Roldan v. Town of Cicero

LUIS ROLDAN, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF CICERO, et al., Defendants.

No. 17-cv-03707

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

August 19, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN F. KNESS United States District Judge

This § 1983 case arising from Plaintiff's arrest and (later vacated) conviction for aggravated sexual assault is now before the Court on Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff asserts four claims: (1) a Fourth Amendment claim for pretrial arrest and detention without probable cause; (2) a Fourteenth Amendment claim for violation of Plaintiff's right to due process resulting in his wrongful conviction; (3) a Monell claim alleging the Town of Cicero's pattern or practice of violating the constitutional rights resulted in his conviction; and (4) a state-law indemnification claim against the Town. (Dkt. 74.)

Defendants ask the Court, for various reasons, to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims. Although some of Defendants' current arguments do little more than restate positions the Court previously rejected, others are raised for the first time and have merit. More specifically, Plaintiff's claims against newly-added defendants Walberto Galarza and Frank Savaglio must be dismissed as time-barred. So too must Plaintiff's Monell claim be dismissed, as Plaintiff has not adequately alleged a widespread pattern or practice of constitutional violations. Conversely Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the remaining defendants must be allowed to proceed for largely the same reasons set forth in this Court's previous opinions. Accordingly, and as explained more fully below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

Because the Court has set forth the alleged facts in this case in two earlier opinions on motions to dismiss (Dkt. 35, Dkt. 53), this background section will focus on information that is new to the Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. 74). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court must “accept as true all of the well-pleaded facts in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Calderon-Ramirez v. McCament, 877 F.3d 272, 274 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 480-81 (7th Cir. 2016)). Thus, the following recitation is drawn from the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint, which the Court must accept as true.

On March 6, 2011, Plaintiff Luis Roldan, who was then 21 years old, spent the day playing drinking games and having sex with an underage girl named “J.T.” (Dkt. 74 ¶¶ 50, 51, 53, 55.) Plaintiff's hedonic escapade began at a movie theater in Cicero, where Plaintiff, his friend Abraham Ramos, another individual named Yesenia, and J.T. tried to decide on what movie to watch. (Id. ¶¶ 47-48.) Failing at that task, the group went to Ramos's aunt's house and began drinking. (Id. ¶¶ 48-51.) Soon they ran out of liquor. So the group went to Walgreen's, where Plaintiff and J.T. had sex in Plaintiff's car. (Id. ¶¶ 52-53, 55.) After returning to Ramos's aunt's house, J.T. and Ramos had sex as well. (Id. ¶ 58.) Soon afterwards, J.T.'s parents arrived at the home and found their daughter, who was apparently unconscious. (Id. ¶ 59.) J.T.'s parents then called the police. (Id.)

Sergeant Frank Savaglio and Detective Walberto Galarza of the Cicero Police Department responded. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 35.) After a brief investigation that included questioning Plaintiff and another witness who was present in the neighborhood, one of the officers-Plaintiff does not allege who-arrested Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 30-41.) Back at the police station, Detectives Eduardo Zamora and Alfred Auriemma interviewed J.T., who told them she did not remember anything after going to the movie theater. (Id. ¶ 42.)^[1] J.T. also told medical personnel that she remembered drinking, but that she was not sexually active and did not recall having sexual intercourse that day. (Id. ¶¶ 23-25.) Medical personnel noted the absence of any signs of trauma or defense wounds. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 28.) Despite this lack of evidence, Plaintiff and Ramos were charged with criminal sexual assault. (Id. ¶¶ 46, 61.)

Plaintiff says Defendants, lacking a warrant or probable cause, conspired to press a criminal sexual assault case against Plaintiff by fabricating evidence against him. (Id. ¶¶ 75-80.) Defendants “prepared police reports containing false account [sic] of how and where plaintiff was placed under arrest” and “communicated the false narrative to the prosecutors which resulted in plaintiff's wrongful detention and prosecution for the crime he did not commit.” (Id. ¶ 80; see also id. ¶¶ 88, 91 (alleging Defendants “used the fabricated evidence against the plaintiff” including “falsified” police reports).) Further, to secure J.T.'s testimony, Defendants entered “an agreement or an understanding between [Defendants] and J.T. and her family whereby the defendants agreed to certify to the [United States Customs and Immigration Services] J.T.'s status as a victim . . . to qualify her as a victim” for the purposes of obtaining a U-Visa. (Id. ¶ 97.) According to Plaintiff, a U-Visa would have permitted J.T. to remain in the United States. (Id.) Defendants, however, failed to disclose that agreement to Plaintiff before or during his criminal trial. (Id. ¶ 108.)

After a bench trial, Plaintiff and Ramos were found guilty and sentenced to, respectively, 8 and 12 years of incarceration. (Id. ¶ 61.) On September 14, 2015, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed Plaintiff's conviction and held the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove Plaintiff's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. ¶¶ 62, 64.) Five months later, the same court reached the same result as to Ramos. (Id. ¶ 63.)

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 17, 2017, Plaintiff, who was incarcerated for three years before his sexual assault conviction was overturned on appeal, filed this action against eight defendants―four individual officers, the Town of Cicero, Cook County, and an Assistant State's Attorney. (Dkt. 1.) Plaintiff alleged that the officers arrested him without probable cause in violation of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. (Id. ¶ 45.) Plaintiff also alleged that that he was wrongfully convicted because Defendants concealed Brady/Giglio material^[2] in violation of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. (Id. ¶¶ 2-3.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleged Defendants failed to disclose that J.T. believed, based on Defendants' representations, that she would receive assistance with a U-Visa (which provides temporary legal status and work eligibility in the United States) in exchange for her testimony. (Id. ¶ 39.) Plaintiff further alleged that J.T.'s statement to the officers amounted to fabricated evidence because the statement was improperly obtained. (Id. ¶¶ 37-39.) Finally, Plaintiff included a Monell claim alleging that the Town of Cicero and Cook County engaged in a pattern and practice of depriving criminal defendants of their constitutional rights. (Id. ¶ 123.)

Defendants moved to dismiss. (Dkt. 25 (Cook County defendants); Dkt. 28 (Town of Cicero defendants).) The Court, by the previously assigned judge, granted the motions and dismissed the case without prejudice. (Dkt. 35.) Regarding the Fourth Amendment claim, the Court rejected it because Plaintiff's allegation that the officers lacked probable cause was “conclusory.” (Id. at 10.) As to the Fourteenth Amendment claim, the Court explained that Plaintiff failed to allege defendants had an “agreement or understanding” with J.T. regarding the U-Visa. (Id. at 7.) Further, the Court dismissed the fabrication of evidence claim because “[e]ven when a plaintiff alleges that an officer coerced a witness to give an incriminating statement, that is not enough to establish that the officer fabricated evidence[.]” (Id. at 8 (citing Avery v. City of Milwaukee, 847 F.3d 433, 439 (7th Cir. 2017)).) Finally, the Court dismissed the Monell claim because the dismissal of Plaintiff's other claims meant that he had not made out an underlying constitutional violation. (Id. at 12-13.) Because this was Defendants' first motion to dismiss, the Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice.

Seeking to cure the defects of his initial complaint, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (Dkt. 36.) To establish a Fourth Amendment violation, Plaintiff alleged the individual Defendants (1) “prepared police reports containing false account [sic] of how and where [P]laintiff was placed under arrest”; (2) “attested through the official police reports regarding the false account of the circumstances of [P]laintiff's arrest”; and (3) “communicated the false narrative to prosecutors which resulted in [P]laintiff's wrongful detention and prosecution.” (Id. ¶ 71.) To show Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment as well, Plaintiff claimed Defendants reached an undisclosed agreement with J.T. to facilitate her application for a U-Visa in exchange for her testimony. (Id. ¶¶ 83-84.)

Defendants moved to dismiss again. (Dkt. 41.) Defendants contended that Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment violation allegations remained conclusory. (Id.) Further, Defendants argued that Plaintiff failed to allege a Fourth Amendment “seizure” because he was released on bail rather than detained before trial. (Id. at 6.) As to the Fourteenth Amendment claim, Defendants argued that Plaintiff had not adequately alleged that Defendants agreed to certify J.T.'s status as a victim and that Defendants were precluded by law from disclosing to Plaintiff J.T.'s U-Visa status. (Id. at 8-9.) Because neither the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment claim would survive if the Court accepted those arguments, Defendants argued, the Monell claim and...