity as a judicial official. Furthermore, the absolute judicial immunity of the court and its members "is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice," nor can a judge "be deprived of immunity because the action [she] took was in error . . . or was in excess of [her] authority." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11, 13 (quotations and citations omitted). Thus, Acting Justice McAllister is entitled to absolute immunity and Plaintiff's claims against her are dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), 1915A(b)(2).

B. Defendants City of New York, Alexander, and John Does 1-3

"In the context of pretrial detention, the Supreme Court has held that, when there has been a warrantless arrest, the Fourth Amendment requires a prompt judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to an extended pretrial detention." Bryant v. City of New York, 404 F.3d 128, 136 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 917 (2017) (noting that a claim challenging pretrial detention, based on warrantless arrest and before a finding of probable cause, "fell within the scope of the Fourth Amendment") (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 106 (1975)). "[A] jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement . . . ." Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). In sum, "[w]hat is constitutionally required is that, except in extraordinary circumstances, the arrestee be given a hearing into probable cause for the arrest within 48 hours." Bryant, 404 F.3d at 138. "In New York, because probable cause determinations are made at arraignments, the Fourth Amendment thus requires that an arrestee be arraigned within 48 hours." Case v. City of New York, 233 F. Supp. 3d 372, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).

Plaintiff seeks damages under § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by failing to promptly arraign him. (Complaint, Dkt. 1, ECF 11.) The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was held for four days before he was arraigned (Complaint, Dkt. 1, ECF 6-8 ¶¶ 2, 10, 13) and that his pre-arraignment delays were punishment for his refusal to submit to iris scans and to DNA testing (id. at ECF 7 ¶¶ 5-6). Plaintiff further alleges that this conduct was pursuant to "a procedure the Department of Corrections like[s] to call 'BullPen Therapy.'...