Roldan v. City of Hallandale Beach

361 So.3d 348

Michael ROLDAN, Appellant, v. CITY OF HALLANDALE BEACH, Appellee.

No. 4D22-103

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[April 5, 2023]

Faudlin Pierre of Pierre Simon, LLC, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Jennifer Merino, City Attorney, City of Hallandale Beach, for appellee.

Andrea Flynn Mogensen of Law Office of Andrea Flynn Mogensen, P.A., Sarasota, for Amicus Curiae The Florida Center for Government Accountability, in support of appellant.

Ashley H. Lukis, GrayRobinson, P.A., Tallahassee, for Amicus Curiae Florida League of Cities, Inc., in support of appellee.

Forst, J.

Appellant Michael Roldan appeals from the trial court's final judgment wherein the trial court failed to award him attorney's fees in his public record enforcement action against Appellee City of Hallandale Beach ("the City"). On appeal, Roldan argues the trial court: (1) erred in finding Roldan's written public record request to the City's records custodian, standing alone, was not sufficient to serve as the "written notice identifying the public record request" required for entitlement to attorney's fees under section 119.12(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2019) ; and (2) erred in entering final judgment in the City's favor on Roldan's enforcement action, despite the City's concession that it unjustifiably delayed in producing the requested public records.

On the first argument, we affirm the trial court's finding that section 119.12(1)(b) requires a complainant to provide a separate "written notice identifying the public record request" before the plaintiff may recover attorney's fees in an enforcement action. However, to the extent the City conceded that it unjustifiably delayed in producing the requested public records, which required Roldan to file his enforcement action, we agree with Roldan that the final judgment should indicate the City's violation of the Public Records Act and that final judgment therefore should be entered in Roldan's favor. Thus, we vacate the final judgment and remand for entry of a new final judgment which includes these modifications.

Background

In May 2019, Roldan requested public records from the City of Hallandale Beach related to a law enforcement matter. Roldan emailed this request to the City's Police Department and the City Clerk, who serves as the City's records custodian. After five months without response, Roldan filed suit to enforce his request. Only then did the City produce the requested public records.

Even though the City had produced the requested public records, Roldan nevertheless pursued his enforcement action by filing a summary judgment motion arguing the City's unjustified delay in producing the requested public records violated the Public Records Act. Roldan also argued he was entitled to recover his attorney's fees under section 119.12(1), Florida Statutes (2019). Section 119.12(1) —titled "Attorney fees"—provides in pertinent part:

(1) If a civil action is filed against an agency to enforce the provisions of this chapter, the court shall assess and award the reasonable costs of enforcement, including reasonable attorney fees, against the responsible agency if the court determines that:

(a) The agency unlawfully refused to permit a public record to be inspected or copied; and

(b) The complainant provided written notice identifying the public record request to the agency's custodian of public records at least 5 business days before filing the civil action, except as provided under subsection (2). The notice period begins on the day the written notice of the request is received by the custodian of public records, excluding Saturday, Sunday, and legal holidays, and runs until 5 business days have elapsed.

§ 119.12(1), Fla. Stat. (2019).

The City conceded that its unjustified delay in producing the requested public records was unlawful, but argued that Roldan was not entitled to recover his attorney's fees under section 119.12(1). Specifically, the City argued that Roldan had failed to provide the City with a separate "written notice identifying the public record request" at least five days before filing suit, as section 119.12(1)(b) requires.

The trial court entered an order granting Roldan's summary judgment motion, but only to the extent of finding that the City's unjustified delay in producing the requested public records violated the Public Records Act. Specifically, the trial court found the City's failure to produce the requested public records until after the plaintiff had filed the lawsuit "constitute[d] an unlawful refusal to permit a public record to be inspected or copied." The trial court's order did not comment on Roldan's request for entitlement to recover his attorney's fees under section 119.12(1).

Roldan then filed a motion for final judgment requesting entitlement to recover his attorney's fees under section 119.12(1). Subsequently, the City filed its own summary judgment motion, arguing Roldan was not entitled to recover his attorney's fees under section 119.12(1).

At the hearing on the competing motions, the parties agreed that whether Roldan was entitled to recover his attorney's fees under section 119.12(1) hinged on a question of statutory interpretation, namely whether Roldan's sole communication with the City—his emailed public record request itself—satisfied section 119.12(1)(b) ’s requirement that he provide "written notice identifying the public record request."

Roldan argued that his emailed public record request satisfied this notice requirement. The City contended that section 119.12(1)(b) requires a later written notice that identifies a prior unsatisfied public record request. Thus, the City argued, Roldan's sole communication—his emailed public record request itself—was insufficient.

The trial court agreed with the City, holding that Roldan's email could not serve as both the public record request and the required "written notice identifying the public record request." Specifically, the trial court found:

[A] plain reading of [ section 119.12(1)(b) ] requires [Roldan] to establish that a written notice identifying the public record request was sent to the City. The Court further finds that [Roldan's] May 21, 2019[,] communication constitutes the public record request and is not the required ["]written notice identifying the public record request["] at least five days prior to filing of the suit.

This reading of the statute is further required when one considers subsection (2) which states, "[t]he complainant is not required to provide written notice of the public record request to the agency's custodian of public records as provided in paragraph (1)(b) if...." Since a request must be made in order for a plaintiff to have a cause of action in a civil complaint, there is no logical reading of [subsection] (2) that would permit [subsection] (1)(b) to be read as meaning that the written notice referenced is merely the public records request itself.

The Court then entered an order denying Roldan's motion for final judgment, granting the City's motion for summary judgment, and entering final judgment for the City. This appeal timely followed.

Analysis

This dispute requires us to determine whether a written public record request—without a separate later notice—satisfies section 119.12(1)(b) ’s requirement to "provide[ ] written notice identifying the public record request to the agency's custodian of public records at least 5 business days before filing the civil action" in order to recover attorney's fees under section 119.12(1). "Because the question presented solely involves interpretation of a statute, it is subject to de novo review." Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cnty. v. Survivors Charter Sch., Inc. , 3 So. 3d 1220, 1232 (Fla. 2009).

No court has interpreted section 119.12(1)(b). "In interpreting the statute, we follow the ‘supremacy-of-text principle’—namely, the principle that ‘[t]he words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means.’ " Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC , 308 So. 3d 942, 946 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012)). "[J]udges must ‘exhaust "all the textual and structural clues" ’ that bear on the meaning of a disputed text." Conage v. United States , 346 So. 3d 594, 598 (Fla. 2022) (quoting Alachua County v. Watson , 333 So. 3d 162, 169 (Fla. 2022) ). "The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole." Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. , 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997).

The purpose of the Public Records Act's attorney's fees provisions "is to encourage voluntary compliance with Florida's public records law, which gives effect to the state's policy ‘that all state, county, and municipal records shall be open for personal inspection by any person.’ " Office of State Att'y for the Thirteenth Jud. Cir. v. Gonzalez , 953 So. 2d 759, 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (quoting § 119.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2002) ).

Before 2017, plaintiffs seeking to enforce the Public Records Act could recover their reasonable attorney's fees and costs merely upon a court finding that an agency defendant had unlawfully withheld public records. See § 119.12, Fla. Stat. (2016).

In 2017, the legislature amended section 119.12 to add a second criterion—the plaintiff must have provided written notice identifying the public record request to the agency's custodian of public records at least five business days before filing the civil action, except under limited circumstances. See Ch. 2017-21, Laws of Fla. As presented above, the amended section 119.12(1) provides:

(1) If a civil action is filed against an agency to enforce the provisions of this chapter, the court shall assess and award the reasonable costs of enforcement,

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