Rolle v. Essex Cnty. Corr. Facility

KEVIN DION ROLLE JR., Plaintiff, v. ESSEX COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 21-15198 (KM) (AME)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

April 7, 2022

OPINION

KEVIN MCNULTY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Pro se Plaintiff Kevin Dion Rolle., Jr. seeks to pursue a civil rights claim pursuant to 42 § U.S.C. 1983, a New Jersey Civil Rights Act claim, and a state claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Essex County Correctional Facility (“ECCF”), Essex County, New Jersey, the United States Marshals Service, and the United States Department of Justice. (DE 1.)^[1] Plaintiff also seeks to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). I denied Plaintiff's first IFP request without prejudice and administratively terminated the action because the request listed $30, 000 in income and failed to include a certified account statement. (DE 3.) Plaintiff now seeks to reopen this matter and renews his request for IFP status. (DE 4.) He also seeks the appointment of pro bono counsel. (DE 2.) For the reasons below, I will grant IFP status, permit some of the Complaint to proceed, and appoint pro bono counsel.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee at ECCF from January to May 2021. (DE 1 at 7.) During that time, he was generally housed in a two-man cell. (Id.) Beginning March 28, 2021, a new cellmate began to subject Plaintiff to “comments of a violent and sexual nature.” (Id.) Plaintiff complained numerous times to ECCF staff that he felt unsafe. (Id.) On April 6, 2021, Plaintiff's cellmate physically and sexually assaulted him. (Id.) Plaintiff contracted a sexually transmitted infection and suffers from stress, anxiety, and suicidal ideations because of the attack. (Id.)

According to Plaintiff, ECCF officials violated numerous Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) provisions. (Id. at 8.) These include the requirement of screening for gay, bisexual, transgender, or gender-nonconforming individuals who may be at greater risk of assault, ^[2] and consideration for cell and unit transfers because of harassment or fear for an inmate's safety. (Id.)

Plaintiff also alleges that prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment^[3] through their deliberate indifference to the risks posed by his cellmate, who had known violent propensities. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that ECCF officials then retaliated against Plaintiff for PREA complaints by isolating him in segregated housing for 17 days, blocking access to medical and mental health treatment telephones, tablets, commissary, and recreation, and communicating information to gang leaders regarding Plaintiff's sexuality that placed Plaintiff at even greater risk of harm. (Id.)

Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, and a New Jersey state tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

II. DISCUSSION

A. New IFP application

Plaintiff's new IFP application explains that he has attempted, unsuccessfully, to obtain an account statement and certification from three separate MDC officials. (DE 4 at 2.) Plaintiff also explains that the $30, 000 was income from the year prior to his incarceration, and that he has received no income since January 2021. (Id.). He also certifies that he is not employed at MDC, and does not have a checking or savings account or other property. (Id. at 5.) Based on this new information, I will grant Plaintiff's IFP application. See Thompson v. Cheatham Cty. Jail, No. 3:18-CV-00227, 2018 WL 1920415, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 24, 2018) (granting IFP application in light of attempts to obtain certified inmate account statements).

I do note that Plaintiff appears to have been transferred to FCI Hazelton in West Virginia to serve his federal sentence (see n.1, supra), and thus could seek to obtain his certified account statement from the officials there. I also note that early in his criminal proceedings, a Bahamian school, “Cherub College, ” wrote to certify that it would guarantee Plaintiff's bail up to $1.3 million, suggesting-at that point, at least-that Plaintiff had access to additional funds. (SDNY Docket No. 20-CR-594 at ¶ 43.) That said, in seeking Plaintiff's assets to satisfy the $1.5 million judgment against him after his guilty plea, even federal prosecutors could locate only $1, 617.55 and various luggage and electronics, and Judge Nathan ordered those seized to satisfy the judgment. (Id. at DE 106-1.) Accordingly, I am satisfied that Plaintiff's application merits IFP status.^[4] Having granted IFP status, I will screen his Complaint.

B. Complaint

1. Screening Standard

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in which a plaintiff is proceeding IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 Fed.Appx. 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)). That standard is set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), as explicated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. To survive the court's screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege ‘sufficient factual matter' to show that the claim is facially plausible. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Pro se pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep't, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

2. ECCF

Plaintiff first names ECCF as a defendant. However, ECCF is not a “person” subject to 1983 liability. See Owens v. Armstrong, 171 F.Supp.3d 316, 337 (D.N.J. 2016) (citing Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F.Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1989)). Accordingly, I will dismiss the claims against ECCF with prejudice. The proper defendant for a claim based on the actions of ECCF would be Essex County, which is also named in the complaint. See infra.

3. New Jersey

Plaintiff next names the State of New Jersey, which is immune from suit. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” That language has been interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court to encompass a more general immunity from suit: “[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). Section 1983 does not override a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Gromek v. Maenza, 614 Fed.Appx. 42, 44 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979)). Accordingly, I will also dismiss the claims against New Jersey with prejudice.

4. Federal Defendants

Also immune are the federal Defendants, the USMS and the DOJ. The United States is not subject to suit for constitutional torts, including the civil rights claims Plaintiff seeks to raise, because it is entitled to absolute sovereign immunity absent an explicit congressional waiver. FDIC v Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 687 (1949) (sovereign immunity...